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  Armed Conflicts Report

Colombia (1964 - first combat deaths) 
Update: January 2009

Summary
Type of Conflict
Parties to the Conflict
Status of the Fighting
Number of Deaths
Political Developments
Background
Arms Sources

Economic Factors


Summary:

2008 Negotiations between FARC (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia) rebels and the government continued throughout 2008. Concern over Ingrid Betancourt, a high profile hostage and other hostages remained high throughout 2008. In a blow to the rebel groups, the government rescued Betancourt and 14 other hostages in mid-2008. Sporadic fighting between the government and the rebel groups continued throughout the year, with approximately 70 civilians, rebels and police officers dying. After the death of three top FARC officials in 2008, the Ejercito de Liberacion National (ELN) and FARC talked about a guerilla alliance, reducing fighting between the two rebel groups. A Colombian airstrike in Ecuador caused instability in the region between countries, but by August relations, although strained, were operating normally. The U.S has pledged to assist the Colombian government in 2009 with a campaign against ELN.

2007 The two main rebel groups, FARC (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionaries de Colombia) and ENL (Ejercito de Liberacion National), continued to fight a brutal turf war, causing the death of over 100 people and displacing thousands more. The Uribe government has been mired in scandal since the discovery of numerous links between murderous paramilitary groups and high-ranking government officials. Despite a fifth round of peacekeeping talks between the ENL and the government, prospects for sustainable peace are unclear. FARC released video footage of kidnapped 2002 Presidential candidate Ingrid Betantcourt, the first to have been released in years. The government believes the footage depicts evidence that Betancourt had been tortured and also demonstrates that three prominent American hostages are sill alive.

2006 Levels of violence de-escalated, although periodic attacks and military clashes continued throughout the year, mainly between the FARC (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia) rebels and the government, resulting in the deaths of 160 people and the displacement of over 2,500. President Uribe was re-elected for a second term in May. The ENL (Ejercito de Liberacion Nacional) agreed to a formal peace process, while negotiations for a hostage exchange between FARC and the government collapsed after an incident of violence blamed on the FARC. The process to demobilize paramilitary fighters continued, and early in the year Uribe declared that the AUC (United Self-Defense Forces) ceased to exist. Uribe’s government came under criticism later in the year for alleged connections to paramilitary warlords.

2005 Fighting between FARC rebels and the Colombian government escalated following a government offensive early in the year. After four years, the UN ended its mediation efforts between the FARC and the government. The paramilitary group, the AUC, continued to disarm as the Colombian congress approved a demobilization framework that reduces sentences for paramilitaries that voluntarily disarm. Preliminary talks began in Cuba for peace talks in early 2006 between the Colombian government and the ELN.

2004 Fighting between rebels, paramilitaries and government security forces and attacks on civilian targets continued as estimated conflict deaths totalled between 3,000 and 4,000, the majority civilian. FARC rebels fought under a new leader, known as Alfanso Cano and US involvement in Colombia increased substantially in 2004. The AUC paramilitaries demobilized nearly 3,000 troops by year-end, and the government set aside two “safe havens” for other AUC troops while they await demobilization

2003 Fighting between rebels and government security forces continued unabated in spite of promising developments, including the initiation of disarmament efforts by the main paramilitary group, the United Self-Defense Forces (AUC). Intensified government counterinsurgency, assisted by US military equipment and training, led the two largest rebel groups, FARC and ELN, to announce their intention to join forces to fight their common opponent. As many as 4,000 people may have been killed in the conflict in 2003, most of them civilians.

2002 The new government of President Alvaro Uribe was elected in May and vowed to intensify its military response to the civil war. The conflict killed approximately 3,500 people this year, many of them civilians.

2001 Fighting intensified again in 2001 between all sides in the conflict – government troops, rebel guerrillas, and paramilitaries – and combatant and civilian deaths increased to at least 1,400. An August law which gave the military sweeping new powers was suggested as a reason for the increase in fighting. Prospects for peace were dim by the end of 2001.

2000 Fighting between government forces and rebels and paramilitary killings of civilians intensified following US President Clinton’s visit to Colombia in August. An independent group reported 1,200 deaths by the end of the year.

1999 Conflict violence increased as government forces clashed with rebel groups, while failing to halt – and even supporting – the operations of paramilitary groups. Most of the year=s 2,000 to 3,000 conflict deaths were at the hands of non-state agents.

1998 Following peace hopes raised by a secret July meeting between president-elect Andres Pastrana and FARC and meetings between ELN and Colombian civil leaders in Germany a week later, a major rebel offensive in August renewed conflict violence. Major clashes between rebels and government troops and paramilitary attacks on civilians killed between 2,000 and 4,000 people during 1998, possibly a decline from 1997. Estimates of the death toll since 1964 are not available, but as many as 40,000 people have died in the fighting and related political violence since 1986.

Type of Conflict:

State control

Parties to the Conflict:

1) Colombian Government, led by President Alvaro Uribe who was reelected in May 2006 in elections that were generally considered free and fair. The Colombian security forces include the following:
(a) Armed Forces, which total approximately 225,000 troops;
(b) National Police, which total approximately 120,000 officers; and
(c) “Peasant Soldiers”, an initiative introduced by President Uribe in 2003, which involves young men, armed and trained by the government, remaining in their local villages and towns to serve their compulsory military service. Government officials argue that this approach would allow professional soldiers to deploy elsewhere, while at the same time supposedly ensuring the security of distant towns.

“In May 2006 independent presidential candidate Alvaro Uribe was reelected in elections that were considered generally free and fair. The 44-year internal armed conflict continued between the government and terrorist organizations, particularly the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and the National Liberation Army (ELN). While civilian authorities generally maintained effective control of the security forces, there were instances in which elements of the security forces acted in violation of state policy. Although problems remained, the government's respect for human rights continued to improve, which was particularly evidenced by progress in implementing the Justice and Peace Law (JPL)." [2008 Human Rights Reports: Colombia. Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, U.S. Department of State, 2009.]

