

Building the Capacity for Sustainable Peace in Sudan

A joint project of
Africa Peace Forum and
Project Ploughshares



Roundtable Report

**17th and 18th October 2006
Juba, Sudan**

About this Report

This report is part of a series of documents resulting from a joint project of Project Ploughshares and the Africa Peace Forum. The report constitutes the proceedings of a project meeting held in Juba, Sudan in October 2006. The aim of the project is to help the emerging governments and civil society of north and south Sudan to build conditions conducive to a successful interim process leading to sustainable peace.

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Africa Peace Forum

Africa Peace Forum (APFO) is a non-governmental organization based in Nairobi, Kenya, which carries out research and analysis on peacebuilding, conflict resolution, and security issues in the Horn of Africa and Great Lakes region. APFO engages civil society and the political community in ongoing and joint exploration of new approaches to security arrangements in the region.

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Cover photo: "Sudan's New Government of National Unity Inaugurated" (UN Photo #81995/Evan Schneider, 9 July 2005). In photo are, from left to right, John Garang, Vice-President; Omer Hassan A. Al-Bashir, President of Sudan; Ali Osman Mohamed Taha, Second Vice-President.

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List of Abbreviations

APFO	Africa Peace Forum
CPA	Comprehensive Peace Agreement
DDR	Demobilization, Disarmament and Reintegration
GONU	Government of National Unity
GOS	Government of Sudan
GOSS	Government of South Sudan
IGAD	Inter-Governmental Authority on Development
NCA	Norwegian Church Aid
NCP	National Congress Party
NIF	National Islamic Front
PPPI	People-to-People Peace Initiatives
RECSA	Regional Center for Small Arms
SPLA	Sudan People's Liberation Army
SPLM	Sudan People's Liberation Movement
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme

BUILDING CAPACITY FOR SUSTAINABLE PEACE IN THE SUDAN

17TH AND 18TH OCTOBER 2006, JUBA, SUDAN

The following is a report of the proceedings of a meeting held in support of a joint Africa Peace Forum (APFO) and Project Ploughshares research and dialogue project.¹ The main aim of the project is to create space for the perspectives and insights of a wide-range of stakeholders on issues and challenges related to the implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA). Research produced and roundtables undertaken are meant to support building sustainable peace in the Sudan.

DAY 1 PROCEEDINGS

WELCOME AND INTRODUCTIONS

Victor Okello called the meeting to order and welcomed participants to the session. He further explained the contents of the conference pack, which had various documents, including a summary of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) and a research paper on the Hazards of Power Sharing aspects of the CPA. After a self-introductory session of participants, he then invited the session's chair Ambassador Kiplagat, the Executive Director of Africa Peace Forum (APFO), to make introductory remarks.

SESSION I: INTRODUCTORY REMARKS

Ambassador Kiplagat noted that APFO's Vision was conceptualized in the early 1990s. Its main focus was to work for peace and security in Africa. APFO has been involved in various ways to support peace processes in Sudan, Uganda and Ethiopia.

He suggested that when analysis was done on the conflicts in the region it was noted that most of the conflicts were part of a bigger conflict system. An internal conflict was not necessarily restricted to local or internal players, but rather had regional dimensions. He underlined that it was important to keep regional thinking in mind, and specifically gave the example of the Sudan CPA as one in which success will largely depend on regional trends.

He outlined various achievements that had been realized in the region as follows:

- Ongoing talks between the Ugandan Government and the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) in Juba, notably mediated by the Government of South Sudan.
- Abuja agreement on Darfur – it was noted that while this agreement had not realized much, its existence is something to celebrate.

¹ Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) provided financial support for the project. The views expressed here do not necessarily reflect the views of CIDA.

- On the Ethiopia-Eritrea border situation he noted that the guns had fallen silent. He underscored that the lack of implementation of the International Court of Justice demarcations had ensured a stalemate, which could be cause for tension.
- Somalia is facing major hiccups and the advances of the Islamic Courts Union are threatening the Transitional Federal Government.
- Another achievement is the major policy shift, regionally and internationally, to focus on conflicts and committed investment to address the issue. He commended the interest and commitment of African countries in settlement of conflicts as witnessed in the Sudan and Somalia peace processes.
- Conflict as a thematic issue is gaining currency in the academic world and amongst researchers. A couple of decades ago this was not the case.

He opined that signing an agreement is not necessarily a solution; there remains a lot of work to be done in order to consolidate peace in the Sudan and prevent any fall back to a situation of conflict. He further posed that one of the worrying trends in Sudan was the presence of too many actors who may inadvertently overshadow a fairly nascent government. He pleaded for some semblance of coordination on the various functions carried out by the different agencies.

He noted that a lot of things hang in the balance in the realization of peace in Sudan. He recognized that there was a need to carry out intensive civic education on the contents of the CPA among the people of Sudan – not only residents of South Sudan but those in the North as well. Finally he noted that there was still need to keep the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) region interested in dynamics taking place in the Sudan.

He shared some of the guiding principles that have informed his years of work as a diplomat and a peacemaker.

- The need to keep hope alive even in situations that are seemingly hopeless. This thinking is especially informed by Psalms 71:10, 13, 14, which in part says, “But as for me I will always have hope.”
- The need to be realistic and look at things for what they are, regardless of how painful or difficult they may be.
- The need to become problem solvers – to start somewhere and not become mourners, to become doers no matter the odds.

Ambassador Kiplagat concluded his remarks by sharing from Isaiah 65: 17-24:

New heavens and a new earth

Behold I will create new heavens and a new earth. The former things will not be remembered nor will they come to mind. But be glad and rejoice forever in what I will create for I will create Jerusalem (Sudan) to be a delight and its people a joy. I will rejoice over Jerusalem (Sudan) and take delight in my people. The sound of weeping and crying will be heard in it no more. Never again will there be in it an infant who lives but a few days or an old man who does not live out his years. He who dies at a hundred will be thought a mere youth. He who fails to reach a hundred will be considered accursed. They will build houses and dwell in them. They will plant vineyards and eat their fruits. No longer will they build houses and others live in them or plant and others eat. For as the days of a tree so will be

the days of my people, my chosen ones will long enjoy the works of their hands. They will not toil in vain, or hear children doomed to misfortune; for they will be a people blessed by the Lord - they and their descendants with them. Before they call I will answer, while they are still speaking I will hear.

