Summary
Type of Conflict
Parties to the Conflict
Status of the Fighting
Number of Deaths
Political Developments
Background
Arms Sources
Economic Factors

Summary:

2008 Despite the commencement of the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID) on January 1st, 2008, the situation in Darfur has not improved. The Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) between the Government of Sudan (GoS) and increasingly fragmented rebel groups remained stalled. In July, International Criminal Court (ICC) prosecutor Moeno-Ocampo applied for an arrest warrant for Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir for 10 counts of genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes. Although at yearend a decision on the warrant was still forthcoming, it was widely feared that Bashir’s indictment would lead to a backlash by the Sudanese government, threatening the DPA and its provisions for 2009 elections, UNAMID personnel, humanitarian workers and civilians within Sudan, and the stability of neighbouring states. To date, the GoS has responded with positive gestures to affirm its commitment to peace. However, the combination of continued bombing of Darfur, failure to disarm proxy Janjaweed militia, obstruction of UNAMID, and a history of broken promises has not encouraged confidence in their intentions. Conflict continued to be characterized by co-ordinated attacks between government forces and rebels, as well as more random acts of violence against villagers, IDPs and humanitarian workers. The state of insecurity continued to threaten the efficacy of humanitarian efforts.

2007 Attempts were made to unify the growing number of armed factions who oppose the government, however the talks were largely unproductive due to boycotting of the talks by key factions of the Sudan Liberation Movement/Army (SLM/A) and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM). International pressure on the government of Sudan increased due to its role in supporting and participating in the violence against civilians in the Darfur as well as impeding the deployment of peacekeeping efforts and violating the arms embargo established by the United Nations. On July 31, 2007, the U.N. Security Council passed resolution 1769 which mandates that a joint UN/AU force composed of 26 000 troops and police be sent to Darfur. The new force known as UNAMID is set to take over from AU forces by January 1, 2008. Due to a lack of cooperation by the Sudanese government as well as logistical deficiencies, the force faces many operational challenges and the deployment of many of the troops is likely to be delayed. There was a decrease in violent civilian deaths, however many attribute this decline not to an improvement in the peace process but to a change in tactics by the Janjaweed, which is now relying more heavily on intimidation to evacuate villagers. Due to growing insecurity and lawlessness many humanitarian organizations and workers were forced to withdraw from the area. Tribal fighting over productive land and other scarce resources also contributed significantly to regional hostilities.

2006 Despite the signing of the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) in May, between 1000 and 1500 people, mostly civilians were killed as a result of continued atrocities. A new rebel faction, the National Redemption Front (NRF), emerged and has taken control of the northern Darfur region. The government of Khartoum finally allowed a light UN force into Darfur to provide logistical assistance to the faltering AU mission. However, the government has not agreed to allow further troops and continues to assert that the UN has colonial motives. Tensions along the Chadian border continue as rebel factions recruit children from refugee camps within Chadian territory. Escalating violence throughout the year has fuelled the fear that a failure to resolve the Darfur conflict could result in destabilization of the entire region.

2005 Several rounds of negotiations between rebel groups and the Sudan government failed to achieve significant progress. Rebel infighting escalated further hampering negotiations. Violence escalated sharply in September after a period of diminished violence earlier in the year.

2004 Despite a November ceasefire and a bolstered African Union force, fighting between rebels and government forces and government bombings of civilian villages continued. There also were more violent attacks on internally displaced persons camps, which resulted in the evacuation of humanitarian agencies. The government announced plans for separate peace talks with a new rebel group that emerged at the end of the year.

2003 The emergence of two armed groups in early 2003, and their subsequent attacks on Sudanese government installations and military forces, inaugurated a year of intense fighting in the Darfur region of western Sudan. Janjaweed militias, armed by the Sudanese government and reportedly supported by elements of the Sudanese military, undertook retaliatory attacks against rebel groups and civilian populations believed to be sympathetic to them, resulting in several thousand civilian deaths and the displacement of hundreds of thousands of people. A September ceasefire agreement between the government and the Sudan Liberation Movement/Army, the more prominent of the two armed groups, failed to end the hostilities and was dissolved in December.

Type of Conflict:

State control/Failed state

Parties to the Conflict

Overview
● Government(s) of Sudan: Government of National Unity (GNU); incorporating 1) North: “Khartoum”: Government of Sudan (Gos), comprised by the National Congress Party (NCP) led by Omar Hassan al-Bashir and 2) South: Government of Southern Sudan (GOSS), whose ruling party is the “rebel” group Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A), led by Salva Kiir Mayardit. The GOSS ratified a separate constitution in 2005. A referendum is scheduled for 2011 to decide if Southern Sudan should become a separate entity.
● Rebel Movements
● Khartoum-Supported Militia Groups
● International Forces: UNMIS

● Government of Sudan (GoS): a power-sharing agreement has been in place since the signing of the January 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) which ended a 22-year north-south civil war and established an interim Government of National Unity. Leadership includes President Omar Hassan Al-Bashir of the National Congress Party and Salva Kiir Mayardit from the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM), the political wing of the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA), who became First Vice President of Sudan as well as the President of the autonomous Government of Southern Sudan which was established in October 2005. In 2011, a referendum is scheduled to determine whether the south will become an independent entity.

“Sudan, a republic with an estimated population of 40.2 million, is governed according to a power-sharing arrangement established by the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), which ended the 22-year civil war between the north and south and established an interim Government of National Unity (GNU). The CPA calls for national elections to be held in 2009. The GNU is composed of the National Congress Party (NCP), dominated by Islamists from the north and ruled by authoritarian President Omar Hassan al-Bashir and his inner circle, and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM), the political wing of the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) led predominantly by Christians and practitioners of traditional indigenous religions from the south. The most recent national elections were held in 2000; Bashir was reelected, and his political party won 340 out of 360 seats in the parliament in deeply flawed elections boycotted by all major opposition parties. The SPLM is the ruling party of the autonomous Government of Southern Sudan (GOSS), established in 2005. The GOSS ratified a separate constitution in 2005. A referendum to determine whether the south will become an independent entity is scheduled for 2011. The country experienced several violent conflicts during the year. While civilian authorities in the north generally maintained effective control of the security forces and government-aligned militia outside of Darfur, there were frequent instances in which elements of the security forces and government-aligned militia acted independently in Darfur.” [2008 Human Rights Report: Sudan. Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, U.S. Department of State, 2009.]

allied with

● The Janjaweed, militia fighters of Arab descent, mainly from the Darfur region, who have traditionally been allied with the government in Khartoum. It is alleged that these fighters have been armed, trained and financed by the government and fight on its behalf. The Janjaweed have been accused of committing numerous atrocities against civilian populations in the Darfur.

"A top militia leader says the Sudan government backed and directed Janjaweed activities in northern Darfur, according to a videotape released by Human Rights Watch today." [Human Rights Watch, March 2, 2005]

"The Janjaweed are a loose collection of fighters of Arab background mainly from Darfur. Beginning in spring 2003, following a string of SLA victories, Khartoum adopted a scorched earth strategy that relies more heavily on the Janjaweed to target civilian populations suspected of supporting the rebellion ... Building on existing ethnic tensions and a raider culture, the government armed the Janjaweed to supplement the army ... travellers to the region relate that most Janjaweed are armed with either AK-47s or G-3 rifles and ride camels or horses provided by the government. It is alleged that the government paid many of them roughly U.S. $100 when fighting began." [International Crisis Group, Darfur Rising: Sudan’s New Crisis, March 25, 2004]

● The United Front for Change (UFC), an alliance of Chadian insurgents led by Mahamat Nour. The main objective of this group is to depose the Chadian President, Idriss Deby. The group reportedly fought alongside the Sudanese army in attacks that took place in January, 2006. Nour denies any involvement with the Sudanese army.