"Garcia is a ‘peasant soldier,’ one of 18,000 the government plans to deploy this year. The program represents a new way for Colombia’s young men to complete mandatory military service, by remaining in home towns that for decades have been the primary battlefields of the country’s civil war. ... In the past month, nearly 6,000 peasant soldiers have been deployed, bringing a permanent government security presence to 133 towns for the first time. Their training emphasizes social outreach over military tactics, but the program has recalled for many human rights organizations the government-sanctioned community defense groups of the late 1990s that, in some cases, evolved into anti-guerrilla death squads." [washingtonpost.com, March 13, 2003]

b) The United States Government.
By the end of 2003, the US had contributed approximately $2 billion in aid to Colombia, mostly as military assistance. It also contributed 400 troops to train Colombian military personnel in anti-terrorist tactics. Congress set a limit of 400 on the number of US military personnel permitted in Colombia at one time; however, this limit was surpassed when US specialized forces were deployed to assist in the search for American civilians taken hostage by guerrilla fighters.

The US significantly increased its commitment to Colombia in 2004, doubling US troops, increasing its annual aid package to over $570 million and adding 200 civilian contract personnel. The US also stepped up direct involvement in the conflict by indicting and issuing extradition warrants for 23 members of rebel and paramilitary forces on drug and terrorism charges. It interfered with a planned government prisoner exchange with rebel groups by stating that if Colombia released prisoners, the US would press charges and ask for them to be extradited. In 2006, Amnesty International USA reports that US aid to Colombia was estimated at $728 million, about 80% of which was directed towards military and police support.

“Colombia has been one of the largest recipients of US military aid for well over a decade and the largest in the western hemisphere. Since 1994, AIUSA has called for a complete cut off of all US military aid until human rights conditions improve and impunity is tackled. Yet torture, massacres, "disappearances" and killings of non-combatants are widespread and collusion between the armed forces and paramilitary groups continues to this day. In 2006, US assistance to Colombia amounted to an estimated $728 million, approximately 80% of which was military and police assistance.” [Amnesty International USA website, http://www.amnestyusa.org/all-countries/colombia/us-military-aid-to-colombia/page.do?id=1101863 , accessed 2 June 2009]

"A $574.6 million US government assistance package to Colombia for 2004 was approved by Congress in late January making Colombia the third largest recipient and signaling Washington’s deepening involvement in the country’s 40-year internal conflict. The assistance is up from last year’s $526 million package…$110 for military training and equipment purchases…$463 million to fight the war on drugs…$1.6 million to train Colombian forces…" [Jane’s Defence Weekly, February 4, 2004]

"President Bush this week used his authority to exceed congressional limits on the number of U.S. military personnel allowed to be in Colombia, sending as many as 150 additional specialized troops to assist in the rescue of three American civilians believed to be in the hands of guerrillas since their plane crashed in a rebel-held area last week, senior administration officials said. ... The Bush administration last year extended the U.S. military mission in Colombia from anti-drug activities to assistance in the country’s long-running counterinsurgency wars. It justified the change, after the Sept. 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, with the designation of Colombia’s right-wing paramilitary army and two leftist guerrilla groups as international terrorists ... The change allowed U.S.-supplied equipment and intelligence, and American-trained Colombian troops, to be used in counterinsurgency operations for the first time. The United States has provided nearly $2 billion in largely military assistance to Colombia since fiscal 2001; the 2003 budget just passed by Congress adds approximately $500 million. ... Under the restrictions ... no more than 400 U.S. military personnel can be present in Colombia at any given time... U.S. citizens working under U.S. government contract are also limited to 400." [washingtonpost.com, February 22, 2003]

2) Paramilitary groups.
Paramilitary groups were formed in the 1980s to protect landowners from the leftist rebel fighters who often extracted “revolutionary taxes” from local populations. The paramilitaries received funding and arms from the government’s security forces in their fight against the rebels. In order to finance their activities, paramilitary groups became involved in Colombia’s lucrative drug trade. In 2002, President Uribe declared the groups illegal and undertook efforts to defeat or disarm them.

The AUC (United Self-Defense Forces) was Colombia’s largest paramilitary group with over 10,000 combatants, and was led by Carlos Castano. Following the AUC’s decision to enter into peace talks with the government in 2002, several militant factions separated from the main group, intent on continuing their armed campaign against the rebels. In April 2006 it was announced that the AUC had officially ceased to exist, though the organization continues to be referenced in discussions about paramilitary groups and the demobilization process.

“High Commissioner for Peace Luis Carlos Restrepo announced in April 2006 that more that 30, 000 paramilitary combatants had demobilized since late 2003, and the Self-Defence Forces of Colombia (AUC) had officially ceased to exist.” [United States Institute for Peace Special Report, August, 2006]

"Members of the [AUC] militia have been accused of some of the worst human rights crimes in the nation’s 39-year-old civil war - including massacring civilians they believed to be collaborators with the rebels. ... The militia is also accused of trafficking in drugs to finance its fight. Mr. Castano and two other paramilitary leaders were indicted in the United States in September on charges of exporting 17 tons of cocaine to the United States and Europe since 1997." [The Washington Times, July 23, 2003]

"In December [2002], a large swath of the United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia, or AUC, ... declared a cease-fire as the start of a peace process with Uribe’s government. But some AUC factions, such as those in the Medellin area and on the border with Panama, have refused to join the negotiations ..." [latimes.com, June 9, 2003]

3) Leftist Guerilla Groups:

(a) Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC), the largest group, consisting of 18,000 fighters; FARC’s longtime leader Manuel Marulanry, dead or soon to die of cancer, was replaced by former head of FARC ideology Guillermo Saenz, known as Alfanso Cano, in 2004.

(b) Ejercito de Liberacion Nacional (ELN), which comprises 3,500 fighters; and

(c) A dozen smaller revolutionary groups, the most well-known being Ejercito Popular de Liberacion (EPL).