GENERAL COMMENTS

It was noted that there was a general lack of international support for the CPA implementation process. It was acknowledged that one of the countries that has been steadfast in its support for Sudan is Norway. Norway could be one of the countries to lead and sustain international interest. It was noted, however, that there was a need for an IGAD presence, which it was hoped would pull in international actors.

One participant sought to know APFO's scope of work and its networking strategies with other similar organizations. It was noted that APFO's engagement has been on small arms advocacy and the implementation of the Nairobi Declaration and Nairobi Protocol. APFO has been working at various levels with the Regional Center for Small Arms – the regional implementing agency for the Nairobi Declaration and Nairobi Protocol.

It was recognized that governments inherently have the capacity to cause problems and the capacity to seek solutions for those problems. It was noted that APFO's approach has been to initiate dialogue between civil society and governments in order to influence policies. Some of its areas of work have included advocacy on landmines in Sudan, which later resulted in the formation of an organization to work on de-mining and landmine awareness education. APFO has also been variously engaged in the development of the IGAD early warning and early response mechanisms.

SESSION II: HAZARDS IN THE POWER-SHARING ASPECTS OF THE CPA

This session focused on the obstacles to power-sharing arrangements under the CPA. Victor explained that this work resulted from the project's initial roundtable held in September 2005, during which Dr Lokuji presented a paper that provided an overview of the various challenges to implementation of the CPA. Participants at this roundtable identified additional areas that needed more thematic research, including power sharing.

The research paper noted that amongst South Sudanese there is euphoria about the CPA. Anyone who has followed the history of Sudan since colonial times would know that the Southern Sudanese have been an accidental segment of Sudanese society and not participants in their fate. The CPA has therefore opened a whole new world of opportunity in terms of political and economic participation by Southerners. However vital the document may be, it was advised that the assumption by various stakeholders that the CPA is cure-all should be taken with caution. It was acknowledged that the CPA has inherent problems.

The research paper's focus was on power sharing, not only between the Government of National Unity (GONU) and the Government of Southern Sudan (GOSS) but also between GOSS and its States.

The CPA was likened to a marriage of incompatible partners. Incidents such as the Sudan Armed Forces destroying wells from which they had drunk or cutting down mango trees as they leave certain areas were thought not be an expression of giving peace a chance. It was noted that the incompatibility of this partnership was recognized as early as 1947. At the now famous Juba Conference of 1947, it was abundantly clear from the views of the participating Southern conferees that they did not sufficiently trust their own experience and skills to be thrust into an untried united political playing field with the rest of Northern Sudan. Acknowledging this reluctance, Sir J.W. Robertson who chaired the meeting admonished that “the sooner Southern and Northern Sudanese come together and work together, the sooner they will coalesce and cooperate in the advancement of their country” (J. W. Robertson, Esq., MBE, Civil Secretary, Chairman, Juba Conference, 1947). As if predicting the fear of later generations of Southerners, Buth Diu, a representative from Upper Nile Province, expressed his reservations about the claims by Northerners that they “have no desire to dominate the South.” He suggested that “there must be safeguards, including no settlement of Northerners on land in the South without permission. Secondly, there must be no interference by the North in local government in the South. Thirdly, there should be a law to prevent a Northerner calling a Southerner a slave.” It was noted that these same grievances still prevail nearly sixty years after the Juba conference.

It was noted that in the Machakos Protocol it was conceded by Khartoum negotiators that there would be freedom of expression. A recent case during which the Khartoum governor closed all schools during Ramadan regardless of the faith practiced by the students was cited. In the protocol, Khartoum was expected to be the capital and the symbol of diversity for the people of Sudan. The current interpretation of this symbol of diversity is to go by majority rule and govern through Sharia law rather than allow for freedom for residents of Khartoum to practice their chosen religion.

The following are the hurdles the researcher identified which could bring about disagreement between the CPA signatories.

a) Hurdle One: Change of Heart

The first hurdle has to do with a change of heart by the signatories. It is possible that any of the signatories may have realized that it may have compromised too much and therefore prevents or stalls implementation or even tries to introduce a new interpretation of the CPA. For example, the South has been given power to govern itself and this may be seen as too much independence. It was suggested that there is evidence of a change of heart in the refusal of Khartoum to give powerful ministries such as Finance or Energy and Mining to Southerners. The question was posed if Unity with the North was really being given a chance when Southerners resolve that “the unity of the people and territory of Southern Sudan shall be supreme over other considerations.” Sir T.R.H. Owen’s statement at the 1947 Juba conference calling for the North to go beyond mere words and prove by their acts that they had undergone a change of heart if the Southerners were even going to consider joining the North willingly was revisited.

b) Hurdle Two: The Commissions and Other Instruments for Implementation

The second major hurdle to the implementation of the CPA is the timely establishment of the Commissions and other bodies to be charged with carrying out implementation activities as per the timetable drawn in the schedules to the agreement. The Pre-Interim Period, as well as the first six months of the Interim Period, have already been marked by a series of long delays, including in the establishment of governing structures, especially in the South. The interim constitution was also not done in time.

It was posed that if it were a problem of trying to chew too much at once it could have been excused; however, it has been noted that the delay has been deliberate. It was further noted that Southerners allege that the National Islamic Front has refused to allow for the creation of a boundary commission to demarcate the oil regions of Upper Nile. The NIF is also allegedly refusing to permit the creation of an assessment and evaluation commission to oversee the implementation of the provisions of the CPA.