“Chadian rebels, led by Mahamat Nour, had fought alongside the Sudanese armed forces when the NMRD [Darfur rebel group - National Movement for Reform and Development] attacked a Sudanese military base in West Darfur.” [Reuters, January 28, 2006]

“Nour leads an alliance of Chadian insurgents called the United Front for Democratic Change (UFC). His group attacked the Chadian border town of Adre in December and are sworn to depose Deby.” [Reuters, January 28, 2006]

Versus

Currently it is estimated that there are 9 distinct rebel groups and some claim that as many as 14-19 factions exist. The main rebel factions, which are made up of non-Arab, primarily Muslim, fighters are:

● The Sudan Liberation Movement/Army (SLM/A):
The SLM/A, the largerst of the rebel groups, was known as the Darfur Liberation Movement prior to February 2003, and is a relatively new political group. It claims to not be fighting for independence for the region from Sudan, but for increased regional autonomy and a separation of state and religion. In August, 2006, the SLM/A underwent a leadership change with the replacement of commander Abdul Wahid Mohammad Ahmed al-Nour with Ahmed Abdulshafi Bassey. al-Nour has support from hundreds of thousands of internally displaced people living in IDP camps as well as among the Fur, who constitute roughly 30% of Darfur’s population. SLM/A refuses to participate in talks until Khartoum backed violence is ceased and the hybrid U.N./AU peacekeeping force is deployed. The SLA claims to have recruited 4 000 former government Arab militia soldiers to their forces, who now oppose the government due to failed promises of land and cattle. JEM (see below) have claimed that some SLA factions, once allied with JEM, are fighting against them in co-operation with government forces. JEM believes that the government gave one faction, SLA Unity, military support and about $138 million dollars in exchange for their co-operation.

“All soldiers of the rebel movement are ashamed now to cooperate with the African Union… The AU came to look after the cease-fire and report to the international community but they have been unable to stop the big incidents carried out by the government and the Janjaweed… It seems very easy for the government to push the AU around and that makes us view them as the enemy.” Ibrahim Abdullah Al, rebel commander of the SLA [Christian Science Monitor, October 4, 2007]

"The SLA drew its first recruits from Fur self-defence militias that had arisen during the 1987-1989 conflict... The SLA grew out of this increased cooperation between the Fur, Massaleit and Zaghawa groups. This explains the geographic and ethnic configuration of its rebellion, with a southern group, predominantly Fur and Massaleit, concentrated in the Jelbel Marra area in Southern and Western Darfur states, and the bulk of the force, predominantly Zaghawa and Meidoub fighters, in Northern Darfur.” [International Crisis Group, Darfur Rising: Sudan’s New Crisis, March 25, 2004]

"The Sudanese authorities have ... accused the southern separatist ... [Sudan People’s Liberation Army or SPLA] of helping the ‘outlaws’ in the Darfur region, a charge denied by the SPLA... It [SLA] has never acknowledged any link with the SPLA, but called in mid-March for an ‘understanding’ with other opposition forces fighting the Khartoum government." [Agence France Presse, May 12, 2003]

"One 14 March, the SLM/A (previously known as the Darfur Liberation Front) announced that it had changed its name and issued a political declaration ... ‘The SLM/A shall struggle to achieve a decentralised form of governance based on the right of Sudan’s different regions to govern themselves autonomously through a federal or confederal system,’ said rebel leader Mini Arkoi Minawi. The rebel group called for a separation of state and religion and committed itself to an armed struggle as ‘one of our means to achieve our legitimate objectives’." [IRIN, March 20, 2003]

● The Justice and Equality Movement (JEM):
JEM is smaller than SLM/A, and although it seems to share similar objectives to those of the SLM/A, it has not articulated a clear political platform. Due to an increase in its military power, JEM became the largest threat to the Sudanese military forces in Darfur by the end of 2007. The Government of Sudan has accused JEM rebels of having ties to the Chadian government.

● The National Movement for Reform and Development:
This group emerged in December 2004 and claims to have broken off from JEM over a leadership dispute. However JEM claims the rebel group is controlled by the Sudanese government.

"A third rebel movement has appeared in Sudan's troubled Darfur region, but nobody seems to be taking it very seriously, apart from the authorities in Khartoum and the government of neighbouring Chad...The NMRD claims to be a breakaway movement from JEM. NMRD leader Nourene Manawi Bartcham, told an IRIN correspondent in N'Djamena at the end of December that his group broke away from JEM in April last year because it disagreed with the influence of Hassan Al Tourabi, an Islamic fundamentalist politician, over the rebel movement...But as far as JEM itself is concerned, the NMRD is just a stooge of the authorities in Khartoum. ‘This group belongs to the Sudanese government…It is very strange that the government negotiates with itself,’ said Mohamed Ahmed Tugod, a JEM negotiator at the currently suspended peace talks in Abuja.’" [IRINnews.org, January 13, 2005]

"It is thought to have between 1,000 and 3,000 forces…They have been blamed for a number of attacks near the border with Chad, one of which caused the death of two British aid workers." [BBC, December 5, 2004]

● The National Redemption Front (NRF) is an alliance of four factions of the SLM/A and the JEM who refused to sign the Darfur Peace Agreement in May 2006. The new movement reportedly receives most of its weaponry from Chad and has emerged to provide a significant challenge to both government and Janajaweed militia as it holds most of northern Darfur. There are also reports that it has attacked an African Union supply convoy.

“The new National Redemption Front now appears the strongest and most active rebel movement. Made up of the Justice and Equality Movement, which also shunned the peace deal, and dissident fighters from both SLA factions, it controls much of north Darfur.” [The Washington Post Online, August 09, 2006]

“Khartoum’s new enemy is the National Redemption Front, an alliance of four factions that refused to sign the Darfur peace agreement. It is proving to be a powerful force. According to AU monitors, Janjaweed from Kutum attacked the NRF-held villages of Malagat and Damathasa. They were repelled, and the government sent in an Antonov and gunships. The NRF claims to have brought down one plane, but this has not been confirmed.” [The Guardian, October 11, 2006]

“The NRF apparently gets most of its high-calibre and heavy weaponry through Chad. In August NRF forces attacked an AU-escorted convoy bringing jet fuel to El Fasher for use by the AU’s aircraft.” [The Guardian, October 11, 2006]

● The Popular Forces Army (PFA) emerged at the end of 2006. It is composed of mainly Arab tribes who oppose the government and is based in Chad. Information regarding the size and logistical capacity of the group is currently unavailable.
[Source: Christian Science Monitor, April 23, 2007]

Tribal Factions

Various ethnic tribes remain consistently involved in fighting, although their alliances do not always split clearly along ethnic lines. For example, reports suggest that members of the Gimir tribe have fought in major battles with both Sudanese government troops and JEM rebels. In-fighting within the Gimir tribe was reported to have resulted in 100 deaths in December 2008. This type of fighting is a testament to the complexity and fragmentation of the conflict in Darfur, and the inability to characterize it simply along ethnic lines. [Reuters, 12/16/2008]

International Forces

● The African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID)
a) 8,935 troops and 2,342 police as of October 31, 2008 (mandated full strength is 19,555 troops with 3,772 police)
b) Took over for UMIS in Darfur on January 1st 2008

The Government of Sudan (GoS) has a legacy of unreliability and antagonism in its relationship with the international community. Despite promises to the contrary, the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID) has been plagued by this same pattern of behaviour since its mandate began on January 1st, 2008. Only a week into its mandate, a UNAMID convoy was attacked by GoS forces. Although the government later admitted to the “mutual mistake”, the event seemed to foreshadow their consistently uncooperative behaviour towards UNAMID. NGOs have reported that the government was chronically slow in passing equipment through customs (often taking months), in providing flight clearance (slowing the deployment when quick action is required), in offering promised security escorts (further undermining the safety of all parties), and in approving the list of countries proposing to contribute troops (for this reason, UNAMID troops from Nepal and Thailand waited nearly a year before finally being deployed in late 2008). Although the government seems to have distanced itself from their proxy militia Janjaweed, these more insidious examples of lack of action – not to mention the government’s continued bombing of Darfur – continue to facilitate insecurity. The Janjaweed themselves, rather than undertaking co-ordinated attacks, seem to be utilizing this state of insecurity to freely steal from, abduct, harass, rape, and/or kill civilians and humanitarian workers. This state of lawlessness seems to be the defining characteristic of the Darfur conflict heading into 2009. The sense of “free-for-all” has produced fragmentation among groups which no longer coincide with ethnicity. Along with the government’s refusal to disarm the Janjaweed, this ensuing fragmentation has been a major factor in stalling the Darfur Peace Agreement.