"Colombia's largest rebel group, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (Farc) is said to have a new leader. Senator Jaime Dussan, of the left-wing Democratic Poll, said Farc commanders contacted the party and informed them that the new leader was Alfonso Cano. Cano's real name is Guillermo Leon Saenz and he has been the ideological head of the guerrilla army. Long-time leader Manuel Marulanda has died or is about to die of prostate cancer, say intelligence sources. The news marks the end of an era for the Farc, one of the world's richest and most powerful guerrilla armies." [BBC News, June 12, 2004]

"The FARC’s 18,000 armed members and the ELN’s 3,000 to 5,000 fighters rely on ... support from urban networks, which frequently mastermind kidnappings for ransom, arrange arms shipments and collect profits from a drug trade that is the primary target of a $1.3 billion U.S. aid package to Colombia." [washingtonpost.com, October 24, 2002]

Status of Fighting:

2008 Fighting resulted in the death of approximately 70 people in Colombia in 2008. Fighting occurred between the FARC and the government and ELN and the government. Uprisings of farmers and aborigines also caused deaths, as did FARC attacks on civilian targets. FARC Number Two Raul Reyes was killed in 2008, as was another influential commander, sparking ELN to approach FARC with a guerrilla alliance proposal.

2007 Fighting between FARC and ELN throughout the year resulted in the death of over 100 civilians and the displacement of thousands more. Despite a fifth round of peace talks with the government, ELN has continued to battle a brutal turf war with FARC over control of key cocaine export channels. A local community leader, Yolanda Izquierda was murdered by Colombian gunmen, resulting in increased skepticism of reports from the Uribe government that violence is beginning to subside.

“Colombian gunmen killed a community leader who represented victims of paramilitary violence after she received threats warning her against seeking justice from disarmed militia bosses, authorities said. Rights groups said Yolanda Izquierda’s murder underscored intimidation facing victims of paramilitaries, who critics say have kept criminal networks intact even after disarming under a peace deal to end their part in the four-decade conflict. Colombian President Alvaro Uribe, a US ally fending off a scandal tying some of his congressional allies to the paramilitaries, ordered police to beef up protection of leaders of victims organizations and offered a $20 000 reward for the killers.” [Reuters, 01 February 2007]

“Violence in Colombia is continuing and even escalating in various parts of the country, despite growing government rhetoric that it is gaining control over the internal conflict that has plagued the nation for the past four decades. Refugees International (RI) teams visited Narino and Choco deparments in June 2006 and February 2007 and found that security conditions have seriously worsened. As a result, increased civilian displacement in the coming months is likely and Government authorities are unprepared to respond adequately.” [Refugees International, March 09 2007]

“The ELN, with an estimated 2 500 fighters, is the country’s second-largest rebel group, behind the FARC, which is estimated to have some 15 000 fighters and has refused to negotiate with this government. The ELN and FARC have battled each other in recent months, leaving hundreds dead throughout the country.” [Miami Herald, 07 May 2007]

2006 Periodic fighting continued throughout the year between the Colombian army and leftist guerrilla groups, primarily the FARC. Conflict also erupted between FARC and ELN, groups that were previously allies. Fighting resulted in over 150 deaths, hundreds of kidnappings, and the displacement of over 2500 people.

2005 Heavy fighting between FARC rebels government forces took place throughout the year involving both large clashes and guerrilla-style attacks. Colombian forces also fought with paramilitary forces despite ongoing disarmament talks. Bombings and kidnappings in urban and rural areas continued.

"After a year of relative quiet since President Álvaro Uribe began "Plan Patriota," an ambitious military offensive using 18,000 soldiers and an estimated $100 million in U.S. military assistance to force the guerrillas from their strongholds in the south, the rebels have come out of hiding with weapons blazing. Since January, the group, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, known as FARC, has made numerous deadly attacks against military and civilian targets, claiming scores of victims and reminding the public that, despite improvements in security under Uribe, a war is still raging in many parts of the countryside. Some analysts believe the government's military offensive has lost momentum in recent months." [Indira A.R. Lakshmanan The Boston Globe, May 27, 2005]

2004 Government clashes with rebel groups and paramilitaries, fighting between paramilitaries and rebels, and attacks on civilians continued through the year, killing hundreds of both combatants and civilians. FARC rebel attacks on cacao fields resulted in significant civilian casualties, including 34 in a single incident. There were some indications of lower conflict intensity, however, including an off-and-on ceasefire declared by AUC paramilitaries.

2003 Fighting between the two main rebel groups, the government security forces and the paramilitary fighters remained intense for much of the year. Most violence was attributed to leftist rebel fighters, primarily FARC. In addition to clashing with government security forces and paramilitary fighters, rebels stepped up their attacks against political figures. Thousands of civilians were killed in 2003, many as a result of over a dozen bombs set throughout the country, the most destructive killing 33 people in Bogota in February. Meanwhile, peace talks between the paramilitary United Self-Defense Forces (AUC) and the government lessened, but did not eradicate, instances of violence between these two parties and among rival paramilitary factions. The conflict also threatened to escalate beyond Colombia’s borders when relations between Colombia and Venezuela were strained by an attack by the Venezuelan Air Force on paramilitaries operating along the shared border. Both major rebel groups and the paramilitaries continued to employ children within their fighting ranks.

"More than 11,000 children fight in Colombia’s armed conflict, one of the highest total in the world, Human Rights Watch said in a new report released today. Both guerrilla and paramilitary forces rely on child combatants ... Eighty percent of the children under arms belong to one of the two guerrilla groups, the ... (FARC) or the ... (ELN). At least one of every four irregular combatants in Colombia is under eighteen years of age. Of these, several thousand are under the age of fifteen, the minimum age permitted for recruitment under the Geneva Conventions. ... Colombian armed forces and police do not recruit children under eighteen ... " [Human Rights Watch press release courtesy of Relief Web, September 18, 2003]

2002 Fighting between the government, the paramilitaries, and rebel groups remained intense. The new government of Alvaro Uribe stepped up its security efforts in an attempt to end the civil war through military force, a move which sparked reprisal attacks by rebel groups and paramilitaries.

"President Alvaro Uribe’s government plans to arm 15,000 peasants to support the armed forces in the fight against outlawed rebel and paramilitary groups, Colombia’s defense minister said yesterday," [boston.com, August 23, 2002]

2001 There was a dramatic increase in the fighting in 2001, between government and rebel groups, government and paramilitaries, and rebels and paramilitaries. In August, the Colombian government enacted a law giving the military sweeping powers over civilian authorities, new powers of detention, and the right to set up martial law in certain areas.

