The number of nuclear weapons world-wide has been cut in half during the past decade, declining from a peak of around 70,000 in 1986 to 35,000 or fewer today. But the destructive power of today's arsenal remains enormous -- the equivalent of 500,000 nuclear bombs of the size that destroyed Hiroshima. If current arms control plans are realized, the total number of nuclear weapons in the world could fall to 15,000-20,000 by the year 2007. But the destructive power of even that residual arsenal is likely to exceed 200,000-300,000 Hiroshima bombs.

The use of even a small fraction of the world's nuclear arsenal would be a disaster unparalleled by anything experienced in the history of the human race, in all likelihood killing billions of people, ending our current civilization, and causing permanent damage to the global ecosystem. There is little likelihood that any sane leader would choose to embark upon such a war, but as long as nuclear weapons continue to exist the danger of nuclear annihilation -- whether caused by accident, miscalculation, desperation, madness, or deliberate terrorist ac -- will continue to threaten the entire human race. One of the most serious false alarms in the history of the nuclear era occurred only three years ago on January 25^th 1995Blong after the end of the Cold War. This fact should serve as a sobering reminder of the continuing danger posed by the existence of nuclear weapons. Canada has affirmed the same point in its support for the substance of the "new agenda" resolution at the UN this fall (i.e., its abstention on A/C.1/53/48, "Towards a Nuclear Weapon Free World," which affirms in preambular paragraph 4 the Canberra Commission's conclusion that "the proposition that nuclear weapons can be retained and never used accidentally or by decision defies credibility, and that the only complete defence is the elimination of nuclear weapons and the assurance that they will never be produced again"). We agree that only the abolition of nuclear weapons can ensure that these genocidal devices will never again be used.

The end of the Cold War enabled many people, and governments, to examine the nuclear threat with fresh eyes, unburdened by fear of imminent attack, and to see more clearly the danger that the continued possession of nuclear weapons poses. The conventional view that nuclear weapons are necessary, or at least inevitable, remains strongly entrenched in many countries, but the post-Cold War re-examination of this issue has led to a surge in support for the abolition of nuclear weapons, as exemplified by a number of recent developments, including:

• the May 1995 permanent extension of the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, which recommitted the nuclear powers to "pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament";

• the November 1995 creation of the Abolition 2000 network, a world-wide coalition of more than 1,000 NGOs created to co-ordinate citizen work on the abolition of nuclear weapons;

• the July 1996 release of the International Court of Justice"s advisory opinion on the legality of the use or threatened use of nuclear weapons, which cast doubt on the legality of almost all uses of nuclear weapons and concluded that "there exists an obligation to pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects";

• the August 1996 release of the Australian-government-sponsored Canberra Commission report, which called on the nuclear powers to "commit themselves unequivocally to proceed with all deliberate speed to a world without nuclear weaponsBnot as an objective for the far distant future, but as an objective which deserves action from the time the commitment is given";

• the September 1996 completion of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), which, upon its entry into force, will ban all future nuclear tests in all environments;

• the December 1996 statement by 61 retired Generals and Admirals from around the world, which concluded that "long-term international nuclear policy must be based on the declared principle of continuous, complete and irrevocable elimination of nuclear weapons";

• the June 1997 report of the Committee on International Security and Arms Control of the US National Academy of Sciences, which declared that "the potential benefits of a global prohibition of nuclear weapons are so attractive relative to the attendant risks that increased attention is now warranted to studying and fostering the conditions that would have to be met to make prohibition desirable and feasible";

• the December 1997 report of the Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict, which concluded that "the only durably safe course is to work toward elimination of nuclear weapons within a reasonable time frame";

• the February 1998 statement by 117 current or former civilian leaders, including former Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau and former Ambassador for Disarmament Doug Roche, which described the elimination of nuclear weapons as "a moral imperative";

• the June 1998 creation of the New Agenda Coalition, currently comprising Brazil, Egypt, Ireland, Mexico, New Zealand, Slovenia, South Africa and Sweden, which is calling on the nuclear weapon states to "commit themselves unequivocally to the elimination of their [nuclear arsenals] and to agree to start work immediately on the practical steps and negotiations required"; and

• the November 1998 passage in the UN First Committee of the "New Agenda Coalition resolution" (A/C.1/53/48), which called on the nuclear weapon states "without delay to pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to the elimination of [nuclear] weapons." Despite intense pressure from the NATO nuclear weapon states to vote against it, 12 out of the 16 NATO members abstained on the resolution, sending a clear signal that in their view the time has come to review NATO's nuclear weapon policies.