“The situation (in Darfur) is not too bright. There is a big challenge of parties breaking into small, small groups making it difficult for a comprehensive peace agreement to be reached” (Gen. Martin Luther Agwai, commander of the hybrid AU-UN Mission in Darfur, quoted in All Africa, March 18, 2008).

“In October 2008, after Sudanese forces had engaged in a week-long air –and-ground offensive on rebel positions in North Darfur, a helicopter under contract to UNAMID had been shot down and a Nigerian peacekeeper had been shot in an ambush, UN Secretary-General Ban Ki Mood declared that UNAMID was ‘severely stretched’ and that the security situation in Darfur was ‘deteriorating.’ [Military Balance 2009]

Status of the Fighting:

2008 The conflict in Darfur is increasingly multifaceted, with fighting occurring between and within groups of government forces, militias, rebels and civilians/ethnic tribes, and the increasing victimization of humanitarian workers. Perhaps the best descriptors include “instability” and “lawlessness”.

Government of Sudan (GoS) airstrikes continued in Darfur despite condemnation from the international community. One such offensive killed 200 people in February, and the UN subsequently accused the government of “indiscriminate” attacks and intentionally destroying villages. In July alone, the UN reported 21 airstrikes, many of which seemed to target civilians. Violence also spilled over the borders of Darfur. In May, Darfurian Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) rebels attacked the capital Khartoum for the first time in 30 years, killing an estimated 465 people. In the aftermath, 30-50 suspected JEM rebels were sentenced to hang; their fate could determine the nature of future relations between the GoS and JEM. Humanitarian organizations were increasingly victims of violence, leading to the limitation and even suspension of their work. In the first 9 months of 2008, 170 workers and 225 vehicles for humanitarian groups were abducted or hijacked (compared to only 137 vehicles in all of 2007). The lack of security is caused one NGO, German Agro Action, to suspend its food assistance efforts in August, leaving 415,000-450,000 temporarily without food assistance. The World Food Program has warned it may take similar action. The inability to deliver enough food led to reduced rations for 3 million people. The state of lawlessness that limits food aid for IDPs also makes them vulnerable to abduction, rape or murder at the hands of immune militiamen. The Goverrnment of Sudan (GoS) itself has pursued military action within IDP camps: in August an apparent “police raid” for arms at an IDP camp in Kalma left 50-122 people dead and 75-221 injured. Insecurity in Darfur has been blamed on the ineffectualness of the new African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID), which is currently functioning at only half of its mandate, and with only half of its current 13,000 force being armed soldiers. However, the GoS itself has faced significant criticism for its obstruction of UNAMID efforts. Overall, about 300,000 additional people were displaced in 2008, and an estimated 4 million people require some sort of aid. Instability in the region has meant that only 65% of people were accessible to UN aid. The level of instability has caused the UN itself to remove “non-essential staff” from the region.

“But diplomats, aid workers and analysts who have traveled to the region recently say things have changed in Darfur. The conflict has become a violent free-for-all in which a bewildering cast of rebels, bandits and militias murder each other and civilians largely unchecked by government authority. ‘The government is brutal, untrustworthy and bloodthirsty, but the reality is that most of the violence in Darfur today is not caused by them,’ [a] senior Western diplomat said. ‘Is there a genocide in Darfur right at this moment? No, there isn’t.’” [New York Times, July 28, 2008]

2007 The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) announced that Sudanese security forces should be investigated for their involvement in attacks on villages in southern Darfur, which resulted in the murder of more than one hundred people between January and May. The United Nations also called for an end to air raids by Sudanese forces due to the loss of civilian life and devastation caused by the attacks. Violence continued to escalate and the number of relief workers in Darfur declined by 16% to 12 300 over the course of the twelve months prior to April in response to security concerns as well as access and funding limitations. April became the deadliest month of the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) following the death of ten soldiers. A reduction in deadly violence propagated against civilian communities by the Janjaweed was observed however many feel that this decrease represents a change of tactics in response to international pressures and not a slowing down or cessation of the conflict. Intimidation and the cutting off of necessary supplies, including access to water replaced deadly attacks and entire villages continued to be evacuated and destroyed. Dozens of former Janjaweed reportedly joined rebel groups fighting the Sudanese government due the failure of the government to deliver on promises of land, cattle and money. Despite shifts in tactics and alliances, violence and insecurity continued throughout the Darfur region and widespread militarization continued in refugee and IDP camps. Tribal clashes over access to scarce resources including land and water were also a significant source of fighting and more than 4.2 million people have been affected by the fighting.

“The bombardments appear to have been indiscriminate and disproportionate [and as such constituted] violations of international humanitarian and human rights law.” Jose Luis Diaz, spokesperson for the office of High Commissioner for Human Rights [Mail&Guardian, May 14, 2007]

“The prevailing insecurity in Darfur and the raised level of harassment of humanitarian personnel have conspired to seriously curtail humanitarian operations through Darfur.” [The New York Times, April 18, 2007]

“When you know who the rebels are and who the government is, you can negotiate with them to get a food convoy through on a certain date. But when you don’t know who’s who, anyone can pull a gun and demand money, it makes it that much more dangerous.” Simon Crittle, spokesperson for the World Food Program [The Christian Science Monitor, June 12, 2007]

“People are moving at the first sign of trouble, and as a result, not losing their lives in the same number.” Fleur Auzimour Just, program advisor at Care International in Khartoum [Los Angeles Times, August 27, 2007]

“Over 240 000 people have been newly displaced or re-displaced during 2007... In many IDP [internally displaced people] camps, armed elements are present, and violent incidents are increasing.” Statement published in a U.N. report on Darfur [Mail&Guardian, September 18, 2007]

“We see new problems erupting in Darfur among the tribes themselves. They are competing on what scorched land is left after the burnings and killings, and there is more fighting among them than between the rebels and the governments.” Jan Eliasson, U.N. Special Envoy to Sudan [Washington Post, May 17, 2007]

“The way it is portrayed, to say that this is Arab versus black, may have been true at the start, but its much more complex now… You have Arab tribes fighting the government, you have black tribes fighting each other.” Alun McDonald, spokesmen for Oxfam in Khartoum [The Christian Science Monitor, June 12, 2007]

“Fighting between non-signatory armed groups and the government to a certain extent declined… But general lawlessness, such as high jacking of vehicles and robbery, is very much worse.” George Somerwill, spokesman for the U.N. mission in Sudan [The Christian Science Monitor, June 12, 2007]

“It’s a symptom of how much the conflict has expanded… It’s no longer the government versus the rebels. There are just far more actors now.” David Mozersky, regional Director for International Crisis Group [The New York Times, October 1, 2007]

2006 Violence continued to escalate at an unprecedented rate throughout 2006. In July, attacks caused the highest number of casualties since the conflict began in 2003. The Darfur Peace Agreement was signed in Abuja, Nigeria in May 2006, however, both the government and rebel factions continue to clash thereby ignoring the principles outlined in the agreement. The SLM/A has split into numerous factions, which have begun to attack each other as well as commit atrocities against the civilian population. The recruitment of child soldiers by rebels in refugee camps has increased, fuelling the government’s deployment of Janjaweed militia forces upon the unarmed camps. Chadian forces continue to play a key role in the conflict, as Sudanese rebel movements claim that militiamen from Chad are aligned with the government in Khartoum and are responsible for attacks against civilians. The African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) remains under-funded and ill-equipped, yet the government of Khartoum refuses to allow United Nations peacekeeping forces into the Darfur region, reportedly claiming a “neo-colonialist” agenda on the part of the UN. At the very end of 2006, approval for a UN light intelligence force finally came through from Khartoum. Attacks on AU personnel as well as humanitarian aid workers have climbed exponentially, reducing the ability of aid workers to reach the millions in desperate need of assistance.

