

Towards Safe and Sustainable Communities

*Addressing Armed Violence as a
Development Priority*

KEN EPPS

WORKING PAPER 07-2

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Priority*

By Ken Epps

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About this Paper

This paper was prepared as a briefing document for a joint project of Project Ploughshares and the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA). The project was designed to provide CIDA with policy guidance on the challenge of integrating sustainable development with reductions in armed violence and small arms misuse. The paper explores these linkages as well as recent related multilateral and domestic policy advances. It proposes steps that CIDA can take to contribute to Canada's commitments to address armed violence through development programming.

About the Author

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Table of Contents

Introduction	1
The Impact of Armed Violence	1
The Policy Framework	5
Armed Violence and Development	6
Small Arms and Development	8
Regional and National Initiatives	10
The OECD/DAC Guidelines	12
The Canadian Policy Context	13
Human Security in Cities	13
The 3D, Whole-of-Government Approach	14
International Dialogue	16
CIDA and Community Safety	17
CIDA Programs	20
Recommendations	27
Annex A – Small Arms and Children	36
Annex B – The Gender Dimension of Armed Violence	38
Annex C – A CIDA-Funded Pilot Program	40
Annex D – Glossary of Terms	42
Annex E – Acronyms and Abbreviations	48
Notes	50
References	54

Introduction

Since mid-2006 Project Ploughshares has worked with the policy branch of the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) on a joint project to address the urgent need for linking official development assistance (ODA) programs with armed violence prevention and reduction and, more specifically, with the control and reduction of small arms and light weapons (SALW).¹ The project is intended to provide CIDA with policy guidance on the challenge of integrating armed violence/small arms reduction with sustainable development. It has involved several components—papers, workshops, interviews, and international seminars—and has drawn on the growing, if still nascent, body of policy research and analysis related to the small arms-development nexus.

This paper provides a summary of the recognized linkages between armed violence, small arms, and development as well as the multilateral and national policy landscape related to the integration and mutual resolution of these issues. The paper notes that the small arms-development link could represent an important point of application of Canada’s “whole-of-government” foreign policy. Consequently, the paper explores the role CIDA might play within this collaborative approach by integrating armed violence and SALW control and reduction with its development program. In the final analysis, the paper is intended to assist CIDA towards the policy and practice required to achieve levels of community safety that will allow development processes to take root and grow.

The Impact of Armed Violence

Armed violence jeopardizes sustainable development. Armed combat kills and maims people, destroys and displaces communities, and wreaks havoc on the environment. Criminal armed violence imposes widespread physical and psychological destruction, targeting primarily young men but holding entire societies hostage to widespread insecurity. Domestic violence harms women especially, underlining the gendered nature of armed violence. Although armed violence affects all nations, it is concentrated in developing countries where its impacts are most dire.

The widespread availability and ease of use of small arms and light weapons can sustain and deepen armed violence, widen its scope—to include child soldiers or child criminals, for example (*see Annex A*)—and undermine peace processes when they occur. Weapons availability has

created “no-go” zones within humanitarian emergency areas, and diverted scarce resources to security and protection from these weapons. With an estimated 600 million small arms in circulation, SALW proliferation and misuse is a global phenomenon.

Box 1 - Community development and reducing small arms demand

In a program evaluation in a remote district in the Amhara region of Ethiopia, World Vision International officials noticed that in addition to socio-economic and environmental improvements in the region, gun violence between two rival tribes had declined dramatically. A subsequent study of the situation (resulting in the September 2000 report “Silent Revolution”) revealed several factors behind the changes as well as a need for further research to establish causal linkages. The study also identified lessons and implications for future programs. The latter included the important role of NGOs in reducing small arms demand; the need for agencies such as the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) to take a holistic approach to disarmament that extends beyond gun users; the designing of humanitarian and development programs to influence cultures of violence; and better coordination between advocacy, policy, and programs.

A descending spiral can link thwarted development and armed violence, fed by small arms proliferation. In circumstances of pervasive poverty or declining economic prospects, especially where these are combined with insecurity or lawlessness, the demand for small arms grows. As the number of weapons increases, violence and its corrosive impact on development also increase, leading to further demand for small arms. The Armed Violence and Poverty Initiative was commissioned by the UK Department for International Development (DFID) to research this correlation, including studying how and when poverty and vulnerability are exacerbated by armed violence. On the connection between development and armed conflict, Project Ploughshares has noted that “the likelihood of armed conflict affecting states increases as their human development ranking declines.”²

Conversely, the opposite linkage can also be true: sustainable development can be advanced by addressing armed violence and the proliferation and misuse of small arms, and demand for small arms can be controlled and reduced by advancing development and reducing poverty (*see Box 1*) (Eshete & O’Reilly-Calthrop 2000). Thus, in many violence-affected regions, initiatives to reduce the impacts of SALW contribute to, and may even establish preconditions for, development. Similarly, while all development programming may be seen to assist stability and

community safety—as well as to lessen the demand for weapons—there are specific initiatives, such as youth employment programs, that will address the particular conditions that give rise to armed violence.

Even so, determining the points of intervention to break the linkages between armed violence and development is a complex task (*see Box 2*).

Box 2 - Poverty reduction and armed violence

To successfully meet the Millennium Development Goals we need to integrate work on armed violence into our efforts to improve the lives of the world's poor.

—Valerie Amos, UK Secretary of State for International Development, 2003

In April 2003, The UK Department for International Development sponsored an international workshop (DFID 2003) to discuss the links between arms availability and poverty. The key findings and recommendations of the workshop were a prescient listing of key challenges that continue to face efforts to integrate small arms with development programming. These were:

- Small arms availability and use is a development issue but more needs to be done to document its impact on poverty;
- Development agencies could be more engaged in small arms;
- More needs to be done to engage development agencies more effectively;
- Small arms reduction measures need to be integrated into national development policy frameworks;
- Governments and civil society in developing countries need to be engaged in armed violence issues;
- Armed violence is particularly relevant to specific areas of development assistance;
- There are risks in integrating small arms controls into development assistance; and
- Cooperation among development agencies on armed violence issues needs to be strengthened.

A comprehensive response must be multidimensional, coordinated, and include a range of actors. It must address the motivations and incentives to supply weapons, as well as the reasons people acquire and use them. Moreover, because the impact of small arms is felt most immediately at the community level, a strategy of promoting and building community safety with the full participation of affected communities and civil society groups is key.

Within the UN system, the UNDP has acknowledged the complexities and challenges of this task. It has undertaken extensive and geographically

dispersed programming in armed violence and small arms since 1998 (*see Box 3*). In a discussion of the rationale for its engagement, the UNDP (2005, p. 20) states:

In many crisis and post-conflict contexts, addressing small arms availability and the dynamics underlying violence and conflict at the local level are critical to creating and sustaining an enabling environment for economic recovery and reconstruction as well as the re-establishment of democratic governance.

Box 3 - Arms for Development in Liberia

In January 2006 the UNDP launched a five-year “Arms for Development (AfD)” program in Liberian communities along the borders with Sierra Leone, Guinea, and Côte d’Ivoire. With funding support from the governments of Japan, the Netherlands, and the UK, the program is designed “to eradicate illegal weapons and to create an environment where human development can be sustained.” Program components include the collection of illicit weapons through voluntary surrender in exchange for development projects, support for the draft Liberian Firearms Control Act, and efforts to reduce the cross-border trade of small arms.

The AfD program is using innovative methods to raise community awareness and improve public sensitization to the negative impact of small arms. These include training journalists from community radio stations, debates at schools on how youth can support disarmament, workshops for women that help them to introduce the program to their communities, and engagement of parliamentarians. Liberian National Police support for the collection and destruction of unexploded bombs and grenades has helped renew community trust in police. As of June 2006 the pilot communities had begun planning development projects they had chosen.

The UNDP notes that while it is not easy to quantify the relationship between armed violence and the achievement of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), it is possible to provide examples of the ways in which specific MDGs can be compromised by armed violence (p. 16). Moreover, armed violence reduction strategies are crucial for some countries to meet their development targets by 2015. According to the UNDP, these efforts should be more fully integrated into national and international development strategies, with an emphasis on the conditions necessary to achieve the MDGs. The agency has developed principles to guide its support for existing and new small arms programs (p. 21).

There is an emerging consensus that armed violence prevention and small arms reduction are crucial to development and there are calls from affected states for programs and expenditures to be approved accordingly.³ Within both donor and partner governments, commitment to integrating small arms reduction into development cooperation is growing.⁴ The challenge now is for donor agencies to find effective methodologies for intervention.

The Policy Framework

Living free from the threat of armed violence is a basic human need. It is a precondition for human development, dignity and well-being. Providing for the human security of their citizens is a core responsibility of governments.

— The Geneva Declaration on Armed Violence and Development, June 2006

The growing recognition that armed violence is a global problem with significant impacts on social, economic, and human development has fostered important policy statements and initiatives by a range of multilateral, state, and civil society actors from the development, health, and arms control communities. Many policy developments have been constructed to address the linkages between widespread violence and a decline in health, economic activity, and social structures. Others focus on the role of small arms and light weapons as the prevalent instruments of armed violence.

Although exploration of linkages between development and disarmament has been underway for decades,⁵ recent important multilateral statements have brought particular attention to the impacts of small arms violence on sustainable development. Some of the most prominent include:

- The May 2003 World Health Assembly resolution 56.34, which called for the support of evidence-based approaches for the prevention of violence;
- The UN Secretary-General's report *In larger freedom: towards development, security and human rights for all* of March 2005, which noted that the accumulation of small arms and light weapons is “a serious threat to peace, stability and sustainable development” (UN Secretary-General 2005);

- The reference to small arms and light weapons in the Millennium Declaration of the World Summit of September 2005; and
- The January 2006 UN General Assembly Resolution 60/68, “Addressing the Negative Humanitarian and Development Impact of the Illicit Manufacture, Transfer and Circulation of Small Arms and Light Weapons and their excessive accumulation” (UNGA 2006).