The growth of abolitionist sentiment also has led to the creation in recent years of two new international nuclear-weapons-free zones, codified in the Treaty of Pelindaba (encompassing all of Africa) and the Treaty of Bangkok (encompassing South East Asia). These two treaties, and the earlier treaties of Tlatelolco (Latin America) and Rarotonga (South Pacific), have, in effect, denuclearized half of the globe -- every state in the Southern Hemisphere is now part of a nuclear-weapons-free zone. In 1991 the only Southern Hemisphere state ever to develop nuclear weapons, South Africa, set an example for the world when it became the first, and so far only, state to entirely eliminate its nuclear arsenal.

Canadians also have paid increased attention to nuclear weapons issues in recent years. Recent Canadian developments include:

• the April 1996 creation of the Canadian Network to Abolish Nuclear Weapons (CNANW), a network of Canadian NGOs established to share information and co-ordinate work on nuclear abolition in co-operation with the international Abolition 2000 network;

• the September 1996 conduct of a cross-country series of community roundtables on nuclear weapons issues, sponsored by Project Ploughshares and other CNANW members and led by former Disarmament Ambassador (now Senator) Douglas Roche, which helped focus Canadian attention on the importance of the nuclear issue and contributed directly to Foreign Affairs Minister Lloyd Axworthy's decision to request a review of Canada's nuclear weapons policies;

• the March 1997-June 1998 review of Canadian nuclear policies undertaken by the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade at the request of Foreign Affairs Minister Axworthy (the committee is expected to report its conclusions before the end of 1998);

• the May 1997 commitment made by Prime Minister Chrétien in the second Liberal "Red Book" that "A re-elected Liberal government will... work vigorously to eliminate nuclear and chemical weapons and anti-personnel mines from the planet";

• the February 1998 statement by Canadian church leaders asking the Prime Minister to affirm abolition as the central goal of Canadian nuclear weapons policy and to add Canada's voice to the call to begin negotiations immediately on a Nuclear Weapons Convention;

• the February 1998 poll of Canadian attitudes regarding nuclear weapons conducted by the Angus Reid Group, which determined that 93 per cent of Canadians would support the negotiation of an agreement to abolish nuclear weapons and 92 per cent would support the Canadian government taking a leadership role in promoting such a ban;

• the March 1998 seminar on "Practical Steps for Canadian Policy Development on Nuclear Weapons Issues," a meeting of Canadian experts and activists representing the full range of security policy views, which expressed near-unanimous support for a number of possible policy initiatives, including Canadian support for no first use, the de-alerting of nuclear weapons, and further steps towards the elimination of nuclear weapons; and

• the September 1998 conduct of a second series of community roundtables, which confirmed that wide support exists among the Canadian public for stronger Canadian action to address the nuclear threat.

The problem has not gone away

Despite these positive developments, much remains to be done. Although the nuclear weapon states are legally obligated to eliminate their nuclear arsenals, none has shown any sign to date of taking concrete steps to fulfil that obligation:

• in September 1997 Russian officials stated that Russia's new military doctrine would reaffirm the recent trend towards greater Russian reliance on nuclear weapons, including the possible first-use of nuclear weapons, making it more closely resemble NATO's nuclear policies;

• in November 1997 US President Bill Clinton signed Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) 60, confirming that the United States intends to retain nuclear weapons for the "indefinite future";

• in December 1997 NATO stated that "nuclear forces continue to play an essential role in NATO strategy." As recently as December 1996Bwell after the release of the International Court of Justice's advisory opinion -- the alliance declared that "NATO countries have no... need to change any aspect of NATO's nuclear posture or nuclear policy -- and we do not foresee any future need to do so" (the November 1998 vote on the New Agenda Coalition resolution makes it clear, however, that many NATO members are not satisfied with this position);

• in May 1998 India and Pakistan ended decades of comparative restraint and conducted a series of nuclear tests, starting what could become an intense nuclear arms race in South Asia; and

• in the Fall of 1998 the Western nuclear weapon states reaffirmed their commitment to the indefinite retention of nuclear weapons through their vigorous opposition to the New Agenda Coalition resolution, and through their insistence that the doctrine of nuclear deterrence must not be challenged.