"Colombia’s President Andres Pastrana has signed a controversial new law giving the military sweeping powers. The legislation gives the military new powers of detention and the right to set up martial law in specific places, giving them authority over civilian officials."[BBC, August 17, 2001]

2000 Clashes between government forces and rebels intensified following US President Clinton’s visit to Colombia in August. Fierce fighting was reported in southern Colombia, where 50 percent of the country’s coca is produced, and which is increasingly becoming a target of American counternarcotics operations. Paramilitary groups staged attacks on civilians suspected to be sympathetic to the left-wing guerrillas.

"Violence has continued to rage across Colombia as left-wing guerillas increase their attacks in the aftermath of US President Bill Clinton’s visit on Wednesday." [BBC News, September 4, 2000]

1999 Conflict violence increased as government forces clashed with rebel groups, while failing to halt -- and even supporting-- the operations of paramilitary groups responsible for civilian massacres. Throughout the country, civilians were subjected to kidnapping and execution by paramilitary and guerrilla groups.

"Armed conflict intensified in Colombia as negotiations between the government and guerrillas stalled. The administration of Andrés Pastrana was slow to develop a plan to improve human rights protections even as guerrillas used territory ceded to them not to talk peace, but to further war. Paramilitary groups working in some areas with the tolerance and open support of the armed forces continued to massacre civilians, commit selective killings, and spread terror. Guerrillas also flouted international humanitarian law, executing and kidnapping civilians and carrying out indiscriminate attacks. Throughout the country, Colombians fled political violence, with waning chances of finding refuge, food, and medical care. Repeatedly, the conflict crossed borders into Panama, Brazil, and Venezuela, heightening regional tensions and prompting talk of a future multilateral intervention...The departments of Antioquia, Meta, Santander, and Bolivar remained among the most dangerous....
The security forces failed to halt both paramilitary and guerrilla incursions into towns where civilians were frequently killed. However, soldiers pursued guerrillas once an attack was reported. In contrast, although paramilitaries often announced plans to attack publicly and well in advance, authorities not only failed to act to stop killings, but rarely pursued paramilitary units even when they remained in the region after massacring noncombatants." [Human Rights Watch World Report, 2000]

1998 Following peace hopes raised by a secret July meeting between president-elect Andres Pastrana and FARC and meetings between ELN and Colombian civil leaders in Germany a week later, a major rebel offensive in August renewed conflict violence which included major clashes between rebels and government troops and paramilitary attacks on civilians.

"Although the army is firmly in control of Bogota, Medellin and other urban areas, it is unable to cover much of the countryside effectively, leaving remote, rural towns caught in often bloody conflict between rebels and the paramilitaries, according to analysts. With rebels present in as many as 50 percent of Colombia’s villages, they have achieved a major political victory against the government in the last two years, analysts said." [The Washington Post, March 8, 1998]

Number of Deaths:

Total: At least 50,000, and possibly as many as 200,000, people have died in the conflict since 1964, including some 40 000 since 1990 alone. In combination with the civil war there are also a staggering number of firearm related deaths totaling 475,000 since 1979. Colombia has 3 million internally displaced people and it is estimated that the numbers may be much higher as many are too traumatized or scared to register. Landmines also pose an increasingly large danger to the civilian population, with 1,000 deaths occurring due to mines in 2006. In 2005 Colombia overtook Cambodia as the country with the highest landmine casualty rate.

“Colombian police say the murder rate in the South American nation has fallen to its lowest level in two decades. Police chief Gen Jorge Daniel Castro said that a total of 17 206 people suffered violent deaths in 2006, 517 fewer than in 2005. Kidnappings also fell from 329 in 2005 to 200 in 2006. Colombia continues to have one of the highest murder rates in the world, but observes say security has been gradually improving in recent years.” [BBC News, 02 January 2007]

“Colombia’s guerilla war has caused more than 40 000 deaths since 1990, most of them civilians, while over 3 million people have been displaced in the world’s worst ongoing humanitarian crisis outside of Africa, the United Nations says.” [Reuters, 04 April 2007]

“There have been nearly 39,000 violent deaths due to armed conflict since 1988. The Yearly average is 2,221 violent deaths, many of them concentrated in rural areas. (…) there have been more that 475,000 firearm-related civilian deaths as a result of crime and conflict violence since 1979, averaging 17,600 per year, with most deaths concentrated in urban cities.” [Small Arms Survey, April 2006]

2008 There were approximately 70 deaths in 2008, many of which were police or rebels. Landmines continued to claim lives of civilians in 2008 and remain a pressing issue.

2007 There were over 100 combat-related deaths in 2006, many of which are civilian and have resulted from the turf war between FARC and ELN. Landmines also claimed the lives of over 1,000 civilians and have emerged as one of the most pressing issues facing the country.

“A US-based rights group has blamed left-wing rebels for making Colombia the country with the highest number of landmine victims in the world. Human Rights Watch says more than 1000 people were killed by anti-personnel mines in Colombia last year, up from less than 300 in 2001. The FARC rebel group often places landmines in civilian areas.” [BBC News, 02 August 2007]

2006 There were 160 combat-related deaths reported deaths this year, including the deaths of 28 civilians. Over 17,000 people were reported to have suffered violent death in 2006, though few of these deaths are directly related to the conflict.

“Police chief Gen Jorge Daniel Castro said that a total of 17,206 people suffered violent deaths in 2006, 517 fewer than in 2005. Kidnappings also fell from 329 in 2005 to 200 in 2006, he said. Colombia continues to have one of the highest murder rates in the world, but observers say security has been gradually improving in recent years.” [BBC News, January 4, 2007]

2005 At least a thousand civilians and combatants were likely killed this year as the fighting intensified relative to last year. Exact numbers remain unavailable and the number of casualties may be two to three times the above figure.

2004 Between 3,000 and 4,000 people were killed according to the US State Department. An accurate estimate remains difficult because much of the fighting occurs in remote parts of the country and is not always reported. Additionally, many figures are unsubstantiated claims made by the Colombian military.