Armed Violence and Development

The most prominent recent multilateral initiative drawing together armed violence and development is *The Geneva Declaration on Armed Violence and Development*. Along with the government of Switzerland, the UNDP hosted a “Ministerial Summit on Armed Violence and Development” in Geneva in June 2006. Canada⁶ was one of 42 donor and partner governments represented at the Summit, which also included representatives of international organizations and NGOs. The goal of the meeting was for participating states “to agree on commitments aimed at reducing the negative impact of armed violence on sustainable development” (UNDP & Switzerland 2006), and these commitments were represented in the declaration that emerged from the Summit. The signatories pledged to integrate armed violence reduction and conflict prevention programs into humanitarian and development frameworks and initiatives.

The Geneva Declaration (2006) included agreement on practical measures to

- Promote a comprehensive approach to armed violence reduction issues, recognizing the different situations, needs, and resources of men and women, boys and girls, as reflected in the provisions of UN Security Council Resolutions 1325 and 1612;
- Ensure that armed violence prevention and reduction initiatives target specific risk factors and groups, and are linked to programs providing nonviolent alternative livelihoods for individuals and communities; and
- Stem the proliferation, illegal trafficking, and misuse of small arms and light weapons and ammunition, and lead to effective weapons reduction; post-conflict disarmament, demobilization,

and reintegration; and small arms control, including control of arms transfers and of illicit brokering.

The declaration also committed the participating states “to strive to achieve” measurable reductions in armed violence and tangible improvements in human security by 2015.

Earlier, Canada had participated in the *Armed Violence and Poverty Initiative* (AVPI) of the Centre for International Cooperation and Security at the UK’s University of Bradford. Originally commissioned by DFID, the initiative expanded to involve several donor agencies and NGOs.

Based on findings from 13 country case studies (all countries the sites of current or recent armed violence), the project generated a synthesis document in March 2005. While the document acknowledged that the findings both confirmed and challenged thinking and preconceptions, a key finding was that “armed violence puts at risk the Millennium Development Goals. ... Across the MDG indicators, the case studies show, armed violence has the impact almost invariably of holding back development” (CICS 2005, p. 8).

Attention was given to SALW in the four projects of the initiative, including a study of “The Impact of Armed Violence on Poverty and Development.” The objectives of the study were to enhance understanding of the extent to which armed violence and small arms impoverish people and societies as well as to inform program design and evaluation.

Additionally, the UNDP and the World Health Organization (WHO) began a four-year project in January 2004 “to fill gaps in armed violence research and policy by supporting, guiding and evaluating interventions aimed at reducing armed violence” (UNDP/WHO 2004). A multiagency collaborative effort, the *Armed Violence Prevention Programme* has the following objectives:

- To reduce armed violence and demand for small arms in selected settings;

- To develop improved policies and strategies to address armed violence at the local and national levels in selected countries; and
- To generate best practices and lessons learned in violence prevention.

The program pledges to emphasize the impacts of armed violence on health and development, including the MDGs, to generate evidence-based responses to armed violence. According to UNDP/WHO documents, the program will work in six selected countries to develop and implement appropriate initiatives and assess their outcomes in terms of their effectiveness to prevent violence.

Small Arms and Development

Efforts to respond to the impact of armed violence on development require interventions across the conflict prevention-to-peacebuilding spectrum. Important entry points include linkages between armed violence and security sector reform (especially the misuse of weapons by state security forces) and disarmament, demobilization, and reconstruction programs that address the potential for armed violence following peace agreements. Yet, because the proliferation and misuse of small arms and light weapons is a major vector in the prevalence of armed violence, activities focused on SALW control and reduction have widespread applicability.⁷ Moreover, where the gender dimensions of small arms impacts are acknowledged and understood, there are opportunities for more effective implementation of particular measures such as community weapons collection projects and Disarmament, Demobilization, and Rehabilitation (DDR) programs (*see Annex B*).

The pervasive, worldwide impact of small arms has prompted significant global, regional, and national policy developments and initiatives in recent years. Without doubt, the most important agreement on small arms and light weapons to emerge from the multilateral system is the *UN Programme of Action on small arms (PoA)* agreed at the 2001 *UN Conference on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects*. The politically binding PoA, agreed by the consensus of all UN member states, is a broad roadmap articulating extensive, multidimensional approaches to small arms control.

The PoA calls for states to support and implement measures at the national, regional, and global levels to “prevent, combat and eradicate” the illicit small arms trade. At the national level these measures essentially constitute a national action plan on small arms if fully implemented. Elements include approving or improving domestic laws and procedures to exercise effective control over small arms production and transfer, establishing national coordination agencies to bring coherence to policy and action, and appointing a national point of contact for liaison among states. At the regional and global levels the PoA calls for joint UN member action in support of such measures as legally binding regional agreements, customs and policing coordination, and cooperation with civil society.

Recognizing that many states with the fewest resources are the most affected by small arms and light weapons, the UN Programme of Action contains an “Implementation, international cooperation and assistance” section that details areas where states may cooperate on implementation. The section (Para III:3) notes that

states and appropriate international and regional organizations in a position to do so should, upon request of the relevant authorities, seriously consider rendering assistance, including technical and financial assistance where needed, such as small arms funds, to support the implementation of measures to prevent, combat and eradicate the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons in all its aspects as contained in the Programme of Action.

During the 2006 Review Conference, the participant states held the sole thematic debate on the topic of the implementation of the PoA, with emphasis on international cooperation and assistance.

Despite the failure of the Review Conference to produce improvements to the PoA—or indeed an outcome document—participating states recommitted themselves to its implementation, and the prospect for effective, cooperative work on small arms programs and projects remains good. Much of the debate at the Review Conference addressed opportunities to improve the PoA, especially in a number of thematic areas identified prior to and during the Conference. In particular, many states, including Canada, expressed support for integrating development into the Programme of Action process.⁸ In cooperation with civil society organizations that have identified and researched the relationships

between small arms and development, some of these states are exploring the framework and objectives required to move the issue forward.⁹

Regional and National Initiatives

In regions affected by armed violence, important, legally binding regional agreements have emerged in the past decade that contain provisions in keeping with or even surpassing the UN PoA (*see Box 4*). Several of these agreements contain operative requirements related to the impacts of small arms on development and security.

Box 4 - Recent regional agreements on small arms

Inter-American Convention Against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Ammunition, Explosives and Other Related Materials (CIFTA) (1997)

OAS (CICAD) Model Regulations for the Control of the International Movement of Firearms, Their Parts and Components and Ammunition (1998)

Bamako Declaration on an African Common Position on the Illicit Proliferation, Circulation and Trafficking of Small Arms and Light Weapons (2000)

OSCE Document on Small Arms and Light Weapons (2000)

SADC Protocol on the Control of Firearms, Ammunition and other Related Materials (2001)

Wassenaar Arrangement Best Practice Guidelines for the Export of Small Arms and Light Weapons (2002)

Andean Plan to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects (2003)

OAS (CICAD) Model Regulations for the Control of Brokers of Firearms, their Parts, Components and Ammunition (2003)

Nairobi Protocol for the Prevention, Control and Reduction of Small Arms and Light Weapons in the Great Lakes Region and the Horn of Africa (2004)

ECOWAS Convention on Small Arms and Light Weapons, Their Ammunition and Other Related Materials (2006)

The 1997 Organization of American States (OAS) convention on illicit manufacturing and trafficking in firearms (CIFTA) noted the harmful effects of illicit firearms: “endangering the well-being of

peoples, their social and economic development, and their right to live in peace.” Similarly the 2002 Southern African Development Community Protocol on the Control of Firearms and the 2004 Nairobi Protocol on Small Arms, agreed by states in the Great Lakes region and the Horn of Africa, both acknowledge the development and security impacts of illicit small arms on the states parties.

Perhaps the most far-reaching recent regional agreement is the 2006 Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) Convention on Small Arms and Light Weapons, which calls for strict controls on small arms transfers and civilian possession. Nevertheless, all these agreements require national and regional cooperative measures to tackle the devastating consequences of firearms/small arms misuse.

Box 5 – Kenya’s National Action Plan on small arms

The Kenya government launched its National Action Plan for Arms Control and Management (NAP) in July 2006. It was motivated both by the challenges to the safety and security of its citizens—worsened by the availability of small arms—and by its obligations from regional and international small arms agreements, some of which it had been instrumental in developing and negotiating. According to a summary from the Office of the Kenyan President, the “NAP aims to take a comprehensive approach by addressing the whole range of factors that affect both the demand for and the supply of small arms.” The 10 sections of the plan include “human development planning” to address the factors that fuel demand for small arms. Priorities for this section include:

- Creating development initiatives to reduce demand based on analysis of the national assessment findings;
- Ensuring the NAP links with police reform and community-based policing initiatives;
- Ensuring the NAP complements and builds upon existing development plans such as the Economic Recovery Strategy for Wealth and Employment Creation and the Arid Lands Resource Management Project.

At the national level, the UN Programme of Action and regional agreements on small arms establish implementation processes and structures that can be used to form national action plans for controlling small arms and light weapons. Already some states in the South have produced national action plans that address the joint challenges of security and poverty by coordinating development and small arms reduction objectives. Such a plan was approved by the government of

Kenya in 2006 (Government of Kenya 2006) (*see Box 5*). National action plans on SALW also have been produced by Uganda and Tanzania and are under formulation in Burundi, Rwanda, Mozambique, and Namibia.¹⁰

The OECD DAC Guidelines

Recognizing that control and reduction of small arms and light weapons are integral to the pursuit of human development, in March 2005 the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) acknowledged landmine clearance, reintegration, and small arms and light weapons control as activities eligible for ODA. The DAC guidelines (OECD 2005b) offer general categories of ODA coverage for SALW-related expenditures. These are:

- Development of laws, regulations, and administrative procedures for the control and reduction of weapons proliferation;
- Development of institutional structures for policy guidance, research, and monitoring;
- Public awareness campaigns on SALW;
- Promotion of regional cooperation and information exchange on SALW programs; and
- Weapons collection and destruction.