“Children as young as 13 are being forced into combat by Sudanese rebels who take the youngsters from squalid refugee camps in neighbouring Chad. Tribal leader Yaqoub Abu from the Goz Amir refugee camp said that in the last three weeks, Sudanese Liberation Army rebels have begun brazenly entering his camp in uniform, and he said the ramifications of that move terrify him. “If anyone discovers we have a relationship with the Sudanese Liberation Army, we must be attacked,” he said.” [CNN Online, May 17, 2006]

“Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir has opposed the deployment of international troops in his country, saying Sudan would be ‘re-colonized’.” [BBC News, June 21, 2006]

“The UN report listed a series of attacks by Minnawi’s group on other Sudan Liberation Movement factions, one led by Abdel Wahed Mohammed al-Nur and one known as the G-19, neither of which signed the Abuja peace agreement.” [Reuters, July 12, 2006]

“The UN has said the rebel groups have begun to fight each other, with the Sudanese military apparently supporting Minnawi’s faction.” [Reuters, July 12, 2006]

“The African Union and United Nations have agreed on the first phase of transforming the cash-strapped AU peace mission in Sudan’s Darfur region into a “hybrid” AU-UN force, officials said. Amid lingering questions over Khartoum’s readiness to accept UN participation in a joint peacekeeping operation, UN and AU officials signed a memorandum of understanding for phase one of the plan. The Light Support Package, which has been agreed to by the Sudanese government, is the first of three phases in the proposed transformation of AMIS into a hybrid AU-UN mission.” [Agence France Presse, November 26, 2006]

“In Darfur government forces, janjaweed, and Darfur rebel groups committed serious abuses during the year, including the reported killing of at least several thousand civilians. Government and janjaweed militias razed numerous villages of African tribes, and committed acts of torture and violence against women. Darfur rebel groups were also responsible for rape and attacks on humanitarian convoys and compounds in order to steal equipment and supplies, resulting in death and injury to humanitarian workers.” [2006 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices, Sudan, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, US Department of State, 2007]

2005 Attacks on villages and, for the first time, refugee camps continued with the Janjaweed militia responsible for a majority of the attacks. Clashes took place between rebels and the Janjaweed militia and between rival factions of the SLA and JEM. Although violence was down compared to past years, in September it escalated as rebels increasingly clashed with government forces. The conflict spilled over into neighbouring Chad when Janjaweed militants attacked villages in Chad and clashed with the Chadian army killing dozens of people.

"’Around 60 people were reportedly killed in the fighting, which was still continuing on Monday, and forced newly displaced people to IDP [internally displaced person] settlements in Zalingei,’ Radhia Achouri, spokeswoman for the UN Mission in Sudan (UNMIS), said. During earlier clashes in the area in October, between 150 and 200 people were reportedly killed and thousands of cattle stolen, Achouri added." [Reuters, December 15, 2005]

"A group of unidentified armed men in military uniform crossed into Chad from Sudan early on Monday, killing 36 herders and stealing livestock, the Chadian government said. In a statement on Tuesday, the government said the attack took place in the village of Madayouna in the Ouaddai region of eastern Chad." [IRINnews.org, September 27, 2005]

"Banditry and continous attacks by armed groups on humanitarian workers, Arab nomads and villages in Darfur have increased significantly over the past weeks and threaten to destabilize the fragile ceasefire in the volatile western Sudanese region." [IRINnews.org, September 14, 2005]

"Threats of violence forced the United Nations to evacuate large areas of war-torn Dafur, underlining Sudan’s failure to curb the notorious Janjaweed militia." [David Blair, The Telegraph, March 18, 2005]

2004 A ceasefire agreement was violated by all parties with fighting between rebels and government forces and government bombings of civilian villages. Internally displaced persons camps also were attacked, leading to the evacuation of humanitarian agencies. Sudanese army and police reportedly forcibly relocated displaced people out of camps, contravening international law and Sudan’s agreements with the United Nations.

"Reports of sexual violence, including rape, have persisted in Sudan's strife-torn western region of Darfur, despite agreements between Khartoum and rebel groups, aimed at improving the security situation in the area." [IRIN, December 7, 2004]

"The latest fighting erupted in a government stronghold southwest of Nyala in South Darfur following shooting at a camp for internally displaced persons (IDPs) in Kalma, UN News reported...The latest reports of fighting, relief workers said, had come only a day after aid workers were reported to have started returning to Tawillah, the base of the North Darfur region, where rebels launched an attack last week in violation of ceasefire accords." [IRIN, December 3, 2004]

"Renewed clashes between government troops and rebel fighters in the western Sudan state of North Darfur has forced the UN World Food Programme (WFP) to temporarily suspend its operations, except in the state capital El-Fasher…This affects about 300,000 displaced people, who are now cut off from aid." [IRIN, November 25, 2004]

"Despite recent pledges of peace, fighting has broken out in the town of Tawillah in North Darfur, home to over 30,000 thousand people who have fled there for fear of being attacked by Government-backed Arab militias. An aerial attack by the Government, including one bomb which landed 50 metres from a Save the Children (UK) feeding centre, forced over 30 of the staff to flee the town into the desert." [Catholic Information Service for Africa, November 23, 2004]

"Sudan is violating both international law and its agreements with the United Nations by forcing internally displaced persons (IDPs) out of camps they fled to in Darfur…In a pre-dawn operation earlier on Tuesday, Sudanese army and police reportedly moved a large number of IDPs from camps near Nyala in South Darfur. ‘Our current understanding is that between 6,000 and 8,000 IDPs were relocated,’ Barry Came, spokesperson for the World Food Programme (WFP) in Khartoum, told IRIN…However, under agreement with the UN, Sudan cannot force them to return to their villages or other locations until they agree to go." [IRIN, November 3, 2004]

"The number of ceasefire breaches in the Darfur region in western Sudan increased considerably during September and early October, Radhia Achouri, spokeswoman for the United Nations Advance Mission in Sudan (UNAMIS), told IRIN…Achouri mentioned that the United Nations had received reports of a heavy aerial bombardment in North Darfur, but were awaiting official confirmation of the incident by ceasefire monitors of the African Union (AU).In another confirmed incident, suspected rebels of the Sudanes Liberation Army attacked government positions near Kutum in North Darfur on 19 October, she said. A number of injured people were admitted to a nearby Red Cross clinic." [IRIN, October 22, 2004]

"On Friday, UN News had reported an attack against the village of Uma Kasara which took place on 2 October. Three policemen were reportedly killed, while 650 families had to flee as unidentified gunmen burnt their village. It said the IDPs had continued to arrive in Kalma, an overcrowded refugee camp close to the South Darfur state capital of Nyala, which already holds an estimated 60,000 people who fled their homes earlier." [IRIN, October 18, 2004]

"The Sudanese government and two rebel movements in the country’s western Darfur region have agreed to a 45-day ceasefire to allow humanitarian assistance to reach several hundred thousand people affected by the fighting." [IRIN, April 9, 2004]

2003 February attacks by the Sudan Liberation Movement/Army (SLM/A) on government forces in western Darfur were met with retaliation by Janjaweed militia fighters, armed and supported by Sudanese military forces. In spite of several ceasefire agreements between the government and the SLM/A, fighting continued incessantly. Later in the year the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) also emerged to conduct small-scale military operations against government institutions and forces in Darfur. The majority of clashes were raid-like operations, conducted primarily with small arms and light weapons. However, Janjaweed raids on villages suspected of being sympathetic to the rebels were also coupled with air-bombing campaigns, allegedly undertaken by the Sudanese military. The indiscriminate nature of the warfare resulted in thousands of deaths, mostly civilian. Additionally, the destruction of thousands of villages led to the displacement, both internally and externally, of more than half a million people. The majority of news reports portray the Arab Janjaweed militias as the primary aggressors in the conflict against the largely non-Arab populations and rebel groups in Darfur, leading many analysts to label the conflict as genocidal in nature, a claim hotly contested by Sudanese officials.

"Reports of attacks by government-supported Arab nomad militias (the "janjaweed"), acting in support of its counterinsurgency campaign, point toward a government-sanctioned policy of targeting ethnic groups represented in the SLA and the JEM. There were reports that the Government and government-supported militia tortured and beat persons suspected of supporting the rebellion in Darfur." [US Department of State, Country report on Human Rights Practices 2003, February 25, 2004]

"Since the breakdown of peace talks on 15 December between the government and the Sudan Liberation Army (SLA) rebel group, fighting and militia attacks in all three Darfur states have escalated. In December alone, about 30,000 people fled from militia attacks across the border to neighbouring Chad, bringing the number of refugees there - mostly women and children - to 95,000." [IRIN, January 5, 2004]

"Rebels and villagers attacked and killed 186 government-armed militia fighters who raided settlements in the west of Sudan, a rebel leader said on Thursday. Justice and equality Movement fighters responded on Wednesday to an appeal from villagers after attacks left more than 20 civilians dead in a tribal area in Western Darfur state, the group’s general coordinator Abu Bakr Hamid al-Nur said." [Reuters, November 27, 2003]

Number of Deaths:

Total: Estimates of the number of people killed during attacks and executions since the outbreak of fighting in early 2003 range from 200,000 to 400,000. According to the most high- end estimates from the United Nations, at least 450 000 people have been killed or died from disease and malnutrition arising from the conflict. More than 2.4 million others have been displaced. It should be noted that a lack of access and independent observers to the Darfur region have made attaining reliable casualty figures difficult. At the peak of the conflict in 2003, health experts estimated that 6 000 to 10 000 people were dying each month as a result of disease, hunger, and violence. Due to a drop in violence and improved health care that figure is estimated to be between 100 to 600 per month. In April 2008 UN under-secretary-general for humanitarian affairs John Holmes estimated that the number of deaths from combined effects of the conflict could be as high as 300,000. This figure has been recognized as a valid high-end estimate by the WHO Collaboration Centre for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters (CRED). CRED’s data also suggests a low end estimate of at least 150,000 deaths. Conversely, the Government of Sudan continues to maintain an estimate of only 10,000 deaths.
[Sources: CRED, April 24, 2008; CRED, May 26th, 2005; Reuters, April 23, 2008; Globe and Mail, January 30, 2007; Los Angeles Times, August 27, 2007]

“A study in 2006 suggested that 200 000 had lost their lives from the combined effects of the conflict. That figure must be much higher now, perhaps half as much again.” John Holmes, U.N. under-secretary-general for humanitarian affairs [Reuters, April 23, 2008]

“According to the UN, more than 200,000 persons have died, two million civilians have been internally displaced, and an estimated 234,000 refugees have fled to neighboring Chad since the conflict began in 2003. Despite the presence in Darfur of the African Union-led international monitoring force (African Union Mission in Sudan or AMIS), security remained a major problem and deteriorated during the year, with reports of violence increasing during the latter half of the year.” [2006 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices, Sudan, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, US Department of State, 2007]

"There is no generally agreed figure for the number of deaths since the conflict began, and one cannot be established until the government allows a credible mortality survey in all three Darfur states." [International Crisis Group, Darfur: The Failure to Protect - Africa Report N°89, March 8, 2005]

2008 The number of casualties directly related to violence in Darfur was over 1000 in 2008. This figure includes deaths of civilians, rebels and government soldiers, as a result of fighting between and within these groups (ie. Ethnic clashes and fighting between rebel groups). Although the number of deaths seems to have decreased, there is no shortage of attacks, displacement, sexual violence and humanitarian need. Thus, the decrease in reported deaths should not necessarily convey the impression that the conflict is abating. As well, an estimated 465 people were killed in Khartoum, including 57 civilians, as a result of an attempted coup of Khartoum by rebels based out of Darfur. These deaths do not fit totally into the dynamic of the Darfurian crisis or the north-south civil war; rather, they are symptomatic of an ongoing proxy war with the Chadian government, which has emerged as a primary driver behind rebel activity in both countries.

2007 Civilian casualties decreased by 70% in the first half of 2007 compared with the same period last year. Violence related casualties during 2007 averaged between 100 to 200 per month leading many to estimate that between 1 200 and 2 000 people were killed throughout the year.

“Violence has subsided in the first part of 2007 and this definitely has affected the death toll.” Ali Hamati, U.N. spokesperson in El Fasher [Los Angeles Times, August 27, 2007]

2006 In 2006 casualties reached rates seen before only in 2003. Numerous debates have arisen as to the reliability of casualty figures, but it is estimated that between 1,000 and 1,500 people were killed throughout the year. July was also the deadliest month for humanitarian aid workers, with eight reported killed. The AU peacekeeping mission has suffered numerous casualties, as rebel forces attacked convoys and targeted personnel. In October the United Nations discovered that government-supported forces attacked 45 villages in the Darfur region within a span of only a few days, reportedly killing hundreds of civilians throughout the course of the attacks.

“One significant problem in establishing a clear idea [of casualty numbers] is that the Sudanese government and their allies, an Arab militia known as the Janjaweed, are blamed for most of the deaths, so the Khartoum authorities show little interest in encouraging any accurate assessment. Indeed they consistently underplay the scale of the crisis.” [BBC News, March 31, 2006]

“Eleven aid workers have been killed since the signing of the peace agreement, “an unprecedented level of deadly attacks,” and humanitarian organizations have access to only half of the 3.6 million people affected by the conflict, he said. He said aid workers may be forced to withdraw completely from North Darfur, where more than 1.2 million need help.” [Reuters, August 01, 2006]

2005 Over 1,000 people were reported killed this year.

"The U.N. report, prepared by Jan Pronk, Annan’s special envoy in Sudan, said the number of confirmed deaths due to violence has not exceeded 100 a month since January when the figure was 300-350 people." [Evelyn Leopold, Reuters, July 20, 2005]

2004 At least 350 people were killed by fighting in 2004. This is a conservative figure due to the limited presence of independent observers in Darfur.

2003 An estimated five thousand people, mostly civilians, were killed by fighting in Darfur in 2003. Due to the absence of independent observers in Darfur, it is impossible to verify this figure. Some analysts have indicated that the death toll may be much higher.

"Militia atrocities are common in a campaign that has thus far led to the indiscriminate killing of an estimated 3,000 unarmed civilians and the displacement of more than 600,000 others." [International Crisis Group, December 10, 2003]

"The human rights group (Amnesty International) said it feared ‘the death toll in Darfur is much higher than which is currently reported’, due to the lack of independent observers in the region and an information black-out." [IRIN, September 8, 2003]

Political Developments:

2008 On July 14th, 2008, Moeno-Ocampo, prosecutor for the International Criminal Court (ICC) presented evidence against Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir for 10 counts of genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity, and requested a warrant for his arrest. As in the cases of Harun and Kishayb (see 2007), the Sudanese government’s rhetoric was largely dismissive. In action however, the government responded with several measures to improve its image and demonstrate commitment to peace: a program for dialogue known as the “Sudan People’s Initiative” in October, engaging in an Arab League peace plan led by Qatar, promising increased commitment to UNAMID deployment and accountability, and even declaring an unconditional ceasefire for Darfur in November. However, rebel groups have largely boycotted these measures, calling for militia disarmament as a first step before ceasefire and movement of the existing Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA). In light of Sudan’s historical failure to keep promises, these measures have also been criticized as “fully reversible”. Nonetheless, African and Arab states, and even many of Bashir’s political opponents within Sudan, have asked the ICC to delay its proceedings, fearing that Bashir’s indictment would lead to a breakdown of the DPA (with its provision for 2009 elections), as well as a backlash against UNAMID, humanitarian efforts and even civilian populations within Sudan. Meanwhile, a last minute vote in the UN Security Council extended UNAMID’s mandate through July 31st, 2009.

“I don’t have the luxury of looking away … I have evidence … [Bashir’s] motives were largely political. His alibi was ‘counterinsurgency.’ His intent was genocide” [Moreno-Ocampo, ICC Prosecutor, quoted in the Christian Science Monitor, 07/15/2008]

“We are very confident of our internal front and we don’t give a damn about the precedents set by those going to court” [President Al-Bashir, as quoted in the Mail and Guardian, 08/21/2008]

2007 On February 27, 2007 a prosecutor of the International Criminal Court (ICC) presented evidence against Ahmad Muhammad Harun (the current Sudanese state minister for humanitarian affairs) and Ali Kishayb (militia/Janjaweed leader) for war crimes and crimes against humanity carried out against civilian populations in West Darfur between 2003-2004. The government of Sudan rejects the authority of the ICC, however the U.N. human rights mission also accused the government of orchestrating and taking part in war crimes in Darfur and urged the international community to provide immediate action to protect civilians living in the region. On July 31, 2007 the U.N. Security Council voted unanimously to pass resolution 1769 which mandates that a joint U.N./AU force composed of 26 000 troops and police be sent to Darfur. The resolution includes provisions allowing the use of force to protect civilians. The newly formed UNAMID is planned to take over from AMIS on January 1, 2008, despite repeated setbacks caused by a lack of cooperation from the government of Sudan, as well as a lack of logistical support (including 24 helicopters deemed necessary to successfully operate in the region, which were previously promised by U.N. member states who have since faltered on their offer). Several attempts were made to assist the rebels in forming a common position in preparation for holding further peace talks between the government and non-signatory rebel groups who refused to sign the Darfur Peace Agreement. Five rebel groups met in Ndjamena, the capital of Chad, however JEM and six factions of the SLM/A boycotted the talks and limited progress was made in brokering peace between non-signatory rebels and the government. Tension between Sudan, Chad and the Central African Republic continued and many fear that the large refugee populations fleeing Darfur will contribute to further insecurity in the region. There is talk amongst members of the international community that should the Sudanese government continue to impede and disrupt the deployment of UNAMID, the Security Council should impose sanctions against the Sudan.

“The situation is characterized by gross and systematic violations of human rights and grave breaches of international humanitarian law… The government of Sudan has manifestly failed to protect the population of Darfur from large-scale international crimes and has itself orchestrated and participated in these crimes.” U.N. human rights mission report to the Security Council [Mail&Guardian, March 19, 2007]

“We are not here to compel any peace. We are here to work with the Sudanese people - both the government and the parties to assist them to find peace. We are not here to impose peace. We are not here to fight anybody.” General Martin Luther Agwai, head of the joint AU/UN peacekeeping mission to Darfur [BBC News, September 17, 2007]

“This meeting… aims at bringing Sudanese rebel groups which have not signed the Abuja accord to harmonise their positions and speak in a single voice at the Tripoli conference.” Chadian official [Agence France Presse, September 19, 2007]

“The implementation timely for UNAMID is being delayed owing to… delays in obtaining feedback regarding the list of troop-contributing countries submitted to the government of Sudan… I remain extremely concerned about the continuing violence in Darfur. The ongoing loss of life and displacement of civilians is unacceptable and is not contributing to an atmosphere conducive to peace talks [in Libya].” Ban Ki Moon, UN Secretary General [Agence France Presse, October 11, 2007]

“Without mobility and transportations, it will be extremely difficult for us to deploy our forces, and even [if] they are deployed, without effective, efficient mobility and capacity, we will not be able to protect the civilians and even our own soldiers… We are at a critical moment for Darfur… Member states have spoken clearly about what must be done. It is time for them to walk their talk.” Ban Ki Moon, U.N. Secretary General [Mail&Guardian, December 7, 2007]

“The member states of the international community continue to be rhetorically extremely strong, and we need to match that rhetoric with the resourcing… We are concerned… It is clear that without the full support of the Sudanese government, as has been promised, the mission will not succeed.” Jane Holl Lute, U.N. peacekeeping official, [NPR, December 19, 2007]

2006 In May, internationally mediated peace talks resulted in the signing of the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) by the faction of the Sudan Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) led by Minni Minnawi. However, a rival SPLM/A faction led by Abdelwahid Muhamed El Nur, as well as the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM), refused to sign, as they felt concessions granted to the peoples of Darfur were inadequate. The agreement granted the Darfurian people the fourth highest ranking position in government, as well as a provision to disarm the Janjaweed militia. Despite this agreement, atrocities continued, the Janjaweed was not disarmed, and at the end of 2006 the DPA appeared to be largely ignored by both sides. In addition, further splits between factions of the SLM/A resulted in inter-group violence. Throughout the year the government of Khartoum repeatedly affirmed that it would not allow a UN peacekeeping force in the Darfur region, despite the inadequacy of the AU Mission. The government claimed that the UN had a colonial agenda, and many local elders have echoed this position, reportedly claiming to declare jihad if UN peacekeepers entered the territory. However, in December 2006, Khartoum agreed to allow the UN to provide a Light Intelligence Force composed mainly of logistics personnel to reinforce the AU mission. Tensions along the Chad and Central African Republic borders continued to fuel fears that conflict in Darfur could de-stabilize the entire region.

“Sudan’s regime hailed a “major achievement” yesterday as it managed to delay the deployment of United Nations peacekeepers in the war-torn Darfur region for at least six months. Oxfam gave warning that “millions” of lives could be endangered by this hold-up.” [UK Telegraph, March 13, 2006]

“The AU deal proposes a Darfurian take the fourth highest-ranking position to the Presidency with the rank of “senior presidential assistant”, a move meant to diffuse a defuse a deadlock over rebel demands for a Darfurian to be made Vice President.” [IRIN, April 28, 2006]

“The government of Sudan and the main rebel force in Darfur reached a peace agreement aimed at ending a three-year civil war that has killed more than 180 000 amid charges of genocide and ethnic cleansing. With diplomats from the United States, Britain, Canada and the European Union acting as mediators, the Sudanese government accepted several amendments aimed at improving security, power sharing and wealth sharing provisions of a draft accord. The agreement was a major accomplishment, despite its rejection by two of the three major rebel groups.” [The Globe and Mail, May 05, 2006]

“The Sudanese government has agreed to disarm the Janjaweed, which had been accused of perpetrating the worst atrocities against civilians, with the support of Khartoum.” [The Globe and Mail, May 05, 2006]

“A rival faction of the SLA and the small Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) rejected the agreement, citing a wide range of objections. Western diplomats said they are hopeful that the SLA contingent, led by Abdel Wahed Mohammed al-Nur, can be brought onside, and played down the influence of the JEM, saying it had no operational forces on the ground in Darfur.” [The Globe and Mail, May 05, 2006]

“The other rebel faction rejecting the plan, the smaller JEM, said that the main sticking point was its demand for the post of second vice-president.” [The Globe and Mail, May 05, 2006]

“Sudan has rejected UN transition in Darfur likening it to a Western invasion that would attract jihadi militants and cause an Iraq-style quagmire.” [Reuters, July 12, 2006]

2005 Negotiations between the SLA and JEM rebel groups and the Sudan government continued with little progress made. Parallel negotiations between rebel factions began in an effort to establish unity among rival rebel factions. A UN Security Council investigation found that war crimes and crimes against humanity had been committed in Darfur and recommended 51 people, including government officials, rebel and militia leaders, face trial at the International Criminal Court.

"Delegates at the AU-sponsored peace talks seeking an end to the 33-month-old crisis in Sudan’s Darfur region returned to the negotiating table Friday in a bid to resolve a row over power and wealth sharing, an AU spokesman said... Previous negotiations were undermined by regular ceasefire violations, and the United Nations has warned the Darfur region is falling into chaos, with murder, robbery and rape on the increase." [Sudan Tribune, December 9, 2005]

"Rival rebel leaders from the Sudanese region of Darfur sounded a rare note of unity on Monday as they worked on a common negotiating position for the seventh round of peace talks with the government…[The rebels] said they would put on hold infighting that has held back progress in previous rounds of peace talks in the Nigerian capital." [The Washington Post, November 28, 2005]

"A Darfur rebel group excluded from upcoming peace talks in Nigeria said on Wednesday it had abandoned a ceasefire agreed with Khartoum and would resume operations in the western Sudanese region. The National Movement for Reform and Development (NMRD) signed a ceasefire with Khartoum in December last year and agreed to a security deal in April." [Reuters, September 14, 2005]

"The security council voted to strengthen its arms embargo on Darfur to include the government, and ordered an asset freeze and travel ban on those who defied peace efforts in the area." [Business Today, March 31, 2005]

"On March 24th, the UN decided to send a 10,000-strong peacekeeping force to Sudan, mainly to police the peace settlement in the south of the country, though some of them could be sent to Darfur, in the west. Currently, there are only 2,000 African Union (AU) peacekeepers there, lacking the resources to face down the janjaweed." [The Economist, April 1, 2005]

"A UN panel investigated the conflict and concluded that, while ‘genocide’ was not taking place, ‘war crimes’ and ‘crimes against humanity’ had been committed. Moreover, the panel named 51 individuals, including senior government officials, rebel commanders and leaders of the notorious, pro-regime Janjaweed militia, and recommended that they should face trial before the newly established International Criminal Court." [David Blair, The Telegraph, February 2, 2005]

2004 Two UN resolutions called on the conflict parties to cease hostilities and uphold humanitarian law but both resolutions were perceived by analysts to be weak. A UN panel was appointed to investigate claims of genocide in Darfur, an African Union force was increased, and peace talks culminated in the signing of a November agreement but violence persisted and a new party to the conflict emerged during the year.

"The UN Security Council adopted a resolution on Friday demanding that the Sudanese government, rebel forces and other armed groups in the western region of Darfur cease all violence and ensure that their members comply with international humanitarian law." [AllAfrica.com, November 19, 2004]

"The Sudanese government and rebel leaders from Darfur have signed two accords aimed at ending the crisis after weeks of talks. In a security deal the government-under international pressure- accepted a ban on military flights over Darfur. A separate agreement seeks to ease delivery of humanitarian aid to Darfur." [BBC, November 9, 2004]

"The African Union (AU) began boosting its peacekeeping force in Sudan’s Darfur region on Friday with the arrival of 50 Nigerian troops. A further 237 soldiers from Rwanda are expected to arrive on Saturday to help try and end violence that has driven more than 1.5 million people from their homes, the AU said." [IRIN, October 29, 2004]

"Sudan has agreed to the deployment of some 3,500 extra African troops in its war-torn region of Darfur. The soldiers along with some 800 police officers, will be tasked with monitoring a shaky ceasefire between rebels and the government." [BBC, October 1, 2004]

"Presenting testimony on Darfur to the US Senate Foreign Relations Committee on Thursday in Washington, Powell had said genocide has been committed in Darfur...the government of Sudan and the Janjawid [militia] bear responsibility [and] genocide may still be occurring." [IRIN, September 13, 2004]

"The United Nations Security Council voted in favour of a watered-down resolution yesterday that set a 30-day deadline for Sudan to bring under control the militia that has been creating havoc in the western Darfur region. The US and UK originally proposed threatening Sudan with an arms embargo and sanctions. But they were forced to back off in the face of opposition from countries such as Russia, China, Pakistan, Algeria and Brazil…Instead of ‘sanctions’, the Security Council will consider unspecified ‘measures’ if Sudan fails to comply by next month. The resolution was adopted by 13 votes to 0, with China and Pakistan abstaining." [The Guardian, July 31, 2004]

2003 Following the government’s early dismissal of the rebels as common criminals and outlaws, officials began ceasefire negotiations with the SLM/A, mediated by Chadian government officials and leading to a September agreement. Violence continued throughout Darfur for the remainder of the year however, and the ceasefire was dissolved in December. The Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) refused peace talks with the government due to concerns that the Chadian mediators were biassed towards the Sudanese government. The Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA), which has been fighting the Sudanese military for over twenty years, voiced support for the rebels in Darfur, but there was no confirmed link between the SPLA and the SLM/A or JEM.

"(JEM) leader said on Thursday his group would not join peace talks between the government and another rebel group, and accused the Chadian mediators of bias in favour of Khartoum... ‘We want separate talks ... and we want international mediation...’ he said." [Reuters, December 4, 2003]

"The resumption of a ceasefire agreement between the Sudanese government and Sudan Liberation Movement/Army (SLM/A) in Darfur, western Sudan, is highly unlikely, according to the rebel group ... The frequently violated agreement, which was brokered by Chad on 3 September, was renewed on 4 November for one month. ‘The ceasefire is a waste of time,’ said (SLM/A spokesman) al-Shafi. ‘There is no ceasefire.’" [IRIN, December 3, 2003]

"(SLM Secretary-General) Minawi said Sunday the SLM wanted to join the southern Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) rebels in peace talks with the government. He reported that his movement had decided to ‘begin a dialogue with the (SPLA) ... in order to reach a comprehensive solution on the entire Sudanese territory.’ ... The government has refused to acknowledge any political motivation for unrest in the states of North, South and West Darfur, blaming it instead on ‘armed criminal gangs and outlaws,’ ..." [Agence France Presse, June 6, 2003]

Background:

The Darfur region of western Sudan has experienced conflict among its inhabitants for decades. Clashes have traditionally been between nomadic herdsmen, who are primarily of Arab-descent, and sedentary farmers, who are primarily indigenous to the region. These disputes have usually been over access to land and water resources, and have in the past been resolved locally through traditional means. With the outset of the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) rebellion in southern Sudan in the 1980s, the Sudanese government provided the Arab population in Darfur with arms and employed them to act as Khartoum-friendly militias. The intensification and continuation of the southern rebellion, which was fought along ethnic lines (the northern Sudanese of Arab-descent versus the largely Black African population of southern Sudan), along with Khartoum’s involvement in Darfur, resulted in the Darfur region’s traditional, low-intensity resource conflicts becoming transformed into the high-intensity, ethnically-driven armed violence of 2003. Although the Darfur Peace Agreement was signed in May, 2006, its provisions have largely been ignored as all factions continue to commit atrocities against the civilian population. Libyan leader, Moammar Gaddafi’s involvement in the conflict gained attention recently when JEM refused to attend peace talks due to their location and host. Scheduled to take place in Libya and hosted by Goddafi, JEM said it would not attend because he had backed both sides in the conflict at different times. In the late 1980’s Gaddafi supported the armed group ‘Islamic Legion’ which fought an unsuccessful battle against the government of Chad. The first Janjaweed Arab militias were amongst those fighting with the Gaddafi supported forces. Following the end of the conflict the Janjaweed returned to their home region of Darfur and brought with them the weapons sponsored by Gaddafi.
[Source: The Washington Post, November 9, 2007]

“If he [Moammar Gaddafi] hadn’t inflamed the conflict in Chad and brought in all those weapons, I don’t think we would have conflict in Darfur now.” Alex de Waal, long time scholar of Sudan [The Washington Post, November 9, 2007]

"At the root of much of the conflict is competition over fertile land and water, exacerbated by desertification in northern Sudan and the drought that has affected Darfur on and off since the 1970s. Nomadic groups of all origins from the northern semi-desert belt have been pushed southward in search of grazing lands and water. The regular presence in Darfur’s agriculturally rich central belt of the nomads and their herds has caused friction with farmers...
Darfur is home to a complex mix for whom the tribe remains a key identifying factor. There are at minimum 36 main tribes ... This mix is composed of two major blocks, Arabs and non-Arabs ... Except for the Zaghawa ... the indigenous black African groups depend on subsistence farming and animal husbandry, while groups of Arab extraction live on camel herding in northern Darfur and cattle herding in southern Darfur ...
Over the last three decades, ‘traditional’ conflicts over resources or livestock have occurred both within the major Arab and non-Arab groups as well as between them... Against the backdrop of environmental degradation, however, government weaknesses and manipulation of the ethnic fabric of the region gradually produced an alarming shift in the nature of the conflict, with ethnicity becoming a major mobilising factor ... Fighters began identifying themselves more broadly as ‘Arab’ or ‘non-Arab’ for the first time in the 1987-1989 conflict between the Fur and the ‘Arabs’.” [International Crisis Group, Darfur Rising: Sudan’s New Crisis, March 25, 2004]

Arms Sources:

The Janjaweed and other Arab militias are alleged to have been armed by the Sudanese government, previously in order to fight against the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA), and recently to engage non-Arab populations in Darfur. The Janjaweed and the rebel forces are armed primarily with small arms. Sudanese government officials have claimed that the Darfur rebel groups have received arms and training from the SPLA. Analysts cite the existence of vast quantities of small arms in Darfur, in other areas of Sudan, and in the greater region in general, as being a major source of weapons for all parties to the conflict. In a report released by the United Nations in 2006, China was cited as a major arms supplier to the Darfur conflict. It has also become clear the SLM/A and the JEM have been in breach of a UN arms embargo receiving vast quantities of weaponry from countries such as Chad, Eritrea, and the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya. The government of Eritrea has been cited for providing arms, logistical support, military training and political support to both JEM and the Sudan Liberation Army (SLM/A). Eritrea has also reportedly provided training for the two groups in camps across the Eritrea/Sudan border. The situation between Chad and Sudan has been described as a proxy war, as both governments continue to accuse each other of providing neighbouring rebels with arms.

Based on U.N. Comtrade data, at least 34 countries exported small arms, light weapons and ammunition valued at almost 70 million USD to Sudan between 1992-2005. Ninety-six percent of the reported transfers were from China and Iran. Due to illegal trading, the amount of weapons traded and the number of source countries is likely to be much higher. There are an estimated 1.9-3.2 million small arms in circulation in Sudan. Two-thirds of the weapons are held by citizens, 20 percent by the government of Sudan and the remainder is divided between the government of south Sudan and current and former armed groups. A confidential U.N. report released in 2007 accused the government of Sudan of flying in arms and heavy military equipment to Darfur, in violation of Security Council Resolution 1591, which was passed March 29, 2005, in an attempt to cut the supply of arms to all parties of the Darfur conflict. The report stated that the government disguised military planes by painting them white to transport the arms and equipment, in violation of the arms embargo. Amnesty International (AI) also released photographs showing the use of Russian-supplied military helicopters by Sudanese troops and published trade figures from 2005 demonstrating that China and Russia sold 24 million and 21 million USD respectively worth of military material to Sudan during that year. The government of Sudan is permitted to conduct humanitarian flights into Darfur but only with U.N. permission, which to date has never been sought.
[Sources: New York Times, April 18, 2007; BBC News, May 10, 2007; Agence France Presse, October 11, 2007; The Times, September 26, 2007; Small Arms Survey, No. 7, July 2007: http://hei.unige.ch/sas/files/portal/spotlight/sudan/Sudan_pdf/SIB%207%20Arms.pdf]

“The Sudanese government is still deploying weapons into Darfur in breathtaking defiance of the U.N. arms embargo and Darfur peace agreements.” Brian Wood, Amnesty International’s Arms Control Research Manager [BBC News, August 27, 2007]

“The government has shipped arms and equipment, including military airplanes and helicopters by air into airports of Darfur’s three provincial capitals.” Ban Ki Moon [Agence France Presse, October 11, 2007]

“If weapons continue to flow into Darfur and peacekeepers are not given the power to disarm and demobilize all armed opposition groups and Janjaweed militia, the ability of the new peacekeeping force to protect civilians will be severely impeded.” Erwin van der Borght, director of Amnesty International’s Africa Programme [BBC News, August 27, 2007]

“The panel believes the use of white aircraft by the government of the Sudan constitutes a deliberate attempt to conceal the identity of these aircraft.” Confidential U.N. report of the Security Council on Sudan/Darfur [The New York Times, April 18, 2007]

“The government is providing guns to two tribes here and causes many problems… They [the government of Sudan] say it’s a tribal problem but they are the ones causing it.” Fatima Adam Yaoub, an IDP living in Abu Shouk Camp [The New York Times, September 26, 2007]

“The [UN] panel said the rebel Sudan Liberation Movement/Army (SLM/A) and Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) “have continued to receive arms, ammunition and/or equipment from Chad, Eritrea, the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, non-governmental groups and other unknown sources, even after the Security Council imposed an arms embargo on all nongovernmental groups in 2004.” [IRIN, February 08, 2006]

“The [UN] panel judges that the government of Eritrea has provided, and probably continues to provide, arms, logistical support, military training and political support to both JEM and the Sudan Liberation Army (SLA). Training of JEM and SLA has reportedly occurred at a number of camps in Eritrea on the Eritrea-Sudan border.” [IRIN, February 08, 2006]

“United Nations investigators have found most of the small arms fuelling the conflict in Sudan’s western Darfur are Chinese, despite an arms ban on a region where tens of thousands have been killed and 2.5 million squat in squalid camps.” [Reuters, June 19, 2006]

“China has been, and continues to be, a major supplier of light weapons to the government of Sudan and many of the neighbouring states,” said Ernst Jan Hogendoorn, one of the four UN experts on a panel which recommended 17 players in the Darfur conflict be sanctioned for obstructing peace. The panel’s report found Sudan’s neighbours Chad, Libya and Eritrea had supplied weapons to Darfur and that most of the small arms and ammunition in the region were Chinese.” [Reuters, June 19, 2006]

Economic Factors:                                         

Both the Sudan Liberation Movement/Army (SLM/A) and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) have cited the lack of economic development in the Darfur region as a source of their dissatisfaction. Furthermore, traditional conflicts between the largely pastoral Arab populations and the mainly sedentary non-Arab populations in the Darfur, have been fought over the control of land and water resources.

Most of Sudan’s current oil production is located in the South, which may gain autonomy from the rest of Sudan depending on the outcome of a referendum scheduled for 2011. The government was awarded three new oil concessions in the Darfur region in 2007, which it may attempt to utilize in the event the South becomes autonomous and they lose the significant amount of oil revenue collected from that area. The split of the South from the rest of Sudan would result in a loss of an estimated 6 billion USD in revenue per year.
[Source: Los Angeles Times, March 5, 2007]

“The consciousness of the world on issues of climate change has to change fast… Darfur is just an early warning.” Muawia Shaddad of the Sudan Environment Conservation Society [Associated Press, June 22, 2007]

"At the root of much of the conflict is competition over fertile land and water ... Ecological decline and a lack of development in the entire region have combined to impoverish Darfur people of all ethnic backgrounds." [International Crisis Group, Darfur Rising: Sudan’s New Crisis, March 25, 2004]

"The FLD said it wanted to eradicate the marginalisation and injustice which had deprived the region of development projects, (North Darfur State Governor) Suleiman (stated) ..." [Agence France Presse, February 26, 2003]