"The conflict caused the deaths of between 3,000 and 4,000 persons during the year, including combat casualties, political murders, and forced disappearances.” [Colombia - Country Reports on Human Rights Practices – 2004, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, US State Department, February 28, 2005]

2003 As many as 4,000 people were killed as a result of the conflict in 2003. An exact figure is difficult due to the remoteness of some of the fighting and to the ambiguity of much of the violence in Colombia. It is impossible to determine how many of the 22,000 homicides which occurred in 2003 were directly related to the conflict. Additionally, thousands of people were abducted for ransom throughout the year, many of them by rebel groups to fund their activities.

"Internal armed conflict continued between the Government and terrorist groups, particularly the FARC, the National Liberation Army (ELN), and the AUC. The conflict caused the deaths of between 3,000 and 4,000 civilians during the year, including combat casualties, political murders, and forced disappearances." [Country Reports on Human Rights Practices, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, US State Department, February 25, 2004]

"There were 2,043 abductions in the world’s kidnap capital in 2003, down from 2,986 cases in 2002, according to a government report. Most kidnappings are carried out by leftist rebels seeking extortion to finance their four-decade war. The number of homicides, including politically related murders, dipped to 22,969, down from 28,837, the report said. And ‘acts of terror,’ which include guerrilla attacks, fell to 846 in 2003 from 1,645 in 2002." [Reuters, January 5, 2004]

2002 An estimated 3,500 were killed this year, many of them civilians.

2001 A total of over 2,500 conflict-related deaths. At least 1,400 civilian deaths were reported in 2001 with one report citing more than 9,000 civilian deaths between January and August alone. In December, the Colombian military issued a report stating they had killed 1,000 rebels in 2001, and 100 paramilitaries. The report, meant to show the increase in operations against rebels and paramilitary groups, did not mention the loss of civilian life over the course of the year.

"The army in Colombia says it has drastically increased operations in 2001 against left-wing rebels and right-wing paramilitaries. In a newly released report the army said almost 1,000 rebels were killed this year, an increase of almost 10%. It also said almost 100 paramilitaries died fighting its troops. This, says the army, is proof that it is serious about taking on the right-wing death squads." [BBC, December 28, 2001]

"According to the Colombian think-tank CINEP, the armed conflict in Colombia claimed the lives of 9,092 civilians between January and August 2001." [www.colombiapolicy.org, December 13, 2001]

2000 1,200 people were killed according to the Colombian Commission of Jurists, the vast majority at the hands of paramilitaries.

1999 Between 2,000 and 3,000 political and extrajudicial killings.

"Political and extrajudicial killings continued to be a serious problem. An estimated 2,000 to 3,000 citizens died in such acts, committed principally by nonstate agents." [1999 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices, Colombia, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, US Department of State, February 25, 2000]

1998 Between 2,000 and 4,000.

Political Developments:

2008 A Colombian airstrike in Ecuador on FARC rebels sparked a regional crisis. Accused of breaching international sovereignty, Venezuela, Ecuador and others mobilized their units to attack Colombia. Tensions were resolved at a variety of conferences and eventually all diplomatic sanctions were lifted on Colombia. Tensions between Venezuela and Colombia remain high however, as documents on dead FARC commander Raul Reyes’ computer showed links between Venezuela and FARC. Interpol confirmed the documents had not been tampered with by the Colombian government. In July, the army rescued Ingrid Betancourt, a high profile hostage, along with fourteen others in a blow against the FARC militia. President Uribe has ruled out international involvement in further hostage negotiations with the militia. In response to the 2007 ‘parapolitics’ scandal, where high ranking political officials were linked to various paramilitary groups, 29 political officers were detained and 38 remained under investigation by the end of 2008. In addition, the government dismissed 2 generals, and 24 soldiers suspected of boosting the death tally by killing 11 civilians and disguising it as the death of FARC rebels. The commander of the army resigned soon after the scandal. The Attorney General is investigating over 1550 cases of extrajudicial killings within the army, the results of the investigation remain unknown.

Protests occurred throughout the year in Colombia, and a strike of judicial workers for 45 days put a halt on legal proceedings. In addition, petitions were passed throughout the country to allow President Uribe to run for a third term in 2010. Parliament refused to pass the bill, however, they have taken preliminary steps to allow Uribe to run for a third term in 2014 after four years away from the Presidency.

2007 The government was mired by scandal in 2007 after a computer seized from a high-ranking paramilitary leader revealed that many top-ranking officials of the Uribe government had links to various paramilitary groups. The ELN entered into a fifth round of peace talks with the government, resulting in the declaration of a “temporary ceasefire”, however Peace Commissioner Luis Carlos Restrepo revealed that such a ceasefire would only take place when the ELN ended its campaign, an event that has yet to occur. The government released some 56 FARC rebels into demobilization programs, a “goodwill gesture” that President Uribe hopes will lead to the release of many prominent hostages currently held by the group. Towards the end of the year FARC released video footage depicting French-Colombian hostage Ingrid Betancourt as well as three other prominent American hostages. The video is the only footage of Betancourt to have been released in years.

“Top paramilitary commanders have in recent days confirmed what human rights groups and others have long alleged: some of Colombia’s most influential political, military and business figures helped build a powerful anti-guerilla movement that operated with impunity, killed civilians and shipped cocaine to US cities. The commanders have named army generals, entrepreneurs, foreign companies and politicians who not only bankrolled paramilitary operations but also worked hand in hand with fighters to carry them out. In accounts that are at odds with those of the government, the commanders have said their organization, rather than simply sprouting up to fill a void in lawless regions of the country, had been systematically built with the help of bigger forces.” [The Washington Post, 22 May 2007]

“Colombia’s National Liberation Army (ELN), the country’s second largest rebel group, plans to start a fifth round of talks aimed at reaching a peace deal with President Alvaro Uribe’s government at the end of this month. The FARC, or Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, the country’s largest rebel organization, is still fighting and authorities recently said the group’s commanders had ordered its combatants to destroy the ELN as they seek control of territory and drug-trafficking routes.” [Reuters, 05 February 2007]

2006 President Uribe was re-elected for a second term in May. During the year, 17,560 paramilitary members were disarmed, bringing the total number demobilized since 2003 to more than 32,000. The Uribe administration announced that AUC had officially ceased to exist, and the demobilization process came to a close. However, there is a fear that without peace talks these demobilized groups will transform into gangs. While a special tribunal that was part of the 2003 agreement took place in December, paramilitary leaders ended talks after changes in their detention requirements. Uribe conducted peace talks with the ELN prior to his re-election in May, and later in the year ELN commander Antonio Gracia declared that he was in favour of an amnesty agreement to imprisoned rebels, and the ELN agreed to move towards full-fledged peace negotiations. Negotiations for a hostage exchange between the government and FARC were called off after a car bomb explosion. Uribe and other political elite faced accusations of connections to paramilitary groups responsible for fighting guerillas and massacring civilians.

“During the year the government demobilized 17,560 paramilitary members, which brought the total number demobilized since 2003 to more than 32,000 and concluded the demobilization process. Former paramilitaries who refused to demobilize were treated as common criminals. Representatives of the government, the ELN, civil society, and international observers continued meeting to explore a possible peace process and demobilization of the ELN.” [Country Reports on Human Rights Practices (Colombia), U.S. State Department, March 6, 2007]

“Over the past several weeks, Colombians have been gripped by revelations of ties between paramilitary fighters and several congressmen close to the president, as well as some officials in his administration. The scandal now threatens to unravel his authority. Uribe won reelection in May after cultivating his reputation as a workaholic technocrat – someone who would be relentless against corruption and illegal armed groups. But lately, he has joined a cast of lawmakers, intelligence service operatives and mid-level government bureaucrats in publicly denying ties to the paramilitary groups, which for a generation the military used as a proxy force to battle guerillas.” [Juan Forego, The Washington Post, December 19, 2006]

2005 Demobilization of the AUC continued after Congress passed a law that grants reduced sentences to paramilitaries in exchange for disarmament. The law was criticized as too lenient by Colombian civil society and members of the international community. The FARC continued to hold 60 hostages including foreign citizens as a prisoner-hostage exchange deal between the rebel group and the Colombian government remained illusive. Preliminary talks on future peace negotiations began in December between the ELN and the Colombian government after Francisco Galan, one of ELN’s top commanders, was temporarily released from prison. The United Nations, after 4 years, suspended efforts at mediation between FARC and the Colombian government. Colombia’s Constitutional Court removed a limit on presidential terms opening the way for President Uribe to run for re-election in May, 2006.

"Colombia and the country's second largest Marxist rebel group moved a step closer to negotiating the end to a brutal 41-year insurgency Wednesday by agreeing to work on an agenda for peace talks in January. Leaders of the 5,000-strong National Liberation Army, or ELN, and negotiators from President Alvaro Uribe's government ended five days of what they termed "frank and cordial" exploratory talks in an optimistic mood. They will meet again in Havana at the end of January to start thrashing out a peace agenda, they said in a joint statement issued in Havana, which is hosting the talks." [CNN.com, December 21, 2005]

"A Colombian court has ruled that President Alvaro Uribe may run for re-election...after Congress lifted a one-term limit for presidents." [Hugh Bronstein, Reuters, November 14, 2005]

"The Colombian Congress on Tuesday approved a law governing the disarmament of the country's death squads, legislation that permits the demobilization of thousands of fighters but grants generous benefits to paramilitary commanders accused of atrocities and cocaine trafficking." [Juan Forero, The New York Times, June 23, 2005]

2004 The AUC demobilized nearly 3,000 troops by the end of the year as part of announced plans for full demobilization by the end of 2005 and the government set aside two safe havens for AUC soldiers before they are demobilized. Ricardo Palmera, the public face of FARC during recent failed peace negotiations, was captured and jailed for 35 years and FARC’s head of a unit of suicide bombers Luis Ospina was captured and awaiting trial. Most significantly, FARC’s longtime leader Manuel Marulanry, dead or dying of cancer, was replaced by Guillermo Saenz, known as Alfanso Cano. Although peace negotiations with the AUC and ELN continued, no progress was made with FARC.

The United States significantly increased its commitment to Colombia, doubling its troops and boosting aid. The Colombian government signed a deal with Brazil and Peru to combat arms and drug smuggling over their borders. It announced that kidnappings dropped in 2004, attributing the decline to hard-line policies, but Colombia remained the site of the world’s third worst refugee crisis with 3 million people internally displaced. Additionally, reports from observers emerged detailing the mass rape and oppression of women in Colombia.

"The number of American military personnel here will double, to 800, in the coming months, based on a weekend vote in the United States Congress…The 2005 United States Defense Department authorization act, approved Saturday by Congress, also permits the Bush administration to increase the number of American citizens working for private contractors in Colombia to 600 from 400." [New York Times, October 11, 2004]

"The US has again got involved in Colombian attempts to make peace with guerrilla groups. US ambassador William Wood effectively torpedoed the Colombian government's proposals to effect a prisoner exchange with one of the groups. He spoke out against the release of imprisoned guerrillas, and warned the US would enforce extradition warrants against them if they were released." [BBC News, August 26, 2004]

"The number of kidnappings in Colombia has almost halved in the first half of the year, the government says. It says 966 people were abducted in the first six months of 2004, compared with 1,906 in the same period last year." [BBC News, July 22, 2004]

"According to the UN, there are up to three million internally displaced people in Colombia, making it the worst humanitarian crisis in the western hemisphere. Elliott Gotkine reports." [BBC News, July 8, 2004]

2003 The United Self Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC) agreed to begin negotiations with the government, leading to the disarmament of almost 1,000 paramilitary fighters by the year’s end– the first step towards the disarmament of all AUC fighters by 2005. In contrast, the two main rebel groups, the FARC and the ELN, announced intentions to unite to fight against the government as President Uribe intensified counterinsurgency operations.

The rapprochement between the AUC and the government was not universally applauded. Several paramilitary factions refused to adhere to a ceasefire prior to the rebels being defeated, and the amnesty granted to disarmed fighters, some of whom had committed grave violations of human rights throughout the conflict, drew heavy criticism.