It was noted that while the CPA has built-in regional and international guarantees to deal with delays or non-compliance, members of the international community are yet to take either signatory to task over infringement of any aspect of the CPA.

c) Hurdle Three: Honoring the Principles of Democratic Federalism

The CPA also offers Sudan a real opportunity to try out what is essentially a democratic federal system with a high degree of decentralization. For instance, at present Juba derives its powers from the Interim Constitution provided for by the CPA and not from Khartoum. This federated system also means that the various states in the South are supposed to be fairly autonomous. It was reasoned that if these principles were not honored the agreement would fail. There have been examples where there has been no respect for each other's autonomy, and encroachment on each other's levels of functions and jurisdiction have been noted. One example is the dismissal of a governor of a South Sudan state by the GOSS.

d) Hurdle Four: Garangites vs. Kiirites

The fourth hurdle has to do with the present power struggle between those who remain loyal to the late Dr. John Garang's vision and those who support Salva Kiir, the current President of GOSS. John Akec has since coined the terms Garangites and Kiirites in reference to these informal groups whose allegiance to either of the two leaders is near absolute. Defending the use of these terms, Mr. Akec admitted that he invented the terms to describe the reality on the ground. He felt that the divisions and differences between the late SPLM Chairman and Salva Kiir were well publicized.

This division has a debilitating effect on the scarce pool of leaders that Southern Sudan has as it emerges from decades of war. The first and greatest harm is that the division has brought about a situation in which the allocation of assignments is based less on proven talent and more on allegiance, region and personal ambition. In testimony to this, there are long-time SPLM cadres, undoubtedly giants in Garang's latter days, who have not assumed

any position under President Kiir's administration, either because they feel rebuffed, or because they have become disoriented by this new leadership.

It was noted that Salva Kiir's own analysis was that the temporary division was a result of various administrative and organizational matters within the SPLM/SPLA, which have since been resolved. This view was not necessarily shared by other Southerners.

A quite threatening and potentially destabilizing aspect of this division will become clearer as the first democratic elections approach in three years, but even more glaringly towards the end of the Interim Period when the recommended choice at the referendum must be unequivocal. With the SPLM overshadowed by Garangites or Kiirites, a central organization for political sensitization and advocacy (for unity or secession) will be sorely needed.

e) Hurdle Five: The Menace of Ethnic Alliances

American professor Eric Reeves noted that Salva Kiir's nominees to high positions were predominantly from his native Bahr El Ghazal region and that six of the new Southern members of the national cabinet hailed from there. There is an acknowledgment that both Garang and Kiir have played the tribal card when it came to nominations. He posed that South Sudan needed to have a rationale for the appointment of legislators and such a rationale would have to take into account geographical coverage and the makeup of the population.

It was noted that ethnic conflict is most serious in the recent disarmament exercises. Ethnicity has been a great cause of bloodshed, especially in areas where it is felt that some ethnic groups attempted to weaken others through disarmament. It therefore follows that disarmament be carefully done after proper sensitization and where adequate alternatives can be given and where the government can be seen to be capable of providing security to the disarmed. An example was cited of a conflict resolution exercise that allowed the Dinka Bor to leave with their animals from Western Equatoria, with safe passage through Juba. Some of the pastoralists went back home while others remained in Juba, creating a possible cause for conflict if not handled well.

f) Hurdle Six: Demands by Groups Excluded from the CPA

There have been great efforts both in the North and the South to incorporate groups that were not signatories to the CPA. There is concern that some of the actors who were as much an enemy of the SPLA as the Khartoum Government but have nonetheless been included in GOSS may prove to be potentially dangerous spoilers to the CPA process.

DISCUSSION

It was observed that the marginalization of women (even since the signing of the CPA) is an issue that needs to be urgently addressed, especially since women make up about 55% of the population. It was recognized that women probably work harder and for longer hours than men, due to the cultural conditioning that makes this state of affairs acceptable. At present, it was noted that there are hardly any forums to address women's needs. There are provisions for 25% participation of women in the new government and while there is goodwill to fill these positions, in reality, because of neglect in education and political awareness this target has not come to fruition. To elaborate on this marginalization of women, an example of a court's refusing to listen to the testimony of a witness simply because she was a woman was given. The decision was covered widely in the local press especially, since the woman in question is one of the Presidential advisors and a person of important social as well as political standing.

Some participants expressed the need for the research paper to bring out in greater detail the issue of armed groups within the context of power sharing. It was noted that some of these groups were disguised as SPLA and yet are aligned with the Government of Sudan. The CPA recognized three armed forces: the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF), SPLA and the Joint Integrated Units. Groups in the North not aligned to the SPLA must be affiliated to the SAF and those in the South not aligned to the North are expected to be part of SPLA. However, the issue that armed groups could be infiltrating forces they are not aligned to is a cause for alarm and requires serious examination.

As well, some armed groups remained outside the SPLA or the SAF and are a source of insecurity. This problem is compounded by the fact that the CPA only stipulates about 12,000 for the creation of the Joint Integrated Units while the number for SPLA and SAF is yet to be determined. The import of this is that the groups that do not want to be aligned to either party will resist any attempts at disarmament.

One participant expressed the feeling that the date for the referendum should have been brought nearer to let Southerners decide their fate as soon as possible. It was felt that there was an inherent problem in the power-sharing arrangement, especially in regard to the composition of the Executive. The constituent elements of the Office of the President in the present Government of National Unity are the President, who comes from Khartoum, and two Vice-Presidents, one of whom also comes from the North. Crucial matters such as the referendum will require the vote of the Office of the President, which at present favours the North.


A number of participants were of the opinion that the crafting of the CPA involved a lot of balancing acts. The interests of the beleaguered parties had to be taken into account and that is what happened. However, the negotiations have left certain gaps that have to be dealt with during the interim period. For the CPA to work, therefore, political goodwill from both parties is needed. For the CPA to work for Southerners there is a need for true dialogue and genuine reconciliation – not the kind of reconciliation in which the former leader of an armed force switches sides, leaving behind his armed soldiers.

It was noted that the government is in the dilemma of trying to figure out the power-sharing percentage that will satisfy everybody. In the absence of well-formed institutions and structures, personalities are used to push through implementation and policies. It was felt that the preoccupation is with filling the quotas, and not necessarily with skilled personnel.

Regardless of its glaring imperfections, the majority of participants felt that the CPA was a very important tool that needed to be advanced. It was therefore important to begin prioritizing the areas of focus for the next couple of years. Key priorities should be security and peace and the issues that threaten them. It was felt that the dynamics in play during the interim period leading up to the referendum needed to be studied closely. One participant recalled that one of the greatest weaknesses of the Addis Ababa agreement was total Southern dependence on the North. The South had no internal or external guarantee. This time around, if there is a major threat to the CPA there is provision for an international force to ensure implementation.

SESSION III: PEOPLE-TO-PEOPLE PEACE INITIATIVES

Dr. Dan Alila, who has been coordinating a consortium of NGOs known as the National Working Group on Civic Education, made a presentation on People-to-People Peace Initiatives (PPPI). Using the pyramid below to aid understanding of the theoretical thinking that informs peacebuilding, he noted that there are basically three major approaches.



Track 1 is generally done by government actors and requires a mediator. An example would be the GOS and SPLA negotiation mediated by General Lazarus Sumbeiywo. Track 2 is usually mediated by middle-level leadership or institutions, e.g., civil society, NGO actors and allows for movement upwards and downwards. Track 3 is at the grassroots level and this is where PPPIs come into play.

He recalled that while the fight was on between GOS and SPLA there were small-scale/lower-level conflicts. The split within the SPLA that occurred in 1991 escalated the lower-level conflicts. In order to deal with the spreading conflict the Catholic Church in Equatoria and the African Inland Church organized the first PPPI in Ikotos in January 1994.

Dr. Alila also made reference to the 1999 Wunlit Peace Conference. It was instigated by killings on the Western side of the Nile between the Dinka and the Nuer, which resulted in the deaths of hundreds of thousands of people. In 1998, a group of officials of the New Sudan Council of Churches reflected on the situation, brought the Dinka and Nuer chiefs together and facilitated a meeting in Lokichoggio, Kenya. The meeting resulted in an accord between the Dinka and the Nuer chiefs, with the chiefs going back to their respective areas to implement their solutions. By the time this accord was being implemented there was a lot of animosity between the SPLA and the SPDF. The Dinka supported the SPLA and the Nuer supported the SPDF. Another dynamic was the construction of the pipeline and GOS interest in clearing the area for development. It was in this environment that the PPPI was taking place. The local leaders consulted widely and agreed on a legitimate representation at the Wunlit conference and the agenda. They participated in the construction of the meeting place, dug boreholes and so on. People were surprised that leaders like Riek Machar sent a delegation to attend the conference – no one thought that this would have been possible in such an environment of animosity. While the political leaders opened and closed the meeting, they were not permitted to speak but only to observe. The participants were ordinary women and men who mobilized and facilitated to reach a consensus.

For a considerable period following the meeting, there wasn't any border conflict. It can be said that subsequent conflicts between the Dinka and the Nuer were less serious than those seen before. As the Machakos peace talks between the GOS and SPLM were taking place, PPPIs were also facilitated in South Sudan. A considerable amount of money from the United States facilitated PPPIs between 2003 and 2005 in different regions of Sudan. The underlying assumption that peace was only brought about by the Track 1 diplomacy neglects the role that the PPPIs played.

Dr. Alila suggested that the following factors are critical to the success of PPPIs:

- Consensus building via a series of local or community leadership consultative meetings prior to the conference focusing on issues, representation, etc.;
- Community participation at all stages of the PPPI;
- Community support for the conference;
- Focus on interests of groups in the conflict;
- Constructive dialogue;
- Common definition or understanding of problem;
- Ownership of the peace process by the belligerent groups;
- Legitimate representation;
- Minimal presence of Track 1 actors, particularly in their official capacity;
- Understanding that PPPI is a long-term process;
- A cost-benefit analysis of the conflict (i.e., relative gains or losses);
- Attention to local cultures, traditions and sensitivities;
- A non-threatening, familiar setting to encourage attendance;

- A final decision, including follow-up activities, made freely by the parties in the conflict; and
- Implementation of the agreement, complete with a monitoring mechanism.

He gave various examples of PPPIs that have been held in various areas of South Sudan:

- Upper Kidepo peace and reconciliation conference focusing on the issue of cattle raiding amongst and between the Lotuho, Toposa, Didinga, Boya, Keteba, etc/. 2004;
- Chukudum peace conference of 2005 for the same group;
- Hajiakara peace initiatives (central Kidepo area) between the Lotuho, Pari and Didinga;
- Sudanic Luo peace conference in Wau 2004, bringing peace amongst the Luo, Fertit and Dinka;
- Aweil peace conference amongst the Dinka, 2004;
- Abyei peace conference involving Ngok Dinka and other ethnic groups, 2004;
- Dinka, Misseriya and Razighat peace conference addressing cattle raiding and abductions of women and children, 2004/5;
- Old Fangak peace conference for the Nuer ethnic group to address interclan conflict, 2004;
- Abuong peace conference aimed at bringing peace amongst the Dinka, Shiluk, and Nuer clans of Upper Nile, 2004;
- Murle peace conference addressing cattle raiding between the Murle, Anyuak and Lou, 2004;
- Iliir peace conference (post-Wunlit conference) held at East Bank addressing reconciliation between the Padang Dinka, Bor Dinka and the East Bank ethnic groups, including Anyuak, Nuer and Murle, 2000;
- Nuba, Baqqara peace conference of April 2005 targeting the Nubas and the Arab cattle herders addressing conflict between pastoralists and farmers;
- Funj youth and women conference of 2005 aimed at consolidating peace within the Funj community.

He suggested the following as some of the achievements of the PPPIs:

- Reduction in the occurrence of violent conflicts;
- Reduction in the inter-ethnic clan mistrust and animosity in many areas;
- Better understanding and working relations between and among the local authorities;
- Peaceful access and joint use of natural resources, e.g., water, grazing land etc.;
- Revival of traditional authorities, cultures, customs and judicial systems; and
- Promotion of South-to-South dialogue and unity.

There have been various challenges to the PPPIs:

- Emerging CPA-related conflict (inter- and intra-ethnic) posed by issues of land ownership and access to resources;
- Peaceful reintegration and resettlement of returnees and IDPs within their respective communities;

- Lack of effective governance structures on the ground, including effective judicial systems;
- Unresolved issues relating to ethnic boundaries, ownership of ancestral land and public resources;
- Limited funding of PPPIs;
- Presence in the community of armed groups unwilling to undergo DDR;
- Lack of clear legislation and policy framework to support PPPI ; and
- Lack of widespread human or legal rights awareness thus allowing people to take the law into their own hands.

OBSERVATIONS

One of the issues participants raised was the involvement of government in peace processes at the Track 3 level. It was noted that in the past there was little interaction between the SPLA and the communities, but now SPLA leaders are also leaders of their communities and are viewed as providers of livelihoods and security. It was noted that while in practice the government has no role to play at the Track 3 level, the community leaders at the Track 3 level now also happen to be members of the Track 1 level. Therefore, one of the challenges to the PPPI is to ensure that it does not become too exclusive. Given that communities now respect their traditional leaders as well as politicians there has to be space to allow the government to participate. It was argued that where individuals can provide extra impetus to a situation they should be allowed to participate.

There was also disagreement about the achievement of PPPIs. If, it was argued, these PPPIs have accomplished so much, why is there still conflict in Sudan? It was felt that to have conferences without any active follow-up, as is the case with most PPPIs, is a waste of resources and time. It was felt that PPPIs face the danger of becoming just community meeting points.

One participant also felt that the assumption that returnees are the cause of conflict is incorrect. Contrary to popular belief, there aren't a huge number of returnees making their way back to South Sudan. They are dissuaded from going back to their communities due to a lack of services.

It was recognized that different theories exist in the field of diplomacy and mediation. The theoretical idea underpinning the pyramid thinking is that you can have different actors working at different levels. For the situation in Sudan it was felt that a pyramid divided into two would probably capture the dynamics better. The various actors are not necessarily restricted to one level but are divided from their counterparts in the North. It was suggested that there was a need to analyze the structure of the conflict and then to organize the intervention. It was acknowledged that PPPIs could not solve the North-South problem but could help to strengthen the South so that it could face the North.

One participant stated that the part played by NSCC in PPPIs could not be over-emphasized; although the process was given the name "People to People," the driving engines of these conferences were NGOs and organizations like NSCC. Without such

organizations there would have been no assumption of leadership of these processes, partly because of the collapse of the traditional systems to address communal conflicts.

A question arose as to whether there were any PPPIs aimed at North-South dialogue and whether there were any peace resources within the Muslim community that could be utilized for PPPIs. The response indicated that the war had left deep scars, which have not thoroughly healed. Telling indications of the passion that people can fall into are the destructive incidents after Garang's death. Shops run by Muslims in Juba were targeted and many Muslims who lived in the South returned to Khartoum and did not think it safe to come back to Juba. So in essence it was felt that now was probably not the right time to initiate North-South PPPIs.

A compounding factor is the chasm of religion. Islam does not allow easy mixing. Questions about circumcision and whether the food is clean (halal) become the yardsticks for engagement. PPPIs, it was argued, cannot take place in an environment where the players don't see each other as equals. It was also noted that any North-South PPPIs at present would be seen as a move to make Unity palatable to both the people in the South and the North. Everyone in the South does not necessarily want to unite with the North and would counter any moves to make the concept of unity attractive.

The importance of having political leadership behind PPPIs was revisited. It was noted that communities are willing to address their problems when they feel there is support by the political leadership, because most of the conflicts were propagated by the political leaders. The Sudanese political movement was organized along tribal lines, not for tribal reasons but because mobilization was easier. Therefore, any changes with the top leadership have implications for the local level. For example, if a governor is relieved of his duties it is seen as an affront to the community as a whole.

Perhaps PPPIs played an important part during the war, but they need to serve the changing realities in the CPA period. For example, any armed group that continues to exist outside of the three designated forces will be considered bandits under the CPA. PPPIs could be used to address the insecurity problems that these armed groups continue to pose.

More importantly, it was noted that the process of peacemaking cannot be tied to the signing of documents. Whether the different governments remain together or split, reconciliation is still necessary. A deeper analysis was deemed important to determine what exists in the hearts and minds of people. What is the nature of the problem? Is it racial? Is it religious? An example was shared of a discussion previously held with a group of Southern Christian women on what a certain agency could offer them. The group proposed that the solution to their problem lay in the removal of all the Northerners from their area. It was felt that this sort of "ethnic cleansing mentality" was more worrying than competition over grazing resources. It was shared that previously, almost all communities were receptive to strangers and the Nuer in particular have been known to make strangers their chiefs. However, during the war a wide range of the hierarchy of a certain community moved in and, instead of adapting to the existing community, they start asserting their own beliefs and cultures. Fundamental respect for existing norms was lost. The resentment felt by the women in the discussion has been fuelled by the disrespect suffered at the hands of other communities in their own land.

Another example of polarized thinking came from a meeting between Southern Muslims women and Southern Christian women. The view expressed by some of the Southern Muslim women was that the signing of the CPA was depriving them of luxuries they had enjoyed during the war. One woman even said she preferred the war to peace. Subsequent meetings were held for the women to help them to understand that the war had determined their various positions in everyday life and the CPA would be protecting the interests of all Southern Sudanese and not just a select few.

Some of the recommendations from the day's session include:

- Support women's rights.
- Encourage South-South dialogue.
- Restructure PPPIs so that they can play a role in addressing insecurity during the CPA interim period.
- Assist the GOSS, nascent as it may be, so that it can play the role that agencies and the international community have been playing, including providing basic services such as water, health, education, etc.

DAY 2 PROCEEDINGS

RECAP OF DISCUSSIONS

Victor Okello recapped discussions from the previous day, noting that Ambassador Kiplagat had shared some of his guiding principles. He further noted that Dr. Alfred Lokuji identified six hurdles in the power-sharing aspects of the CPA: change of heart, delays in setting up institutions, honoring principles of democratic federalism, tensions between officials and individuals allied to the different camps within the SPLM/SPLA (Garangites and Kiirites), ethnic alliances and demands from armed groups who are not part of the CPA. It was mentioned that one of the major hurdles was the lack of participation of women. He noted that the afternoon saw Dr. Alila giving a brief presentation on PPPIs, during which he gave theoretical aspects of Tracks 1, 2 and 3. During discussion it was pointed out that it may be detrimental to exclude leaders from Track 1 in Track 3 negotiations. It was mentioned that the NSCC played a critical role in grassroots initiatives. After these brief remarks he invited session Chair Ms. Lynne Griffiths-Fulton to moderate the discussion.

Lynne invited Benjamin, Ferdinand and Paul to lead the discussions on DDR, noting that the ultimate test of these measures will be determined by whether they achieve community security and safety.

SESSION IV: DISARMAMENT, DEMOBILIZATION AND REINTEGRATION

Benjamin Gimba, the Director of the South Sudan Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (SSDDR) Commission, noted that there are two DDR commissions; the SSDDR Commission in South Sudan and NSDDR in North Sudan. To link the two commissions there is a National DDR Commission that is intended to oversee

implementation and provide policy guidelines to the two commissions. However, the National DDR commission was just formed recently and has yet to meet.

One of the key programs of the SSDDR Commission is disarmament of the armed groups, even though there is awareness that communities and individuals also have arms. As a government institution the Commission sees itself as charged with the task of creating an enabling environment in which DDR can take place. The Commission seeks to use other agencies to implement interventions and wants to liaise with agencies that can partner with it. He noted that several agencies were keen to work with the Commission, while others worked independently without informing the Commission. He cited some specific developments, such as setting up DDR technical committees that would develop the criteria for the people to be demobilized and pension schemes. He noted that full-scale DDR is linked to the downsizing of the military and reflected that DDR in South Sudan was an enormous task, especially due to the continued insecurity in the region.

The Commission had contacted PACT to develop interventions in various states of South Sudan and was also in discussion with UNDP, which has an interest in community security. He maintained that it was important not to overlook reintegration, as well as disarmament and demobilization, even though it is long-term and more expensive.

Ferdinand von Habsburg, an advisor to UNDP Sudan, gave background on small arms issues in Sudan, noting a series of factors that had contributed to the large number of available arms. Weapons distributed by both sides during the war infiltrated the country through porous borders and other arms were captured during the war. The problem is compounded because the GOSS is in its emerging phase and its structures are still very weak. A culture of war still prevails in South Sudanese society, which is heavily militarized. The ordinary citizen is armed and guns are believed to be a source of security. He noted that the late John Garang was known to say that the people are ready to go back to war to defend the CPA. He also drew from statements by the Deputy Speaker in GONU talk of disbanding the CPA if the SPLM continued to call for the end of the Darfur crisis and UN engagement. He informed the meeting that there was little legislation or policy framework to address small arms issues. He noted that this legal vacuum allows people to continue bearing arms.

He also noted that the proliferation of small arms is a regional problem and as such it will take many actors to create order. He said that the UNDP community security program has drawn a lot from the PPPIs, specifically the element of community-level engagement.

He outlined some of the weaknesses of arms reduction programs to date. First, most actors, including governmental actors, do not really know what can work in a region like Sudan but must rely on trial and error and attempting to replicate the few success stories in other areas. Second, the presence of a variety of actors creates the need for coordination and a harmonization of approaches. As well, the problem of small arms affects various countries bordering Sudan and solving the problem in only one country would not effectively address the proliferation. He noted that many are concerned that the CPA's provisions on disarming civilians will expose the South to the North; if the same process is not reciprocated in the North it will reduce the degree of enthusiasm in the South. The large number of militias and SAF troops in the border areas, and their influence on the communities, are cause for

concern. If the threat posed by the militias is not addressed comprehensively, security in the area will be gravely endangered. This element needs strong advocacy and action from the international community and other actors.

He emphasized that the UNDP community security measures were undertaken under the umbrella of the SSDDR Commission and targeted armed people not necessarily recognized in the CPA. He said that the UNDP, with other actors, had been engaged in advocacy with the government and the Commission. The GOSS had engaged in the process of disarmament in various communities, in some cases successfully. However, there have been incidents in which major fighting between SPLA, the communities and armed groups was ignited by these disarmament efforts, resulting in many deaths on both sides, looting, destruction of property and resentment. The UNDP then formulated an emergency proposal calling for a pilot community security project and discussed it with the Vice-President and other security organs.

Taking into account issues of legislation and policy, the UNDP approach also recognized advocacy, information sharing and mobilization as important aspects of the project. He argued that the different organs of government, including the police, need to be involved, as well as civil society, the private sector, youth, women, etc. While most of the community needs previously were met by agencies working under Operation Lifeline Sudan, there is now an opportunity for the government to take the lead and to help to identify the core issues driving arms demand. He noted that community security measures are necessarily ambitious as they involve multi-tiered solutions to a complex set of problems.

Akobo Community Security and Arms Control Pilot Project

This pilot project aimed to reduce the tensions in Akobo and reduce arms. It was undertaken in an environment in which the SPLM was prepared to move in and forcefully disarm people if the process did not work. Prior to the beginning of the implementation phase the process and what it hoped to achieve was explained to the community.

The project utilized registers to indicate the number of arms being surrendered and noted who was turning them in. In two weeks, 1,200 arms were recovered. Ferdinand emphasized that the process was more significant than the number of arms recovered. There were no violent incidents related to the disarmament process. While there was fear of retaliation on those who had been disarmed, it did not hinder the disarmament exercise.

Based on this success, the GOSS recognized it as a positive process, which triggered further discussions on the way forward in community disarmament. The GOSS took up the initiative to chair various meetings, bringing in key actors from various sectors, including state ministries, governments, human rights commissions, peace commissions, legislatures, the Nuer, the UN and the NGO community. The result was lively and constructive discussion about the whole issue of common security and arms control.

Thus the Akobo Pilot Project has informed the understanding of the approach needed in other areas. It was noted that processes must go beyond the scope of this forum as the government and the communities recognize that community security is a serious issue. Ferdinand suggested that the SPLA must provide security until the police are able to take

over. The police currently are ill equipped and ill trained to provide any semblance of community security. The SPLA must be prepared to provide buffers between communities to deter conflict.

Paul Savage of Pact Sudan insisted that any process including disarmament measures needed to be Sudanese-led. In any disarmament program it is important to address issues of inclusion and ownership. It is therefore necessary for the program to have a component of dialogue both to thwart any negative sentiments about the project but, more importantly, to promote ownership of the measures.

He used the analogy of an octopus to illustrate the correct way to address the security needs of Sudan. It is not possible to deal with only the issue of disarmament or only one community. It is prudent to strive to manage the whole issue while dealing with the specifics. Otherwise it is like grasping one leg of an octopus while the other seven legs continue to pose threats. He also used the analogy of a kaleidoscope to emphasize the same point. He noted that addressing insecurity in Sudan is like dealing with different actors moving against each other and forming different shapes.

He also pointed out that while implementation can take place in the South, regional and North-South dimensions must be considered. He saw a huge opportunity for Northern manipulation of the DDR process and indicated that it was therefore important, while studying the positive processes, to understand the role of spoilers such as Khartoum, militias and those who benefit from not having community security. He asked, how do we anticipate and strategize on what dynamics could affect the long-term prospects for peace in the Sudan? Participants were asked not to underestimate the deep mistrust and fragmentation of a society that has come out of war. Besides the technical aspects of storing, recovering and controlling arms, DDR initiatives should address the social and psychological wellbeing of the people.

DISCUSSION

The most neglected aspect of DDR is reintegration. The idea that the sole context for reintegration is home communities is false. The assumption has been that returnees will be reintegrated into their communities but in many cases they end up in larger cities or capitals because their former communities lack amenities. This scenario poses the danger of over-concentration in towns, stretching facilities and leading to an escalation of crime, especially if citizens are armed.

Another participant countered that, ideally, reintegration should mean reintegrating or rehabilitating communities and not individuals. As one strategy, relevant actors need to address the needs of the communities into which individuals are being reintegrated. The SSDDR Commission, it was noted, was addressing the needs of communities where individuals are being reintegrated and have worked to reintegrate children with the help of UNICEF, for instance. However, measures are insufficient and challenges remain.

A discussion ensued about the role of development and the provision of ‘incentives’ in disarmament exercises. Lessons learned from other UNDP-sponsored programs suggest that developmental alternatives must be provided to communities that had surrendered their arms.

It was noted that an appropriate approach for Sudan would be economic development or recovery for the whole region rather than different alternatives for specific communities. Defining appropriate alternatives that provide for people’s basic needs was considered key. The notion that individual incentives could work in South Sudan was refuted because they would undermine the community mechanisms of conflict resolution. In the past, when the community went back on an accord and resorted to conflict it was possible to hold the leader and, by extension, the whole community responsible for the accord’s failure.

The Akobo project did give individual incentives but this process was not ideal. The lesson learned was that it was better to provide or negotiate community incentives. In Akobo, when weapons were collected the chiefs of each area identified the weapon sites and encouraged individuals to turn in the weapons. The SSDDR Commission was still questioning the whole idea of incentives, because the key aim is to block or stop the source of arms. Incentives could create more demand for illegal weapons, especially if there was no buy-in from the whole community.

A discussion ensued about what constituted civil society and communities in South Sudan. One participant asked if it was necessary to dedicate resources to ensure the emergence of a strong civil society. It was noted that communities were both stratified and very well structured. Those engaged during the Akobo pilot project played the roles of both civil society and community. If the strict definition of civil society were applied to South Sudan, key members from the peacebuilding process could be blocked out. Some vibrant nascent organizations, including church organizations and NGOs, are key to mobilization and advocacy efforts.

Analysis of the Akobo experience, led to the conclusion that an appropriate intervention – control or disarmament – is crucial. Much work needs to be done among the youth to understand their logic of conflict. What motivates their demand for arms? How can these demands be addressed? Such guiding questions must inform any future interventions.

Noting the proliferation of actors as well as current initiatives, one participant asked if there were any coordination forum on disarmament. There is a Core Group on Community Security that draws in various stakeholders and whose main task is to advise the GOSS. It was set up in recognition of the need for a forum to coordinate efforts. However, the group has no mandate, no terms of reference and no work plan. Another participant asked if there were any forum in which the South and the North could share information on various initiatives and lessons learned. The National DDR Committee would be the ideal forum but has not yet met. The DDR initiatives have been crippled with political dilemmas and both sides have failed to agree on how to carry out DDR in the transitional areas.

The discussion then focused on arms controlled by armed groups. It was argued that legislative structures may not sufficiently address this problem. The CPA is clear on who is to be disarmed. It proposes that only three forces will be in play: the SPLA, SAF and the

Joint Integrated Units drawn from the various armed forces. The government faces the challenge of collectively moving in a coordinated fashion to disarm and reintegrate all armed groups. On the side of SPLA the army has set up an integration committee charged with engaging armed groups to join it. But there is a realization that the armed groups may not care much for the provisions of the CPA. If armed groups are neither demobilized nor incorporated into security forces they become potential spoilers.

In many areas of South Sudan people still need to be convinced that there are peace dividends. As well, there isn't a clear division between civilian possession and militias. At some point many individuals have served in militias. Because militias are dependent on their constituency and their communities it was felt that if the armed groups or militias saw that their communities were ready to disarm they might find the idea palatable. The post-conflict experiences of countries such as Mozambique, Angola and Rwanda in appeasing armed groups were offered as appropriate examples.

Finally, the participants discussed small arms legislation. It was felt that the Nairobi Protocol and its provisions did not in any way inform or serve as a framework for the activities of the DDR Commission. There didn't seem to be any connection between the various DDR commissions and the Sudan National Focal Point based in Khartoum, which is charged with implementing small arms measures contained in the Nairobi Protocol. Participants suggested that it would be useful for outside actors (APFO, RECSA) and other technical experts to contribute to this policy evolution. Participants emphasized that outsiders can provide technical expertise but should not drive the process. The GOSS also has resources and expertise that could be used, despite the common perception that it has no capacity.

RECOMMENDATIONS

The following practical recommendations were made:

- a) What has been learned in small arms exercises in this region must be documented and shared with the South Sudanese actors.
- b) The Core Group that advises the GOSS should be formalized. APFO could join this group.
- c) Policy formulation on small arms control in the South must begin. APFO needs to take this idea to GOSS.
- d) APFO was asked to determine the viability of a regional forum that draws in the Sudan and its neighbouring countries in discussions over issues relating to small arms in border areas.
- e) The challenge of tapping into regional capacity to the benefit of national organs should be explored. The formation of a regional resource group to assist Sudan needs to be considered.
- f) Liaise with RECSA and learn about its strategy for engagement of South Sudan in small arms measures.
- g) There should be a forum to expose national actors to the provisions of the Nairobi Declaration/Protocol.

VOTE OF THANKS

On behalf of Project Ploughshares Lynne thanked the participants for their high-level engagement in the various discussions. She also challenged participants to respond to the roundtable report once it is disseminated.

Ambassador Kiplagat thanked Norwegian Church Aid (NCA) for organizing the meeting and also applauded Victor for his handling of the logistical preparations. He noted that he would be leaving with a somewhat dented hope. He advised that whatever work is undertaken should not in any way undermine or batter the spirit and the confidence of the people the programs ostensibly serve. He promised that this roundtable was only the beginning and that there will be more consultations to help address peace and security in the region.

Victor also thanked NCA for its logistical support and Pact for providing invaluable documentation that formed the basis of the background reading.

ANNEX 1: PROGRAMME

DAY 1 PROGRAMME

- 09:00 – 10:00 Welcome and Introductions
- Chair: Ambassador Bethuel Kiplagat – Project Manager & Executive Director, Africa Peace Forum (APFO)
- (i) Dr. Samson Kwaje – Minister of Information, Broadcasting & Television (GOSS) (TBC)
Welcome and introductory remarks
 - (ii) Ambassador Bethuel Kiplagat
Brief background of the project
 - (iii) John Siebert – Executive Director, Project Ploughshares (Canada)
Anticipated project achievements
- 10.00 - 10.30 Dr. Alfred S. Lokuji – Consultant (Governance, Development & Policy Analysis)
Presentation of Research Paper *“Hazards in the Power-Sharing Aspects of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement During the Interim Period in the Sudan”*
- 10.30 – 11:00 Tea/Coffee Break
- 11:00 – 12.30 Discussion and information-sharing on key issues arising from research paper and presentation by Dr. Lokuji, including the emerging issues relating to CPA implementation.
- 12.30 - 13:30 Lunch break
- 13:30 – 14:00 Dr. Dan Alila (National Working Group on Civic Education & Peace Sudan)
- 14.00 – 15.30 Discussion and information-sharing on *Grassroots People-to-People Peacemaking Initiatives (PPPI)*
- Existing PPPI
 - Achievements and challenges facing such initiatives
 - Enhancement and strengthening of such initiatives
- 15:30 – 16:00 Tea/Coffee Break

END OF DAY 1

DAY 2 PROGRAMME

Chair:	<u>Dr. Cirino Hiteng Ofuho - Undersecretary, Ministry of Regional Cooperation (GOSS) and Coordinator, Nairobi Liaison Office (TBC)</u>
09:00 – 09:15	<u>John Siebert</u> – Executive Director, Project Ploughshares Recap of Day 1 discussions
09:15 – 11:00	<u>Arop Mayak (Southern Sudan DDR Commission)</u> Discussion and information-sharing on: <ul style="list-style-type: none">▪ Small Arms & Light Weapons Controls/Limitations▪ Disarmament, Demobilization & Reintegration (DDR)
11:00 – 11:30	Tea/Coffee Break
11:30 – 13:00	Discussion and information-sharing on key issues in post-conflict Sudan: <ul style="list-style-type: none">▪ Security Arrangements▪ Armed Groups
13:00 – 13:30	<u>Dr. Cirino Hiteng Ofuho - Undersecretary, Ministry of Regional Cooperation (GOSS) and Coordinator, Nairobi Liaison Office (TBC)</u> Closing remarks

LUNCH AND DEPARTURE

ANNEX 2: LIST OF PARTICIPANTS

1. Amb. Bethuel Kiplagat – Executive Director, Africa Peace Forum
2. John Siebert – Executive Director, Project Ploughshares
3. Lynne Griffiths-Fulton – Project Ploughshares
4. Peter Mbae – Norwegian Church Aid Eastern Africa
5. Margaret Komen – Norwegian Church Aid Sudan
6. Brigitte Villumstad – Norwegian Church Aid Sudan
7. Laban Cheruiyot – Africa Peace Forum
8. Victor Okello – Africa Peace Forum
9. Ayalew Teshome – World Vision Sudan
10. Benjamin Gimba – South Sudan Disarmament Demobilisation and Reintegration Commission
11. Dr. Alfred Lokuji – Consultant
12. Dr. Dan Alila – National Working Group on Civic Education and Peace Sudan
13. Ferdinand von Habsburg – UNDP Sudan
14. Paul Savage – Pact Sudan
15. Adele Sowinska – Catholic Relief Services Sudan
16. Apollonia Mathia – Juba Post
17. Abeba Berhe - FECCLAHA