Recommended Canadian Policy Initiatives

1. Advocate immediate steps to reduce nuclear threat

The Canadian government should advocate immediate steps to reduce the nuclear threat, including removing all nuclear forces from alert and concluding agreements on no-first-use of nuclear weapons and non-use against non-nuclear states.

The reductions that have been made in the world's nuclear arsenals since the end of the Cold War are encouraging, but they do not go nearly far enough. The nuclear weapon states' continued deployment of thousands of nuclear weapons on "hair-trigger" alert and their continued adherence to nuclear policies that countenance the possibility of first-use or other warfighting uses of nuclear weapons expose the entire world to intolerable and wholly unjustifiable risks.

The dangers posed by these postures and the kinds of measures that could be taken to mitigate or eliminate them have been described in detail by Bruce Blair and others (see, for example, Bruce Blair, Harold Feiveson, and Frank von Hippel, "Taking Nuclear Weapons off Hair-Trigger Alert," Scientific American, November 1997). The burgeoning global consensus on the necessity of addressing these dangers is one of the most striking developments of the post-Cold War era. The Canberra Commission report, the military leaders' statement, the National Academy of Sciences report, the Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict report, the civilian leaders' statement, and the New Agenda Coalition statement all highlighted the importance of taking immediate steps to reduce the dangers posed by current nuclear arsenals and nuclear postures. Among the immediate steps that could be taken (and which Canada should advocate) are the following measures:

• removing remaining nuclear forces from alert;

• removing warheads from delivery vehicles;

• ending deployment of non-strategic nuclear weapons;

• negotiating much deeper reductions in nuclear stockpiles; and

• concluding agreements on no-first-use of nuclear weapons and non-use against non-nuclear weapon states.

As noted below, Project Ploughshares recommends that Canada support the initiation of negotiations on a convention to rid the world of nuclear weapons. But it is important to recognize that immediate steps such as the ones listed above can -- and should -- be taken even in the absence of progress on the abolition of nuclear weapons.

2. Support Nuclear Weapons Convention

The Canadian government should adopt nuclear abolition as a real objective, calling on the nuclear weapon states and other states to begin negotiations on a convention to eliminate all nuclear weapons.

Canadian governments have long expressed their commitment to the eventual elimination of nuclear weapons. That commitment was given a welcome injection of urgency during the Fall of 1998 when Canada actively pressed its NATO allies to support the new agenda resolution (A/C.1/53/48) and its call for the "speedy and total elimination" of nuclear weapons. At the same time, Canada has not given explicit support to proposals for early attention to a Nuclear Weapons Convention. In October 1997 the Ambassador for Disarmament characterized such proposals as "premature at best." He said Canada was not opposed to a "convention," but saw it "as a potential step at an appropriate stage in the process of nuclear disarmament, but not as a comprehensive first step in that process." The "new agenda" resolution also does not prescribe a convention as a first step, but it does "affirm that a nuclear-weapon-free world will ultimately require the underpinnings of a universal and multilaterally negotiated legally binding instrument or a framework encompassing a mutually reinforcing set of instruments."

We are happy for Canada's support for that affirmation and consider that the time is now indeed appropriate to begin work on such an instrument or framework to consolidate the progress to date on nuclear disarmament and to provide a compelling context for the next stages of reduction. We are well beyond the first step" in the disarmament process. We appreciate Canada's attention to essential limitation measures, notably the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and a proposed treaty to stop the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons, but the time has now come for the international community to also begin laying out a comprehensive framework for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons.