"After singing the national anthem, 800 fighters of Colombia’s feared right-wing militia piled their weapons and ammunition on the floor – a disarmament ceremony Tuesday touted by the government as a first step toward ending four decades of war. Yet before the nationally televised event even started, critics were denouncing it as a choreographed show that lets killers, kidnappers and drug peddlers off the hook. ... President Alvaro Uribe has been pursuing a twin strategy of unleashing war on the two leftist rebel groups while negotiating the demobilization of the paramilitary groups ... Under a pact signed with the government in July, the paramilitary umbrella group agreed to demobilize all its 13,000 fighters by the end of 2005. Tuesday’s ceremony was the first step." [Associated Press, November 25, 2003]

"The Colombian government’s operations against Marxist guerrillas ... has achieved what many thought unthinkable. It has driven the country’s two most powerful insurgent groups into each other’s arms. ‘The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and the National Liberation Army (ELN) inform the Colombian people that the guerrilla commanders of both organizations met in the mountains of Colombia in an environment of camaraderie, fraternity and mutual respect,’ said a communique published on insurgent websites on 24 August." [Jane’s Defence Weekly, September 3, 2003]

2002 In February, the government broke off peace talks with the ELN. In May, Alvaro Uribe replaced Andrés Pastrana as president and promised to introduce a new security strategy aimed at bringing about the military defeat of rebel forces and paramilitaries. The Uribe government enacted emergency legislation to increase military spending by US $210 million dollars and to create a network of civilian informants some of whom will be armed. The United States branded the AUC, ELN and the FARC “terrorist groups”, increased its military aid to Colombia, and agreed for the first time to allow this aid to be used directly against rebel groups. In December, the AUC and a number of other paramilitary groups agreed to a unilateral ceasefire.

"The Colombian Government has broken off talks with the country’s second largest rebel group, the National Liberation Army (ELN), saying the guerrillas were not committed to peace... Our correspondent says the announcement also paves the way for President-elect Alvaro Uribé to carry out his plan of total war against the Marxist rebels." [BBC News, June 1, 2002]

"... national and international human rights groups have warned that involving civilians - who already bear the brunt of the country’s violence - directly could turn an already brutal civil conflict into a wider, bloodier war." [Guardian Weekly, September 19-25, 2002]

"In an offshoot of America’s new anti-terrorism stance, President Bush has signed a law authorising the use of US military aid directly against rebel groups engaging in ‘terrorist’ activities. Until now, all funds for Colombia have been strictly limited to counter-drug programmes." [Times Online, August 22, 2002]

2001 A number of attempts at peace negotiations with Colombia’s largest rebel group, FARC, failed in 2001. Negotiations with the second largest rebel group, ELN, ended in August with the rebels refusing to negotiate with Colombia’s President Pastrana. The US continued support under Plan Colombia, providing the Colombian government with $256 million during 2001, mostly for the purchase of military equipment.

"In response to Plan Colombia, and in consultation with the Colombian Government, the United States is providing a $1.3 billion package of assistance to Colombia. Adding to previously approved U.S. assistance to Colombia of over $330 million, the legislation provides $818 million as an emergency supplemental for Fiscal Year 2000 and $256 million in additional funding for Fiscal Year 2001. The U.S. assistance package will help Colombia address the breadth of the challenges it faces -- its efforts to fight the illicit drug trade, to increase the rule of law, to protect human rights, to expand economic development, to institute judicial reform, and to foster peace. ...
“About $750 million of our assistance out of the $1.3 billion emergency supplemental to Colombia and the region is in fact for items such as training and equipment to Colombia Army counter-narcotics battalions, provision of helicopters, communications equipment, infrastructure, weapons and other equipment. ... [T]he most high-profile items being procured are the 14 UH-60 Blackhawks for the Army's counter-narcotics battalions, and two UH-60 Blackhawks for the Colombia National Police." [US Department of State, March 3, 2001]

"The National Liberation Army, Colombia’s second-largest guerilla group, said in a written statement that it will not engage in any further talks with President Andres Pastrana. The announcement comes a day after Pastrana said he was suspending talks with the leftist group, known as ELN. He said the group has no desire for peace. The ELN statement said the group will wait for Pastrana’s successor next year before resumption of talks." [CNN, August 8, 2001]

2000 FARC formed its own political party in March -- the Bolivarian Movement. In June, the US approved $1.3 billion in aid to Colombia, a package that will deliver 60 helicopters and train three anti-narcotic battalions to help with Bogota’s fight against drugs.

1999 The government and FARC officially launched peace talks based on a 12 point agenda in October in the town of La Uribe in southeastern Colombia. By year’s end, however, no significant progress had been achieved.

1998 There was some hope for the commencement of the first stage of a peace process, as one of the guerrilla army groups and the main paramilitary alliance stated willingness to begin talks with the government. As well, the historic, albeit brief, meeting of rebel leaders with President Andrés Pastrana at a secret location in June offered one of the first recent concrete signs of possible reconciliation. Among both rebels and paramilitary groups, there appeared to be guarded respect for the new Pastrana Presidency, and its intentions for promoting a fair and lasting peace. At year=s end however, there was still no reduction in the fighting, nor was there any willingness between the rebels and paramilitaries to engage in direct discussion.

Background:

The current conflict in Colombia can be traced back to La Violencia (1948-1958), a partisan civil war waged between Liberal and Conservative parties within the country. In 1958, a power-sharing pact creating a coalition government was agreed but some left-wing fighters continued a military campaign, this time aimed at the elitist coalition government. At this point several groups currently involved in the armed conflict came into existence. Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC), the Ejercito de Liberacion Nacional (ELN), the Ejercito Popular de Liberacion, and other smaller revolutionary groups, which together comprise the Simon Bolivar Guerrilla Co-ordinating Committee, began fighting the Colombian Army and later associated paramilitary groups in 1964. Paramilitary groups also played an increasingly important role in the conflict even as the Colombian government lost control over them (and officially banned them in 2002), and covert co-operation continues with government security forces. Elements of the government forces, the paramilitaries, and the guerrillas are involved in the drug trade and other criminal activities, making it difficult to distinguish conflict-related deaths from the more than 20,000 crime-related deaths each year. During 1998 peace prospects were boosted by statements by the ELN and the main paramilitary alliance that they were willing to begin talks with the government and by a brief meeting of FARC leaders with incoming President Andrés Pastrana. In October 1999, the Pastrana administration and FARC officially launched peace talks based on a 12 point agenda in southeastern Colombia, but by 2001 they were stalled. The government of Alvaro Uribe came to power in 2002 on a platform of increasing military spending to fight the rebels and paramilitaries. US military assistance in the form of troops, equipment, aid and private contractors, exceeded $2 billion by 2004 as its rationale shifted from a “war on drugs” to a “war on terrorism”.

Arms Sources:

The US is the largest source of weapons for the Colombian government, recently providing a $2 billion aid package that will not only deliver 60 helicopters and other military equipment, but also train three Colombian anti-narcotic battalions. Germany, Russia, Italy, France and Spain also are recent suppliers. The rebel groups and drug cartels buy weapons on the black market, which is well established in Central and South America, or capture them from Colombian forces. Paramilitary groups are at times supplied by members of government forces.

"Further, the USA will instruct a Colombian commando unit in tactical intelligence techniques and procedures, and provide equipment such as small arms, communications, optics, night operations and solider systems." [Jane’s Defence Weekly, January 8, 2003]

"Several factors contribute to the rapid and relatively free flow of small arms into Colombia, including its position as a geographic bridge between Central and South America, borders that are ‘porous’ and difficult to monitor, a government presence that is mostly concentrated in the cities of the Andean mountains and that is essentially nonexistent in southern Colombia... The arms flow problem is further magnified by the availability of Cold War-era weapons stockpiles in Nicaragua, Honduras, and El Salvador and the alleged assistance of regional sympathizers in Cuba and Venezuela. ...
Central America represents the single largest source of illegal weapons to Colombia ..." [Arms Trafficking and Colombia, prepared for the Defense Intelligence Agency, 2003]

Economic Factors:

Unequal distribution of wealth remains a key feature of the Colombian conflict. The government intends to address the problem through its controversial Plan Colombia and initially consulted with FARC before the launching of the peace talks in 1999. The plan aims to promote the peace process, combat narcotics production, revive the economy, and strengthen democracy. It is expected to cost $7.5 billion, of which $4 billion has been pledged by the Colombian government. Washington recently agreed to provide close to $2 billion, mainly targeting its assistance on military strategies aimed at destroying the narcotics industry and counterinsurgency training. More financial support is expected from the international community, particularly the European Union (EU), which remains cautious in its participation. The rebel FARC is wary of Plan Colombia, saying the American aid not only displaces people, but also paves the way for more fighting. Diplomatic measures were underway in 2007 by the Colombian government to lobby Washington for a “Plan Colombia II”, a multi-faceted strategy that would combat drug trafficking as well as leftist guerillas. The conflict has been prolonged by fighting over control of Colombia’s cocaine and crude oil resources; both the paramilitary fighters and the rebel groups fund themselves through the drug trade and the government relies upon its oil exports to finance its war against insurgents. This reliance has led to rebel attacks on oil pipelines in recent years. Oil pipelines are also a major source of income for paramilitaries. A reported 7,000 barrels of oil a day are siphoned from Colombia’s oil pipelines by right-wing groups who then sell the fuel at cheap prices to fund their activities. Attacks on the oil pipelines by FARC militias continued, forcing the shutdown of one pipeline periodically throughout 2008. At the end of the year, President Uribe announced the failure of Plan Colombia to reduce coca production in the country.

“The Colombian government has arrested five national politicians, including Sen. Alvaro Araujo, the brother of Colombia’s foreign minister, and has issued an arrest warrant for one other politician charging them with links to illegal right-wing paramilitaries. The revelations came amidst a diplomatic offensive by the Colombian government in Washington to help secure funds for Plan Colombia II, a multi-pronged strategy to fight drug trafficking and leftist guerrillas that have plagued this country for decades. Colombia is the largest recipient of US aid outside of the Middle East, receiving somewhere in the vicinity of $700 million annually.” [The Miami Herald, 16 February 2007]

"Up to 7,000 barrels of petrol a day are stolen from Colombia's oil pipelines. Right-wing paramilitaries are believed to be responsible for most of the thefts, using the proceeds to fund their war on the Marxist guerrillas. They siphon off petrol and other petroleum derivatives and then sell the fuel illegally. The Colombian authorities are now cracking down on the problem which reportedly costs the country's economy $75m a year. Colombia's main oil pipeline, which stretches across the northern half of the country, has so many holes in it it is known as the flute. The holes are made by what is called the petrol cartel that sells the stolen fuel at bargain basement prices. Much of the petrol cartel is controlled by the illegal right-wing paramilitaries." [BBC News, February 15, 2004]

"Colombian leftist rebels late Wednesday blew up a section of the country’s most important oil pipeline in the northern Arauca province that US Special Forces are helping to guard, police said. The pipeline, operated by multinational oil giant Occidental Petroleum, links the oil fields around the town of Cano Limon with the Carribean oil terminal of Covenas and carries 105,000 barrels of oil a day. ... Seventy famed US Green Berets troops have been deployed in the area since January to help train Colombian forces and assist them in guarding the pipeline that was attacked by leftist Colombian insurgents 170 times in 2001 alone. Early last year, US President George W. Bush allocated 98 million dollars for that mission and other measures to boost security around the pipeline. Sabotage to the pipeline in 2001 cost [multinational oil company] Occidental Petroleum some 445 million dollars in lost production, and prompted the Colombian government to lace the oil producing region under military control." [Agence France Presse, February 5, 2003]

"Although the civil war in Colombia has its roots primarily in the struggle for social justice and ideological confrontations that began in the 1940s, in later years it has been fuelled - and prolonged and complicated- to a significant extent by a fight over natural resources: cocaine and crude oil... Colombia is today the world’s largest supplier of cocaine (90 percent of the crop goes to the United States), and all factions in the civil war benefit financially." [Source: The Anatomy of Resource Wars, Michael Renner, Worldwatch Paper 162, October 2002]

 

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