With the DAC guidelines endorsing categories previously identified by civil society experts and others as important action areas, a key challenge to the international community now becomes converting the guidelines into tangible field-level activities to reverse the negative impacts of armed violence and small arms on development. Building on the work of the AVPI, the Conflict, Peace and Development Cooperation (CPDC) Network of the DAC is currently developing guidance on armed violence prevention and reduction for OECD members. This is intended to challenge donors to apply aid effectiveness modalities to their work on armed violence, to strengthen partner government and civil society engagement, and to advance coherence and cooperation among development agency practice (OECD 2007).

For CIDA, the DAC guidance on armed violence and small arms programming represents an opportunity to cooperate with other government departments to implement a joint program as a tangible and focused application of Canada’s foreign policy.

The Canadian Policy Context

The commitment of Canada to the concept of human security emphasizes the linkage between development and security and acknowledges that all the world's peoples deserve "freedom from want" as well as "freedom from fear." Canada's pursuit of a "people-centred" approach to human security has included action to reverse the proliferation and misuse of small arms and light weapons.¹¹ Indeed, led by the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT), Canada has been an active advocate of small arms control on the international stage, supporting a range of regional and multilateral initiatives to address the consequences of the illicit trafficking and operation of small arms.

For DFAIT, small arms and light weapons initiatives fall within its work on conflict prevention, since "in addition to taking a heavy toll on human life, the proliferation and misuse of small arms fuel armed conflict, hamper humanitarian and peacebuilding efforts and impede sustainable development, including achievement of the Millennium Development Goals" (DFAIT 2007).

Through its Human Security Program, DFAIT has supported conflict prevention and peacebuilding programs in armed conflict and post-conflict situations, with attention to the security of vulnerable populations under conditions of armed conflict or its aftermath.

Human Security in Cities

DFAIT has recently linked concerns about small arms availability to a policy focus on human security in cities and the "freedom from fear in urban spaces." Noting that, because of the rapid global growth of urban populations, the world became half-urban in 2005, the department has developed human security policy areas specific to cities, including the pervasive issue of "kids, guns and gangs."

The affordability and availability of small arms are central to a widespread phenomenon of child and youth gangs organized into competing urban criminal empires that in some cases have produced more deaths than many armed conflict zones. The vulnerability of child participants in urban violence suggests that important concerns about war-affected children should be

extended to the armed violence of cities. The impact of such violence on the social and economic dynamics of many urban spaces also suggests the need for programs that address both the security and development challenges of cities, including the proliferation of small arms.

In contrast to DFAIT's initiatives to address the consequences of SALW proliferation and misuse, other Canadian government departments with relevant mandates have made more modest contributions. Yet it is apparent from the crosscutting nature of the armed violence-development nexus that this conjunction represents an important opportunity for all the major Canadian foreign policy actors—the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, the Department of National Defence, and the Canadian International Development Agency—to find common cause in joint programming.

The 3D, Whole-of-Government Approach

Canada has articulated a "3D" model of foreign policy linking defence, development, and diplomacy. This model has resulted in efforts to integrate Canada's foreign policy objectives, most prominently in recent collaborative efforts in "failed and fragile states" such as Afghanistan, Haiti, and Sudan.¹² But it is apparent that the task of a wider and longer-term application of the "whole-of-government" approach to foreign policy remains. A coherent and multidimensional program across government departments that integrates armed violence reduction and small arms control with development cooperation could make a significant contribution to meeting this task.

To advance the whole-of-government formulation (and implementation) of small arms and development policy, all relevant Canadian government departments would need, of course, to liaise and collaborate on complementary and even joint policy and programs. These departments most especially include CIDA, the Department of Foreign Affairs, and the Department of National Defence, and, perhaps to a lesser extent, the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (host of the Canadian Firearms Centre), the Department of Justice, and others. The National Committee on Small Arms, led by DFAIT and responsible for reporting on Canada's implementation of the UN Programme of Action, is an obvious mechanism for liaison and collaboration among government ministries. Another channel is the interdepartmental Working Group on Justice and Security Sector Reform (JSSR), where small arms reduction and control

would necessarily be considered as parts of broader governmental programs.

An ongoing national policy discussion should also include civil society experience and expertise, particularly from members of the Small Arms Working Group of the Canadian Peacebuilding Coordinating Committee (CPCC) and the Canadian Council for International Co-operation (CCIC). Both networks are also well placed to identify civil society partners with expertise in small arms issues and programs in affected regions of the South.

Box 6 - The UK “Joined-Up Government” strategy for small arms and light weapons

The UK government established the “Global Conflict Prevention Pool” in 2001 as a joint FCO, MOD, and DFID mechanism to fund and manage contributions towards violent conflict prevention and reduction. Within the 2005/06 GCPP total budget of £74 million, about £4 million was devoted to the small arms strategy. This funded work on international transfer controls (via the diplomatic “Transfer Control Initiative”); international advocacy (in cooperation with civil society groups and other donor nations); improved analysis (through support for the *Small Arms Survey*, in particular); national action plans in Kenya, Uganda, and Tanzania (among others); and the destruction of over 800,000 small arms and light weapons in Africa and Eastern Europe.

An unpublished May 2006 review of the GCPP small arms strategy revealed that

- The strategy reflects the UK government’s objectives well and it is comparatively well run and effective, although there is no standard project processing across the three ministries;
- The three ministries work together well;
- The strategy has been successful in moving forward international policy discussion;
- The ministries have mainstreamed the strategy into their respective areas, although less successfully in DFID-country programs; and
- There is growing interest in linking the SALW strategy with the Security Sector Reform strategy, possibly under a “security and justice” agenda.

A whole-of-government approach to efforts to link armed violence and small arms reduction to development would benefit from the lessons learned by other donor states. The United Kingdom and the Netherlands have important experience here—including joint administration of common program funds—that would be instructive for similar Canadian

initiatives (OECD 2005a, pp. 19-31). The recent history of the UK’s “Global Conflict Prevention Pool” (GCPP) (and its partner “Africa Conflict Prevention Pool”), jointly administered by DFID, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO), and the Ministry of Defence (MOD), would be particularly relevant to CIDA, DFAIT, and DND respectively (*see Box 6*).

International Dialogue

From the policy framework discussion above it is apparent that Canada has the opportunity to work with other donor states, multilateral organizations, and partner countries to widen the international policy dialogue on armed violence reduction and the challenge of integrating small arms control with development. Canada’s experience with multilateral processes could be further exercised in efforts to deepen global commitment through common donor policies, principles, and objectives.

A multilateral cooperative approach to policy formulation and coherence offers both the benefit of shared resources and expertise as well as the prospect of eliminating duplicated effort. The CPDC is an important international forum to carry forward such work, since it brings together donor governments, the UN system, and International Financial Institutions with interest and expertise in conflict prevention and peacebuilding.

Equally important, the Geneva Declaration process has emerged as a leading policy forum regarding armed violence and development. It will be important for Canada to remain fully engaged in this process and to ensure that the operational guidelines produced by the DAC network inform and complement the political outcomes of the Geneva Declaration discussions. With concerns that the UN Programme of Action has failed to take up the issue of development, a growing number of states—including many donor and partner countries—are looking to the Declaration initiative as the most promising avenue to move the armed violence-development agenda forward.¹³ Moreover, Canada’s commitment to a whole-of-government foreign policy warrants greater participation in, and commitment to, the Geneva Declaration process by CIDA in particular, given that “development” is a central component in the process.

Canada also could actively seek opportunities to work with donors, partners, and civil society groups to promote common policy approaches to small arms reduction. These could occur, for example, in conjunction with the UNDP, in future activities regarding the UN Programme of Action, or in cooperation with regional bodies of small arms-affected states. In other contexts, Canada may also need to press for greater multilateral attention to the armed violence/small arms issue or even for changes in existing international institutional policy. For example, the World Bank's operational policies on development cooperation and conflict are problematic. Although the Bank recognizes the destructive impacts on sustainable development of violent conflict, "it does not provide direct support for disarming combatants," in spite of the widespread recognition of the importance of coherent disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) programs for post-conflict reconstruction.¹⁴

CIDA and Community Safety

Within CIDA, how might we guide policy and practice towards enhancing community safety through the integration of small arms reduction and control into development programming? In other words, if we assume a CIDA goal of increasing development and economic prospects while reducing the impact of armed violence—and particularly the effects of small arms and light weapons—on affected communities, how would CIDA go about reaching this goal?

It is first worth noting that the CIDA policy environment may need amending to accommodate and support the integration of armed violence prevention and reduction with development programming. CIDA's commitment to "good humanitarian donorship" and "aid effectiveness"—worthy goals in themselves—may nevertheless block or restrict armed violence programming in some affected areas. In the case of CIDA's pursuit of aid effectiveness, for example, one commentator has noted that

Canada's involvement assumes some degree of absorptive capacity within the recipient country of the aid, and a reasonable degree of stability and security in order for it to carry out its programmes.

This precludes involvement in anything but secure and stable theatres of operations. (Fitz-Gerald 2006, p. 116).

As CIDA focuses its programs on fewer countries, and as the review of priority partners emphasizes prospects for success, countries that suffer from armed violence may be systematically excluded from the CIDA priority list. This may be offset by Canadian foreign policy attention to failed and fragile states, of which many, if not all, are countries with high levels of armed violence and small arms proliferation. Yet, since the Canadian response to failed and fragile states appears to be led by the DND and the START mechanism at DFAIT, a whole-of-government approach must create space for CIDA participation and for CIDA to use this space to build an armed violence/small arms intervention capacity in countries beyond the priority partners. Moreover, it is important that Canada's and CIDA's approach to failed and fragile states address the "hyper-political" and other criticisms of civil society groups concerned that this approach may emphasize state security at the expense of human security (CCIC 2006b).

In conjunction with a Canadian whole-of-government policy that draws upon the international dialogue as above, success in reaching our goal would be determined by the extent to which CIDA's program branches integrate armed violence/small arms reduction and control into their regular programs when it is appropriate to do so. This in turn will be dependent on the extent to which CIDA program staff are conversant with the issues and engaged in program integration and implementation (*see Box 7*).

Box 7 - Engaging CIDA program staff

A survey of CIDA program staff in October 2006 and interviews with CIDA officials in December 2006 suggest that a strategy must begin by making the case internally and implementing measures to raise CIDA staff awareness of, and expertise in, armed violence and small arms issues. Equally important, staff must be engaged in the generation of innovative approaches towards the goal and how it might be advanced within their program areas. Suggestions include:

- *Build common language and discourse between the development and disarmament communities.* There are significant differences between the language and experiences of the development and disarmament

communities as seen in their quite separate institutional and policy preoccupations. Efforts are required to bridge this cultural divide. A key necessity here is to break down a perception that any response to small arms and light weapons proliferation and misuse is purely a disarmament issue. Integration of small arms and development programming will only be effective if CIDA program personnel are convinced that it is a relevant and pressing nexus and that there are legitimate development avenues of response.

- *Demonstrate that small arms violence is a development concern.* The concern that the application of ODA to small arms programs represents a diversion of development assistance from poverty reduction is shared by a range of development actors.¹⁵ However, as more donor agencies support pertinent policy research and programs, there will be growing and persuasive evidence of the poverty reduction benefits of small arms programs through progress reports and examples of good (and bad) practices. This evidence can be used in staff training and education, perhaps through joint programs with other development agencies. This is not to ignore the need to resist political pressure to recognize military-related cooperation programs as ODA, regardless of their applicability to small arms disarmament (CCIC 2006a).
- *Include SALW control under existing programs and cross-cutting themes.* With several existing priorities and crosscutting issues within the CIDA policy system, it would be unwise to introduce small arms control and reduction as another issue to be integrated into CIDA programs. Rather, there are opportunities to accommodate SALW reduction objectives under existing programs or themes. Program areas include conflict prevention and peacebuilding (DDR, security sector reform [SSR]). With regard to existing themes, *good governance* and *gender equality* in particular relate to small arms programming. Good governance necessitates an environment that is secure from threats of weapons misuse, and gender analysis and implementation are needed for effective small arms remedial efforts.
- *Promote innovation and new programming with supportive tools.* Successful introduction and implementation of programming to accommodate armed violence/small arms issues will not occur without necessary support mechanisms. These may include policy approval and guidelines for programming from senior management, institutional “champions,” technical expertise within CIDA, roundtable discussions among staff, additional funding, demonstration examples, project flexibility, and requests from partner governments and civil society.

It will require program innovation and flexibility, as well as openness to small arms points of intervention within programs that address wider themes, such as good governance.

While it is not necessary to establish a new program stream at CIDA to address small arms, the crosscutting nature of small arms programming suggests that, to achieve our goal, most, if not all, of CIDA’s program branches—from Policy Branch to Partnership Branch to Multilateral Programs—would need to participate. It would be crucial to engage Bilateral Programs, especially the country programs of small arms-affected states. The same applies to the Peace and Security Unit of Multilateral Programs, with its responsibility for conflict prevention, peacebuilding, and peace support activities.

CIDA Programs

In addition to supporting innovative approaches and activities, CIDA could construct a policy-led strategy on armed violence/development integration that will have program relevance for years to come. The activity to develop such a strategy could include the following:

Research and analysis. The integration of armed violence reduction and development is an emerging policy area, and the need for both policy- and program-relevant research is paramount. There are many under-explored facets of the linkages between armed violence and thwarted development and a key purpose of such research would be to assist with the “measurability” of the impacts of interventions. A common theme in recent forums on armed violence and development has been interest in criteria and indicators to establish and measure project success in reducing the effects of violence and in advancing the MDGs. There is also strong interest in measurements that might be used across violence-affected regions.

In general, three areas of research have been identified by policy analysts and practitioners as requiring new or greater attention and these correspond to the stages of effective implementation of remedial programs. We need to know the conditions that we wish to improve, the most effective actions that we can take to make improvements, and the information we need to assess effective actions.

Consequently, in conjunction with other development agencies such as DFID that have funded research on the armed violence-development nexus, CIDA could sponsor the following three areas of research:

1. Baseline research: To support effective intervention to reduce impacts of armed violence on development, it is important to collect data and assess conditions before interventions are planned and implemented. Baseline research should provide an assessment—and, where possible, quantification—of the impacts and dimensions of small arms violence on affected communities. In other words, this research should identify the conditions that intervention programs would be designed to improve.

An example of the baseline approach has received support from Canada's Department of Foreign Affairs. The Small Arms Survey (based in Geneva) is currently conducting the "Sudan Human Security Baseline Assessment" (2007) to "review the spatial distribution of armed violence throughout Sudan and offer policy-relevant advice to redress insecurity." The two-year Small Arms Survey project combines research to quantify the flows, stockpiles, and demand for arms with a series of "victimization" surveys that review mortality, morbidity, and victimization trends in affected communities. The research is intended to inform the design, implementation, and evaluation of DDR and civilian arms collection programs.

One challenge is to develop research methodologies that recognize the unique nature of the range of regions and communities affected by violence and that also support the identification of "best practices" with wide applicability. A current project by the UN Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR 2007), funded by the Dutch and Swedish Foreign Ministries, is seeking to develop a model "Security Needs Assessment Protocol" that could be applied across varying conditions to assess security issues as they are understood by local stakeholders. The protocol would adopt a "diagnostic approach" to develop security needs assessments intended to better design intervention strategies appropriate to each community.

2. Action-oriented research: This area of research generally focuses on "the relevance, experience and opportunities for small arms projects to contribute to poverty reduction" (Thurin 2007a, 2007b). Action-oriented research gives priority to field-based activity and collaboration with local experts and activities in affected regions. It can emphasize qualitative over quantitative approaches that value community input and it is often concerned with deriving "lessons-learned" and "best practices" that may be used in the construction and implementation of further projects (as an example of a CIDA-supported project that may generate important

lessons-learned see the Canada Fund for Africa-supported project described in *Annex C*). It is a "hands-on" form of research that is and will be important for gauging where and how armed violence/small arms reduction is needed to reach development objectives.

An example of suggested action-oriented research can be found in the Swiss Peace Foundation working paper, *Gender Awareness in Research in Small Arms and Light Weapons* (Schroeder, Farr & Schnabel 2005). In addition to those specifically related to gender (such as giving priority to gender-disaggregated data), the paper's recommendations included research that "values non-academic input and activist approaches to generating information" and steering clear of "parachute research" where experts insert themselves briefly into affected communities.

3. Evidence-Based Research. Research is also required to provide evidence of the inverse relationship between small arms misuse and poverty reduction. This involves evidence both to illustrate (and quantify) how small arms proliferation and misuse impede poverty reduction as well as evidence to illustrate that reductions in armed violence and small arms availability advance poverty reduction strategies and achievement of the MDGs. This research is important to the generation of appropriate indicators to measure project success. The Research Initiative on Small Arms (RISA) is a research network established to take up this challenge by linking researchers across a wide range of disciplines using social science research methods and techniques. In March 2006, RISA hosted a meeting in Durban, South Africa entitled "Reducing Firearm-Related Mortality and Morbidity: Data to Action" (Violence Prevention Alliance 2006).

Evidence-based research would also explore linkages between small arms and health, refugees, children, gender, and other social issues. In the case of health, for example, there is growing data on both the direct and indirect impacts of gun violence, and a public health framework for developing interventions to break cycles of violence could be a useful program tool.¹⁶ With regard to assistance to survivors of gun violence more particularly, there is much to be learned from the lessons of assistance to survivors of anti-personnel landmines.

All types of research should give attention to the opportunities for CIDA (and other Canadian departmental) intervention, but also to prospects for longer-term impacts. This work would be an obvious area for

collaboration with the Departments of Foreign Affairs and National Defence, and the results could be shared with other donors and agencies.

Policy and program dialogue. Advancement of policy and program discussion with CIDA program staff could begin from existing program and project examples as well as the experience of international agencies and other donors. Perhaps led by a departmental expert or “champion,” the discussion would provide the opportunity to raise awareness of small arms issues among CIDA officials and invoke creative thinking about methods and means to integrate these issues into their programming areas. It would be important to ensure that the issue of small arms reduction was amalgamated with other converging thematic concerns such as fragile states and good governance. Separate pursuit of thematic issues risks being seen as a distraction from the larger development effort and a diversion of resources.

If the policy and program dialogue is extended to civil society and country partners, CIDA staff would be better placed to develop integrated program priorities and objectives. Perhaps more importantly, CIDA’s partners would also be better engaged. In the case of Canadian development and humanitarian NGO partners, recent interviews suggest that some direction from CIDA on the armed violence/small arms issue would be welcome, especially in regions where the personal security of program staff is paramount.¹⁷

Elsewhere, CIDA has structured opportunities to engage partner governments in the integration of armed violence prevention and reduction programs into poverty reduction strategies. The extensive consultations of the Country Development Programming Framework (CDPF) process, for example, could include a small arms component, especially if it were included within an existing focus such as governance. Similarly, although Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs) for many partner countries may be in place, they require periodic updating and renegotiation among donors and partners. The update would be an opportunity for countries like Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda, which have National Action Plans on Small Arms, to negotiate integration of the NAP with the PRSP.

The whole-of-government approach is also relevant to partner countries that are the sites of small arms reduction/development programs. One critical challenge to integrating SALW control into

development programs is a common disconnect in partner countries between security agendas and implementation of development cooperation objectives. Whole-of-government complexities in Canada are magnified in developing countries, made more difficult by a lack of resources and institutional capacity. Ideally, a partner country would identify small arms control as one of its priorities for bilateral or multilateral programs, but if the police or border control officials most familiar with the effects of small arms are not communicating with the development program officials who are negotiating partner agreements, then important factors could be left out of the program equation. It would be incumbent on partner and donor states alike to seek a whole-of-government strategy to coordinate national small arms control plans with national development plans.