We offer several reasons why the start of negotiations leading to a Nuclear Weapons Convention (NWC) is an appropriate, and indeed highly desirable, step at this time:

" Agreement to begin negotiations on a NWC would dramatically improve the international security climate. By helping to lay the ghosts of the Cold War to rest and build a positive non-military relationship with Russia, it would help allay Russian concerns about NATO expansion. It would dramatically strengthen the legitimacy of the global non-proliferation regime, which is under severe stress as a result of the failure of the nuclear weapon states to eliminate their weapons and the recent Indian and Pakistani entry into the nuclear club. It would underline the growing commitment of states to respect and strengthen international law, which, as the International Court of Justice concluded, obligates states "to pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control."

" NWC negotiations would provide a legitimizing context for many of the more limited measures currently being pursued by the Canadian government and other governments. The entry into force of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and the completion of a fissile materials production ban, both of which are major Canadian objectives, would be far more likely to occur if these measures were incorporated, explicitly or implicitly, into a real, on-going abolition process.

" NWC negotiations would put on the table crucial abolition-related measures, such as the development of stringent warhead and fissile material accounting procedures, that are not currently the subject of negotiations. The earlier such accounting and verification procedures are implemented, the more rapidly and more securely we will be able to proceed to the final elimination of nuclear weapons.

" NWC negotiations would ensure that the interim steps that do get taken in the course of strategic arms reduction agreements and other talks are in the right direction. The negotiations might determine, for example, that the preferred configuration for the smaller nuclear arsenals that would exist as the world proceeds through various interim stages on the road to abolition is significantly different from the configuration currently being pursued in arms control talks (to provide one minor example, surplus missile silos currently being destroyed might be utilized instead as secure storage facilities for warheads removed in the course of various de-alerting measures).

" Finally, agreement to negotiate a NWC would be a major step forward in itself, signalling concurrence by the nuclear weapon states that nuclear weapons are not essential, that they are in fact unnecessary and detrimental to security, and that the fundamental objective from this time forward must be to eliminate them as soon as possible in a secure and verifiable manner. This would mark a fundamental psychological turning point in the delegitimization of nuclear weapons and would have immediate consequences for existing nuclear doctrine and plans, providing further impetus for the implementation of the previously-mentioned immediate steps to reduce the risks posed by current nuclear arsenals.

None of this is meant to suggest that the negotiation of a NWC would be an instantaneous process. A model NWCBUN document A/C.1/52/7Balready exists and the primary stumbling block is a lack of political will to proceed, but no one should be surprised if the negotiations take a long time. The process might in some senses resemble the long saga of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, which took many years to achieve concrete results but whichBthrough its very existenceBcontributed substantially to the end of the Cold War. The process of negotiating a NWC will likewise make an important contribution to the abolition of nuclear weapons, and the start of negotiations on a NWC should be an immediate objective, not an objective for the indefinite future. As the Canberra Commission put it, a commitment by the nuclear powers to proceed with all deliberate speed to a world without nuclear weapons is the "first requirement" for movement towards a nuclear weapon free world: "A commitment of this kind could transform the whole process."

Prime Minister Chrétien's "Red Book" pledge that "a re-elected Liberal government will... work vigorously to eliminate nuclear and chemical weapons and anti-personnel mines from the planet" is fully consistent with, indeed points to, immediate Canadian efforts (i.e., within the government's current mandate) towards negotiation of such a Nuclear Weapons ConventionBjust as the government already is working for the full implementation of both the Chemical Weapons Convention and the Landmines Convention.

The annual sessions of the United Nations General Assembly provide an important opportunity for Canada to demonstrate more explicit and more urgent support for negotiations toward a NWC. Canada this fall still opposed (in the First Committee) the call in resolution A/C.1/53/L.45 for "A multilateral negotiations... leading to an early conclusion of a nuclear weapons convention." The forthcoming vote on the same resolution, as well as the Anew agenda" resolution, in the General Assembly will be an opportunity for Canada to make its support for a convention or comprehensive framework direct and explicit through "yes" votes on both items.

 3. Renounce nuclear umbrella

The Canadian government should renounce Canadian reliance on the "nuclear umbrella" and bring an end to Canadian support for the nuclear weapons possessed by other countries.