Implementation—pilot projects and indicators. Implementation will require formulation of priorities and objectives that integrate small arms and light weapons reduction and control into CIDA programs where possible and appropriate. The development of priorities and objectives would benefit from the lessons learned by CIDA-funded DDR and SSR experience, although the UNDP and WHO caution against framing the problem of violence exclusively in security sector terms (*see Box 8*). CIDA programming would also benefit from the lessons learned from other Canadian government programs, particularly within DFAIT, that have sponsored small arms mitigation. Moreover, it is important to recognize here that an integrated small arms/development approach does not end with the removal or reduction of small arms. Attention should be paid to the post-reduction development and security context and programs must be devised that bring order, stability, and economic prospects to communities so that the benefits of disarmament are not reversed.

Although there are opportunities for CIDA to act at all levels and in all programs, the most practical and immediate application may be that of pilot projects within the Partnership Branch. Such projects perhaps could be structured to provide a comparison across countries with a range of conditions—for example, in CIDA priority partner states, in failed and fragile states, and in post-conflict states. The experience gained from projects in different security environments would be invaluable to reviews of priorities, objectives, and indicators.

To determine the effectiveness of interventions to control and reduce small arms, appropriate indicators will be needed to measure progress. Indicators could assess not only direct impact—the health costs of firearms violence, for example—but also indirect impact, such as levels of agricultural production in a small arms-affected region.

Box 8 - Small arms in Haiti

“At present, Haiti is a divided country in the midst of a political, economic, ecological and social crisis. HIV/AIDS rates are among the highest in the Western hemisphere. Violence, *bolstered by the prevalence of thousands of small arms in the hands of both state and non-state actors*, has sabotaged attempts to establish the rule of law, leading to an overall climate of insecurity” (Shamsie & Thompson 2006, p. 1) (emphasis added).

Apart from the quotation above, which opens the recent report on Haiti by the Canadian Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Development (SCFAID 2006), there is only one other reference to small arms in the 30-page document. This is to note that there are an estimated 170,000 small arms in circulation in the country and that little progress has been made in disarming violent gangs.

The SCFAID report makes recommendations regarding Canada’s role in Haiti, including a whole-of-government policy approach, and improvements to the development strategy, electoral assistance, and support for good governance. Its recommendation in the area of security calls for strengthening MINUSTAH, the UN peacekeeping mission, especially to disarm criminal gangs, and for Canada to contribute to training and reforming the Haitian police force. It also recommends further Canadian contributions to justice and penal reform.

Although it provides several constructive recommendations, the SCFAID report is an example of a tendency noted by the joint Armed Violence Prevention Programme (AVPP) of the UNDP and WHO (2004, p. 3): “in lesser-developed countries particularly, the problem of violence has tended to be framed as a security sector and policing issue.”¹⁸ The AVPP paper (“Support to Community Based Violence Prevention Programmes”) points out that “a much broader variety of interventions than those advocated by the security and policing sectors have been shown to be effective in preventing violence” (p. 4). It goes on to identify violence reduction strategies aimed especially at youth violence—“the major driver of armed violence”—and these include societal strategies to reduce access to small arms.

In addition to providing evidence of small arms reduction and removal, indicators also are needed to measure progress towards other objectives of a comprehensive program of integration. So, for example, if awareness-

raising and sensitization are included as part of the small arms/development program (and many existing actors such as the UNDP stress their critical role), then indicators would help to assess changed public awareness of, and attitudes towards, small arms and light weapons.

In deriving indicators, CIDA can draw on its sponsored research as well as on the work of other donors and multilateral agencies including DAC, the AVPI, the Geneva Declaration grouping, and the UNDP. The Carleton University Country Indicators for Foreign Policy project is a potential source of indicator data and analysis, particularly since the project has received funding support from CIDA. CIDA can also look to the research and analysis of civil society groups such as the Small Arms Survey, which has suggested indicators for the direct and indirect impacts of small arms on development. The 2004 *Guns or Growth* report of the international civil society “Control Arms” campaign (pp. 60-64) provides another example of the use of indicators, here for assessing the impact of arms transfers on development.

An integrated approach. Based on the experience of pilot projects, longer-term, systematic, and integrated approaches can be developed that especially target the states, cities, and communities most affected by small arms violence or that fall within CIDA’s larger program priorities. Given the widespread nature of the problems arising from small arms misuse, there would be opportunities for intervention regardless of the geographic focus of CIDA programs. Unfortunately, for the foreseeable future, humanitarian crises will be made worse by the presence of weapons, and the cities, states, and regions of the developing world will continue to be threatened by repressive regimes, rebel groups, and criminal gangs with easy access to guns.

The challenge to CIDA is to develop an effective strategy to determine how and when it will respond and to make a program commitment commensurate with the duration of the problem. While innovative pilot SALW projects may be implemented in the short term (three to five years) to demonstrate viability and to test design effectiveness, plans and processes also should be put in place to integrate remedial small arms objectives into longer-term bilateral and multilateral country programs. This includes planning now for programs following the current periods of committed funds. In other words, the small arms-development cycle will require a multiyear approach to a plague that will affect many regions and communities for years to come.

Recommendations

The challenges of addressing armed violence through development programming must be realistically assessed and pragmatically addressed. Currently, there are few rigorous evaluations of successfully implemented projects. Research undertaken by Bradford University for the AVPI, and by the UNDP, indicate that programs likely to have the greatest impact will follow good development programming principles that include:

- Broad-based studies of the local security situation and an assessment of the willingness and capabilities of civil society and police/military actors to participate in good will;
- Local participation in all phases of the design and implementation of programs;
- Addressing the underlying sources of armed conflict and violence, not just a narrow focus of controlling or reducing the number of small arms;
- Realistic project objectives, with milestones, and adequate resources for evaluation and monitoring to respond to shifts in the project environments and project timelines of 5 to 10 years, or more, with decision-making control and flexibility in the field; and
- Sustained funding and technical support without long delays in disbursements.

The following recommendations, primarily for CIDA but also for DFAIT and other relevant federal government departments and agencies, have been formulated to enable Canada to meet its international commitments to address armed violence through development programming. These commitments are spelled out in the *United Nations Programme of Action on Small Arms and Light Weapons* and the *Geneva Declaration on Armed Violence and Development*.

1. Canada's International Commitments—CIDA's Policy Vacuum

Background. Through DFAIT, and with the cooperation of CIDA and other federal departments and agencies, Canada has been an active proponent in the UN and regional fora of strengthening international regimes to control and reduce the proliferation and misuse of small arms and light weapons and to reduce armed violence. Canada's further participation in the core group of the *Geneva Declaration on Armed Violence*

and Development and in the OECD/DAC process on armed violence prevention and reduction has entailed more specific political commitments to support the mainstreaming of armed violence reduction in development programming within the broader framework of Canada's foreign policy. To date, however, CIDA has not internally approved a policy committing itself to these goals and directing staff to consider armed violence reduction measures in its programming. Without concerted effort, CIDA runs the risk of presenting to the international community progress reports that lack substantial policy or programming results.

Recommendation. That CIDA adopt a policy at a high level (e.g., Cabinet, Minister or Deputy Minister) that affirms and promotes addressing armed violence where it is a significant impeding factor in poverty alleviation through appropriate development programming, and that this policy be situated in Canada's broader foreign policy commitments on small arms and light weapons control and reduction.

2. Framing the Policy Issue—Linking to Ongoing Development Priorities

Background. Generally, development professionals, both within governments and in nongovernmental organizations, are skeptical of incorporating measures into development programming that focus on security broadly stated, or arms control more narrowly defined. This skepticism does not extend to the reality of armed violence itself and its debilitating effects on development processes, which are self-evident but not necessarily measured. The question posed by some development professionals is whether development funding (ODA) should be "diverted" from its primary goal of poverty alleviation, and why other government departments or agencies (i.e., DFAIT, Defence, RCMP) are not better placed to address these issues outside the development assistance envelope.

The evolution of programming in this area currently underway among donor nations and partner countries should be seen as a deepening and strengthening of development programming in thematic areas already well recognized. Security should be seen in a rights-based approach as a basic entitlement of the poor. Armed violence puts a drag on trade and economic activity, increases health care costs, and has other profound

social impacts. Security needs to be understood in relation to the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and fragile states analysis.

Recommendation. That armed violence reduction programming be incrementally and pragmatically introduced across CIDA with reference to crosscutting themes such as gender equality and the environment, and the global issues of governance reform, private sector development, health promotion, and education. Such programming is to be understood as integral to the development goals to be achieved in each of these areas, and may include, for example, measures related to increasing civil society and police/military cooperation in the reduction of armed violence, and the control, and reduction in numbers, of small arms and light weapons. Unique entry points in each priority area should be identified as they emerge from local analysis of armed violence situations.

3. Building Internal CIDA Support

Background. A policy pronouncement from the Ministerial level alone will not create support among CIDA staff for armed violence reduction programming. Concerted efforts of communication and professional development will be required to build in-house knowledge, expertise, and commitment. Where practical, this effort should include collaboration with other development agencies such as DFID, which may have undertaken, or be interested in conducting, similar staff support programs.

Recommendation. That CIDA engage in staff education and training on the relevance and practical applications of armed violence programming, including peer seminars, policy officer training, and pilot projects; and that the Agency consider creating a position or office to function as an ongoing resource for staff in this effort.

4. Building Canadian NGO Support

Background. NGOs, including CCIC, are reluctant to see ODA funding used for police and military expenditures in partner/recipient countries. This principled objection is based in part on fears that ODA will be inappropriately used to address donor countries' security concerns or will increase a perception of militarizing of aid. Political support from

Canadian NGOs, international NGOs, and indigenous NGOs for armed violence reduction programming is crucial to its success.

Recommendation. That CIDA invest in specific programs of education and professional development for Canadian NGOs related to development programming and armed violence reduction, including policy dialogue and development. Canadian NGO expertise in this area should be identified and supported.

5. Long-term and Sustainable Funding with Local Participation

Background. What research exists on successful armed violence reduction programs points to the requirement for time horizons of five or 10 years or more before substantial positive results are realized. Local civil society and community-based organization participation and capacity-building are necessary in all phases, including the research. Recognizing the current formative nature of armed violence reduction programming, considerable flexibility and decentralized decision-making will be required. Engagement between civil society and security authorities is crucial, as is awareness-raising among civilian populations. Within this formative field, which is experiencing a proliferation of initiatives without a settled or necessarily coherent framework, caution in the application of programming tools such as Results Based Management (RBM) must be observed. Sufficient flexibility is required to be responsive to what is happening at the community level.

Recommendation. That CIDA commit long-term sustained funding to pilot projects or country programs linking armed violence reduction and development, in coordination with other country and multilateral donors. These projects should ensure local participation in all phases of planning and implementation, including the development of local research capacity and civil society participation. They may include private-public partnerships.

6. Impact of Armed Violence on Indigenous Peoples

Background. The differential impact of armed violence on Indigenous peoples requires specific sensitivities and analysis when designing programs. Marginalization and dispossession from traditional lands require disaggregated analysis of the unique pressures on Indigenous

peoples. Identities sometimes predate the establishment of current state boundaries and Indigenous peoples can be marginalized from formal political processes. Canada plays an important role on the international scene in policy development and program support on Indigenous issues. Tracking the impact of armed violence in rural areas affecting Indigenous peoples and the challenges of their migration to urban settings provides a unique opportunity for Canadian programming in this area.

Recommendation. That CIDA support or design armed violence reduction programming that is sensitive to indigenous peoples' concerns and realities.

7. Research in Support of Armed Violence Reduction Programming

Background. This is a relatively new area for development programming. Armed violence reduction measures will be relevant to poverty alleviation in a variety of situations, including post-conflict (DDR programs), urban gangs and criminality, rural competition for livestock, and cross-border conflict over land or resources. Successful programming will require baseline, action-oriented, and evidence-based research; conflict-sensitive analysis; local knowledge of local institutions; research training; and capacity building.

The pressing need to address armed violence cannot wait for the results of long-term study and assessment, although this will also be required over time to incorporate lessons and improve outcomes. The effectiveness and efficiency of armed violence programming should be measured over time to establish the "return on investment" of such funding. Specific attention to the impact of armed violence on men, who are the primary perpetrators and victims, particularly in the 15-29 age group, and on women need to be better understood through appropriate gender-sensitive research. The Country Indicators for Foreign Policy (CIFP) can provide backward-looking data on incidents and prevalence, but forward-looking analysis is also required.

Recommendation. That CIDA, in cooperation and coordination with other relevant federal departments and agencies, and in tandem with other donor countries through such mechanisms as the Geneva Declaration and the OECD/DAC, engage in research and assessment

processes to document best practices, and improve the overall level of knowledge and expertise in armed violence reduction programming.

Recommendation. That CIDA identify and assess all its recent and current initiatives in the field of armed violence and development for the purpose of identifying common denominators, effects, and best practices.

Recommendation. That CIDA engage a variety of research methodologies to assess current situations and measure programming results achieved through time, including:

- Conflict-sensitive analysis of regions, subregions, countries, and local areas;
- Baseline research to identify conditions that intervention programs will improve;
- Action-oriented research on field-based activity to derive "lessons learned" and "best practices";
- Evidence-based research to generate appropriate indicators of success; and
- Long-term impact assessment.

Recommendation. That a variety of expert research methodologies from relevant fields be engaged to assess, for example, the health costs and impacts of injuries and deaths from armed violence, the educational needs of urban primary school dropouts, the economic and social impact of women-led single-parent families in areas where men are the primary victims of gun violence, or the economic costs for local trade and investment of high insecurity through gun violence. Canadian expertise in this area should be identified and cultivated among civil society organizations and NGOs.

Recommendation. That the differential impact of armed violence on men and women be specifically tracked in all research efforts.

8. Partner/Recipient Country Support for Armed Violence Reduction Programming

Background. With the increasing international coordination of aid to respective partner countries, as well as reliance on multilateral pooled funding, it is important that partner/recipient countries identify and advocate for armed violence reduction programming to be included in

Country Development Programming Frameworks, revisions of Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers, and other negotiations. Incentives should be incorporated into negotiating processes and funding mechanisms that encourage partner/recipient governments to organize their internal responses to armed violence challenges into national development priorities and make these known to donors.

Recommendation. That CIDA work in coordination with the OECD/DAC and multilateral agencies to identify and incorporate armed violence reduction programming into Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers, other national poverty reduction programs, and multilateral pooled funding mechanisms in order to strengthen partner country commitment and support donor programming that is driven by the demand of the partner/recipient country rather than the donors.

9. Canadian Government Coordination

Background. Discussions with UK officials indicate that a pooled funding model involving DFID, the Foreign Office, and the Ministry of Defence provided a useful bureaucratic vehicle for a coordinated “whole of government” approach on armed violence reduction with common objectives. It also had drawbacks, including an extra-department dynamic in which representatives on the coordinating committee faced challenges in relating their shared work back to their home departments or agencies.

In Canada there has been, to this point, an organic or informal coordination process between various departments or agencies engaged in small arms work, particularly CIDA and DFAIT, with National Defence, the RCMP, and others providing a set of more technical tools such as gun management and storage systems. This process has been particularly effective in policy development, for example around Canada’s participation in the UN Programme of Action, but has not been fully tested in the coordination of programming on armed violence reduction. Currently, it is unlikely that a separate armed violence reduction funding pool will be created in Canada. The lessons learned from mainstreaming mine action programming within CIDA and DFAIT, with appropriate interdepartmental coordination and participation by civil society, point to further focusing and formalizing of the current organic approach to armed violence and small arms control and reduction programming.

Recommendation. That CIDA and DFAIT continue to discuss and coordinate armed violence programming between them and with other departments and agencies, giving consideration to more formal structures of coordination as needed. Consideration should be given to jointly funded projects to build and test a coordinated approach.

10. DFAIT’s Role in Programming

Background. DFAIT has particular responsibilities for policy development and diplomatic negotiation of international instruments on small arms and light weapons, including measures on marking and tracing, brokering, stockpile destruction, border controls, and community policing. Although the control and reduction of SALW respond only to part of the much larger problem of armed violence, they are necessary steps in building long-term sustainable peace. It also is clear that, in many parts of the world, international and national commitments on these issues are much more in evidence than national abilities to fulfill these commitments. DFAIT could materially contribute to SALW control and reduction in supporting capacity-building and implementation strategies. Such support, through the Global Peace and Security Fund and the Human Security Fund, could be in the context of 3D engagement in countries such as Afghanistan, and in failed or fragile state frameworks for countries such as Sudan, Haiti, and Lebanon.

Recommendation. That DFAIT, in cooperation with and complementing CIDA armed violence reduction programming, commit funds and diplomatic resources to encouraging and assisting SALW control and reduction in targeted partner/recipient countries, and through such regional and subregional organizations as ASEAN, ECOWAS, the OAS, and the OSCE.

Recommendation. That DFAIT develop overall policy guidance on how the various foreign policy instruments related to small arms and light weapons control and violence reduction can be integrated and coordinated.

11. SALW Transfer Intelligence

Background. The UK military intelligence collects information on small arms transfers and distributes its assessments internally among

relevant departments and agencies. This process has provided a number of benefits, including raising the profile of small arms and violence reduction within the UK Government. Canada (and the USA, Australia, New Zealand) could be included in this distribution through appropriate intelligence-sharing agreements. This information could potentially build on the limited picture of illicit weapons flows available through Interpol.

Recommendation. That Canada enter into appropriate agreements with the UK and others (USA, Australia, New Zealand, etc.) to track SALW transfers and share this information with each other.

12. Canadian Government Military Exports

Background. In the UK DFID participates in the regulation of UK arms exports where appropriate by providing an assessment of the likely impact of weapons transfers on the sustainable development of the recipient country. In this manner, the UK government department responsible for development is included in a “whole-of-government” approach to arms transfers.

Recommendation. That CIDA be included in the decision-making process with regard to the “case-by-case” approval of permits for the export of Canadian military goods by providing assessments of the impacts of the arms transfers on the development of CIDA-partner countries.

Annex A Small Arms and Children¹⁹

The impacts of SALW on the lives of children can be categorized into direct, indirect, and consequential effects. Directly, children suffer death and injury from guns, abuses of their rights and displacement from their homes at the point of a gun, and psychosocial trauma from fear or witnessing misuse of guns. Indirectly, small arms diminish the support structures for children—limiting access to health care, education, and basic resources like food and water; and devastating families through forced separations and deaths of parents. A tragic consequence of SALW proliferation and ease of use is the arming of children. Many tens of thousands of armed child soldiers fight in over 20 conflict zones and many thousands more participate in organized armed violence in urban centres worldwide.

The importance of the link between small arms and children is well recognized in global and regional statements on Children and Armed Conflict. Indeed, the body of child-focused policy in general has incorporated small arms control strategies more effectively than the policy reverse, that is, the small arms-focused measures that address the needs and rights of children. States and civil society groups are just beginning to consider how to include child- and youth-focused elements in small arms policies and initiatives.

Some insight into an action-oriented agenda on children and small arms can be gleaned from a needs assessment survey conducted by World Vision Canada in May 2006. The survey was distributed through NGO networks on small arms, child rights, and children and armed conflict. The survey responses from 33 organizations across the globe yielded three broad conclusions:

- There is significant interest in creating new, or expanding existing, networks on small arms and children to share information and experiences.
- Additional research on the links between the two issues is necessary and desirable, especially case studies and quantifiable data.
- There are a wide variety of existing resources, including program suggestions, best practice guides, and training manuals, which

could be adapted to benefit organizations working in the field or at the community level.

Annex B The Gender Dimension of Armed Violence

The proliferation and misuse of small arms and light weapons contributes to inequality between women and men and to gender-based violence in countries all over the world, whether war affected or at peace.

—IANSAs 2006a

Whatever the cause of violence, the presence of guns has an impact that varies according to gender, age, and context. According to a World Health Organization report, 90 per cent of gun homicide victims are men and boys. Men are also the main perpetrators of armed violence in both armed conflict settings and in criminal activity, and are more likely to be involved in armed gangs. Socio-cultural factors condition men in countries where it is “macho” or a rite of passage into manhood to own and use a gun.

The relationship between women and guns is equally complex. Women and girls participate in and suffer from armed violence. On the one hand, women are members of armed forces, involved in militias and gangs, and encourage the use of guns. On the other, damage to health and education infrastructure by armed violence disproportionately affects women and children, and a lack of legal protection in war zones contributes to sexual violence by armed men. When men are killed or disabled during conflict or gun violence, women become breadwinners and caregivers. Even in “peacetime,” intimate partner violence is more likely to be lethal when a firearm is present in the home (IANSAs 2006b).

Particularly in post-conflict situations in which weapons are readily available, initiatives that deal with guns in public circulation need to focus on young men who are at risk of engaging in violent or criminal behaviour. Studies undertaken following the armed conflict in El Salvador show that violence actually increased during the ten years after the peace agreement was signed. DDR programs need to deal with ex-combatants and those associated with the fighting forces, including women and children.

International Attention to Gender Analysis

Over the more than five years since the UN Programme of Action (PoA) was agreed, NGOs and International Organizations have pressed for greater recognition of the gender dimension of the small arms problem.

The PoA has only one reference to gender in a preamble paragraph that refers to the “negative impact” of the illicit trade in small arms on women, children, and the elderly. And in reporting their progress in implementing the PoA, only a handful of states make reference to gender. Women are viewed as victims rather than possible perpetrators or key resources in combating violence.

In 2005, the UN General Assembly First Committee passed a resolution on the humanitarian and development impact of small arms. The resolution calls on states to

- Take full account of the roles that women and women’s organizations could play in DDR processes;
- Address the needs of female combatants and dependents in DDR programs; and
- Promote and protect the rights and welfare of children in armed conflict.

In addition, the 2005 World Summit declaration pledged to end impunity for violence against women. UN Security Council Resolution 1325 calls for equal participation of women in peacebuilding initiatives and formal peace negotiations.

More work is needed to address the demand-related issues that prompt men to take up arms and more attention must be given to the strict control of private acquisition, use, and storage of firearms. Moreover, civil society has an important role to play in changing gender attitudes towards guns. Young men in particular need to be offered viable alternatives to combat or involvement in criminal or gang activities. Cultural attitudes and norms need to be constructed to reverse associations of masculinity with armed violence.

Annex C A CIDA-Funded Pilot Program to Reduce Regional Small Arms Proliferation

CIDA’s Canada Fund for Africa is supporting a two-year program in West Africa that “will contribute to the fight against the proliferation of SALW in Guinea, The Gambia, Guinea Bissau and Senegal.” Administered by the Canadian Centre for International Studies and Cooperation in partnership with the UK-based Oxfam GB, the Sub-Regional Programme – Small Arms and Light Weapons (SRP-SALW) is working to improve security, particularly for women, and to advance development opportunities in targeted communities in West Africa.

Since April 2005 the pilot program has undertaken national programs within a subregional approach to the problem of illicit small arms and light weapons. The four states are members of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), which in June 2006 agreed to the *ECOWAS Convention on Small Arms and Light Weapons, their ammunition and other related materials*. The convention, which imposes strict conditions on small arms transfer and domestic possession,²⁰ grew out of a shared recognition that the problem of small arms could not be solved by the states in the subregion on their own. ECOWAS has established ECOSAP, its Small Arms Program, and member states have established national commissions to coordinate country responses to the small arms problem. Although the political and security conditions differ in the four program states, they share a common experience of illicit weapons that exacerbate domestic tensions.

In the first year of the program, the SRP-SALW established a program team at the subregional level that, for each country, set up a steering committee, which included a representative of the national commission and a local NGO operating in the field. Each of the four state steering committees created an implementation framework for national activities as well as a civil society/state partnership that made important advances on a civil-military dialogue on security issues. Local committees were established to oversee activities in the targeted communities.

The program also undertook capacity-building for program partners through training activities, exchanges, and participation in implementation. All were intended to promote local ownership of the program. The training modules included result-based management for the

steering committees, the gender dimensions of SALW for female trainers and local partners, and planning and community development for local actors. An important exchange visit to Mali of a delegation made up of four representatives from each program country provided insights and inspiration from the SALW reduction and control activities underway in Mali. Surveys of community perceptions and the local impact of SALW were carried out in each country in preparation for the development of a “sensitization program” to raise public awareness of SALW problems and challenges. The sensitization program resulted in a range of activities, including community meetings, a mass bike tour of volunteers to deliver the SALW message, and school awareness-raising events, as well as radio and other media coverage of the activities.

Although many challenges remain, to date the SRP-SALW has demonstrated impressive potential for a SALW reduction program that operates at subregional, national, and local levels. It is already apparent, however, that the two-year program will likely be limited to establishing an operating framework. The multiyear task of reducing SALW impact in support of long-term development will remain. With the imminent completion of the Canada Fund for Africa, the challenge will be to find other avenues of funding support for the communities of West Africa.

Annex D Glossary of Terms

ARMED CONFLICT

According to Project Ploughshares (2007):

For the purposes of the annual *Armed Conflicts Report* an armed conflict is defined as a political conflict in which armed combat involves the armed forces of at least one state (or one or more armed factions seeking to gain control of all or part of the state), and in which at least 1,000 people have been killed by the fighting during the course of the conflict. An armed conflict is added to the annual list of current armed conflicts in the year in which the death toll reaches the threshold of 1,000, but the starting date of the armed conflict is shown as the year in which the first combat deaths included in the count of 1,000 or more occurred.

The definition of “political conflict” becomes more difficult as the trend in current intrastate armed conflicts increasingly obscures the distinction between political and criminal violence. In a growing number of armed conflicts, armed bands, militia, or factions engage in criminal activity (e.g., theft, looting, extortion) in order to fund their political/military campaigns, but frequently also for the personal enrichment of the leadership and the general livelihood of the fighting forces. Thus, in some circumstances, while the disintegrating order reflects the social chaos borne of state failure, the resulting violence or armed combat are not necessarily guided by a political program or a set of politically motivated or defined military objectives. However, these trends are part of the changing character of war, and conflicts characterized more by social chaos than political/military competition are thus included in the tabulation of current armed conflicts.

In many contemporary armed conflicts the fighting is intermittent and involves a very wide range of levels of intensity. An armed conflict is deemed to have ended if there has been a formal ceasefire or peace agreement and, following which, there are no longer combat deaths (or at least fewer than 25 per year); or, in the absence of a formal cease-fire, a conflict is deemed to

have ended after two years of dormancy (in which fewer than 25 combat deaths per year have occurred).

The above definition builds upon, but differs in some aspects from, the definitions of other groups producing annual conflict tabulations, notably reports by Peter Wallensteen and Margareta Sollenberg of the Department of Peace and Conflict Research, Uppsala University (Sweden), published annually in the yearbook of the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute.

ARMED VIOLENCE

According to the UNDP (2005, p. 12):

Armed violence can be defined generally as the use of armed force (usually with weapons) to achieve specific political, social and/or economic goals. The manifestations of armed violence often occur where violence, crime and conflict intersect. As a number of recent reports have pointed out, contemporary conflicts and crime often fuel and overlap with one another.

Violent crime includes individual acts such as violent assault, sexual violence, premeditated murder, armed theft, extra-judicial killings, kidnappings and assassinations. **Violent conflict** refers to collective acts such as gang wars, ethnic conflict, rebellions, civil wars and interstate conflict. **Violent criminal conflict** includes mercenary violence, armed rebellions, terrorism and illegal use of state force.



CONFLICT PREVENTION

According to a report (Marriott & Carment 2003) prepared for the Canadian Peacebuilding Coordinating Committee:

Conflict prevention, in its broadest sense, refers to activities and measures that reduce the likelihood of tensions or disputes between and within states, and among interest or identity groups that could lead to large-scale violence. Conflict prevention activities may be those that address a conflict directly, such as mediation, preventive diplomacy, people to people contacts, advocacy, peacekeeping and negotiation efforts. Prevention may also take the form of responses to structural factors that may contribute to future and current conflict. Such structural efforts include equitable economic and social development, governance reform, arms control, and security sector reform. Conflict prevention also includes activities that enhance the conflict-sensitivity of aid and trade, such as the use of peace and conflict impact assessments, and may take place in the short or long term. Conflict prevention may be carried out by non-governmental organizations, government departments, international institutions, and private sector firms and is supported by the work of academics and think tanks who carry out research into best practices and emerging trends. While ambitious and broad, this definition is consistent with current research and policies relating to conflict prevention and allows an inclusive and holistic picture of the conflict prevention community.

DISARMAMENT, DEMOBILIZATION, AND REINTEGRATION (DDR)

The UN Department for Disarmament Affairs (2007) has described DDR as follows:

Disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) are activities designed to facilitate disbanding military fighters and easing their transition back into society. They are often given priority at the cease of hostilities, as it is important to help former combatants settle into peacetime occupations.

These activities can involve the turning in of weapons and weapons caches, the physical relocation of ex-combatants (often first in camps and then to other locations), distribution of benefits packages for ex-combatants (this can include clothing,

minimal amounts of food and cash settlements), and development of credit, training or other programmes to assist the reintegration of combatants into their communities.

FAILED AND FRAGILE STATES

According to the Canadian Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (2006):

[Many have] highlighted the absence of an authoritative definition of a “failed” or “fragile” state. These sentiments are echoed in academic, government and NGO circles worldwide, where profound disagreement persists over how to define these terms. However, the lack of definitional clarity has not prevented progress in understanding the phenomenon of state failure and/or fragility, and many of the treatments for these conditions do not represent a dramatic departure from current practice. This has allowed for a loose international consensus on some causes and symptoms of fragility (acute and chronic poverty, loss of territorial control, widespread insecurity, deterioration of public services, human rights violations) and on the identification of a number of failed or fragile states. In light of this, Canada has successfully engaged in prevention, reconstruction and stabilization projects in certain failed and fragile states, even as discussions within DFAIT, CIDA and DND proceed over how best to generically define these terms. For example, all three of these departments are currently collaborating to mitigate fragility and support the establishment of a functioning state architecture in Afghanistan, Haiti, Sudan and the Palestinian Territories.

HUMAN SECURITY

According to the Human Security Centre (2005) at the University of British Columbia:

Human security is the protection of individuals and communities from war and other forms of violence.

The Human Security Network (2006) of states, of which Canada is a founding member, provides an operative definition of human security:

A commitment to human rights and humanitarian law is the foundation for building human security. Human security is advanced in every country by protecting and promoting human rights, the rule of law, democratic governance and democratic

structures, a culture of peace and the peaceful resolution of conflicts.

PEACEBUILDING

According to the recently created UN Peacebuilding Commission (2005):

Post-conflict peacebuilding is all that is needed to help a country move from war to peace.

The Peacemakers Trust, a Canadian NGO, elaborates (Morris 2000):

Peacebuilding involves a full range of approaches, processes, and stages needed for transformation toward more sustainable, peaceful relationships and governance modes and structures. Peacebuilding includes building legal and human rights institutions as well as fair and effective governance and dispute resolution processes and systems. To be effective, peacebuilding activities requires careful and participatory planning, coordination among various efforts, and sustained commitments by both local and donor partners.

SECURITY SECTOR REFORM/SECURITY SYSTEM REFORM (SSR)

The *DAC Guidelines: Helping Prevent Violent Conflict* (OECD 2005a, p. 20) provide a comprehensive definition of security system reform:

Security system reform is another term used to describe the transformation of the “security system”—which includes all the actors, their roles, responsibilities and actions—working together to manage and operate the system in a manner that is more consistent with democratic norms and sound principles of good governance, and thus contributes to a well-functioning security framework.

The security system includes the following:

- Core security actors (armed forces, police etc)
- Security management and oversight bodies (e.g., Ministry of Defence)
- Justice and law enforcement institutions (e.g., judiciary)
- Non-statutory security forces (e.g., private security companies)

SMALL ARMS AND LIGHT WEAPONS (SALW)

According to the UN General Assembly (2005):

(a) “Small arms” are, broadly speaking, weapons designed for individual use. They include, inter alia, revolvers and self-loading pistols, rifles and carbines, sub-machine guns, assault rifles and light machine guns;

(b) “Light weapons” are, broadly speaking, weapons designed for use by two or three persons serving as a crew, although some may be carried and used by a single person. They include, inter alia, heavy machine guns, hand-held underbarrel and mounted grenade launchers, portable anti-aircraft guns, portable antitank guns, recoilless rifles, portable launchers of anti-tank missile and rocket systems, portable launchers of anti-aircraft missile systems, and mortars of a caliber of less than 100 millimetres.

SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT

A combination of economic growth and social progress that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs.²¹

Annex E Acronyms and Abbreviations

3D	Defence, development, and diplomacy
AfD	Arms for Development (UNDP)
ASEAN	Association of South-East Asian Nations
AVPI	Armed Violence and Poverty Initiative
AVPP	Armed Violence Prevention Programme
CCIC	Canadian Council for International Cooperation
CDPF	Country Development Programming Framework
CICAD	Inter-American Drug Abuse Control Commission
CICS	Centre for International Cooperation and Security
CIDA	Canadian International Development Agency
CIFP	Country Indicators for Foreign Policy
CIFTA	Inter-American Convention against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Ammunition, Explosives, and Other Related Materials
CPPC	Canadian Peacebuilding Coordinating Committee
CPDC	Conflict, Peace and Development Co-operation Network (OECD DAC)
DAC	Development Assistance Committee (OECD)
DDR	Disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration
DFAIT	Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (Canada)
DFID	Department for International Development (UK)
DND	Department of National Defence (Canada)
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
FCO	Foreign and Commonwealth Office (UK)
GCPP	Global Conflict Prevention Pool (UK)
JSSR	Working Group on Justice and Security Sector Reform (Canada)
MDG	Millennium Development Goal
MEDA	Mennonite Economic Development Associates
MOD	Ministry of Defence (UK)
NAP	National Action Plan for Arms Control and Management
NGO	Nongovernmental organization
OAS	Organization of American States
ODA	Official development assistance
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development

OSCE	Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
PoA	UN Programme of Action on small arms
PRSP	Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper
RBM	Results Based Management
RCMP	Royal Canadian Mounted Police
RISA	Research Initiative on Small Arms
SADC	Southern African Development Community
SALW	Small arms and light weapons
SCFAID	Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Development (Canada)
SRP-SALW	Sub-Regional Programme – Small Arms and Light Weapons
SSR	Security sector reform
START	Stabilization and Reconstruction Task Force (DFAIT)
UNDDA	United Nations Department for Disarmament Affairs
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNIDIR	United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research
WHO	World Health Organization

Notes

1. For definitions of armed violence, small arms and light weapons, and other terms used in this paper see Annex D, “Glossary of Terms.”
2. In its *Armed Conflict Report 2005*, Project Ploughshares noted, “5.5 per cent of the countries ranked as High Human Development states by the UN Human Development Index (HDI) 2004 experienced one or more armed conflicts during the ten-year period 1995-2004. This figure rises to 29.1 per cent of those ranked as Medium Human Development states. For Low Human Development states, there was almost as much likelihood (47.2 per cent) that they were at war during the decade as not.”
3. At a recent UN meeting (2006b), Nigeria, on behalf of the African Group of States, stated: “The Group requests that multilateral and regional financial institutions should include provisions for small arms and light weapons programmes, where appropriate, in the reconstruction and rehabilitation efforts in post-conflict areas, in the consolidation of governance issues, and in the area of strengthening legislation and improving operational capacity of law enforcement agencies on small arms and light weapons. We also request them to include those programmes in the promotion of socio-economic development agendas that include public awareness on small arms and light weapons.”
4. See, for example, the Kenyan “National Action Plan for Arms Control and Management,” July 13, 2006.
5. Perhaps the most prominent example was the idea of a “Peace Dividend”—the shifting of priorities and resources from security to development goals—at the end of the Cold War.
6. The Canadian statement at the Ministerial Summit was delivered by Paul Meyer, Ambassador and Permanent Representative to the United Nations and the Conference on Disarmament (June 7, 2006). Since the Summit an additional six states have endorsed the Declaration.
7. For examples of small arms activities across the conflict prevention-to-peacebuilding spectrum, see UNIDIR 2005, p. 12.
8. A Working Paper submitted jointly by the Netherlands and the United Kingdom to the Preparatory Committee for the Review Conference addressed “the negative humanitarian and development impact of the illicit manufacture, transfer and circulation of SALW and their excessive accumulation.” Identifying key challenges for national poverty reduction strategies, peacebuilding and peacekeeping, the paper noted (about the first of these): “The inclusion of SALW issues in development policy dialogues based on the stated priorities and policies

of the national government ensures that SALW control measures will be appropriate and sustainable. Indicators of success for such measures need to be developed and used in development reporting on both budget and sector support, and stand-alone projects. Good examples of this already exist in some countries” (UN 2006a).

9. In preparation for the Review Conference, the Royal Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Norway and the Norwegian Initiative on Small Arms Transfers (a civil society coalition) co-sponsored a two-day seminar in March 2006 on “Integrating Development into the UN Programme of Action Process.” The seminar brought together “over 70 experts from 23 different countries (17 of which were developing countries).” See Thurin 2006.

10. According to the “Biting the Bullet” report (2006), *Reviewing Action on Small Arms 2006 – Assessing the first five years of the UN Programme of Action*, other states in the South with “either a formal national action plan with relatively comprehensive scope, or an active strategy/set of strategies” are Botswana, Brazil, Costa Rica, Guatemala, and Paraguay.

11. As an example of the Canadian approach, a January 2005 meeting of the Human Security Network in Switzerland sponsored and chaired by Canada resulted in a Chair’s Non-Paper, “A People-Centred Approach to Small Arms: Core Principles.” The four principles identified in the non-paper were transfer controls, prevention of misuse by state officials and agents, regulation of civilian possession, and capacity building (assistance to states for implementation). At the UN Review Conference on small arms in 2006, Canada’s policy priorities included these four principles plus demand-side issues, security and destruction of surplus stockpiles, and the UN follow-up process.

12. The challenging experience in Afghanistan in particular could be the subject of a “case study” of the 3D approach that identifies departmental mandates, spending, cooperation, and progress, as well as risks and failures.

13. The objective of a meeting of states in Guatemala in late March 2007 is to have the Geneva Declaration endorsed by as many countries from Latin America and the Caribbean as possible and to obtain commitment on specific steps relevant to those countries.

14. See paragraph 3.a in “Development Cooperation and Conflict,” from World Bank 2001. For a discussion of this issue, and the recommendation that the World Bank “mainstream small arms-related issues into its policy and planning agenda,” see Small Arms Survey 2003, p. 152.

15. At the 2006 UN Review Conference on small arms, Barbados, on behalf of the Caricom states, objected to the paragraphs in the proposed Outcome Document that referred to ODA support for implementation of the PoA.

16. For further discussion of this point see Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue 2004, pp. 15-45.

17. For example, comments during a January 2007 meeting with staff of Mennonite Economic Development Associates (MEDA), which has micro-finance projects in Afghanistan and Haiti, among other states.

18. On this point it is worth noting that the SCFAID report also notes that a CIDA official “emphasized CIDA’s commitment to help address the challenges of security sector reform of the police, judicial system, and prison administration.”

19. This material is drawn from two resources prepared by World Vision Canada (2006a, 2006b) and produced with financial assistance from Canada’s Department of Foreign Affairs.

20. The convention prohibits all transfers of SALW within the region unless a Member State requests and obtains an exemption from the ECOWAS Secretariat. The Secretariat will decide the exemption using strict criteria that are based on the commitments of governments under relevant international law. The Convention also harmonizes national laws on private gun possession across the region, requiring users to obtain a renewable licence and to provide proof of a genuine need for gun possession.

21. Based on that used in the UN World Commission on Environment and Development, Brundtland Report (1987) *Our Common Future*.

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