More than fifty years after the advent of the nuclear age, Canada's policy toward nuclear weapons remains fundamentally ambiguous. The Canadian government rules out acquiring its own nuclear weapons, opposes nuclear proliferation, actively supports a variety of interim nuclear arms reduction and control measures, and supports the abolition of all nuclear weapons. But until now it has also supported the continued possession of nuclear weapons by its allies, it participates in a nuclear-armed alliance, and, in endorsing NATO's current policy and posture, has declared that it does not currently foresee "any future need" to change "any aspect" of NATO's nuclear posture or policy. Canada is a non-nuclear-weapon-state signatory of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, but current practice continues to assert that the defence of Canada relies on the "nuclear umbrella" that the United States and other NATO allies have unfurled above this country, and it continues to provide both physical and political support for those weapons in a variety of ways. In short, while the Canadian government, like many others in the West, condemns any reliance on nuclear weapons by non-allied countries, it continues to treat those same weapons as a useful -- even necessary -- element of Canada's defences and those of its allies.

Among other forms of nuclear co-operation, Canada:

• provides airspace and facilities for nuclear bomber training;

• hosts visits by nuclear-armed submarines;

• has agreed in the past to permit the deployment of nuclear-armed bombers and support forces to Canadian airfields during nuclear crises (the current status of these agreements is not publicly known);

• produces and exports components for nuclear weapon delivery vehicles, such as bombers and submarines; and

• provides political and diplomatic support for American and NATO nuclear policies.

In recent years the Department of National Defence also has begun laying preliminary groundwork for the possibility of Canadian participation in whatever US ballistic missile defence system might be deployed in the future. The deployment of such a system would not be a step towards the elimination of nuclear weapons. Rather, it would be a dangerously destabilizing misstep, providing no significant protection against nuclear terrorism or accidental launches, almost certainly preventing further nuclear cuts, and quite possibly leading to a renewed nuclear arms race.

Canada will significantly enhance its effectiveness as an advocate for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament by ending direct and indirect support for nuclear weapons programs and for other programs that promise to undermine nuclear disarmament. The May 1994 decision to stop testing the air-launched cruise missile in Canadian airspace was a significant step in the right direction. Additional steps are also necessary.

Indeed, an appropriate and constructive framework to guide those additional steps toward becoming a true non-nuclear state would be for Canada to declare itself a nuclear-weapon-free zone (NWFZ). Becoming a NWFZ would not protect Canada from the consequences of a nuclear war, but it would make Canada a more effective advocate for the abolition of nuclear weapons, the only reliable way to prevent nuclear war.

Thus, Canada should reject not only the possession and production of nuclear weapons (as we do now), but also:

• the deployment of nuclear weapons in Canada at any time;

• the transport of nuclear weapons through Canadian territory; and

• the provision of any form of support for nuclear weapons (including participation in ballistic missile defence systems).

 4. Provide leadership in co-operation with like-minded states

Canada should continue to work with like-minded states to press the nuclear abolition agenda.

Canada is well-positioned to provide leadership on the nuclear abolition issue. As a close friend of the United States, Britain, and France that also bears strong UN credentials and a good reputation among non-NATO states for its peacekeeping and other activities (including most recently the strong leadership it demonstrated in helping to make the ban on landmines a reality), Canada has rare credibility in both the nuclear and non-nuclear camps. As a member of NATO, Canada is in effect part of the problem (through its support for NATO's existing nuclear policies), but it can also become a part of the solution. Canada can work to bring about changes in NATO's nuclear policies, including elimination of forward-deployed nuclear weapons and adoption of a no-first-use policy. Such changes should be reflected in the next version of NATO's Strategic Concept, due in April 1999.

Canada has a history of working well with, and giving leadership to, coalitions of like-minded states on a variety of issues. Canada could make an important contribution to the New Agenda Coalition of middle power states in its efforts to encourage the nuclear weapon states to "demonstrate an unequivocal commitment to the speedy and total elimination of their respective nuclear weapons and without delay to pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to the elimination of these weapons, thereby fulfilling their obligations under Article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT)." Canada's success in marshalling NATO member support -- in the form of abstentions -- for the "new agenda" resolution (see Globe and Mail, 14 November 1998) was a clear example of the kind of leadership that Canada can provide in building international support for further action.

This document is an updated version of the February 1998 Project Ploughshares brief to the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade.