Canada is a non-nuclear-weapon state, but it is not a nuclear-weapon-free state. What would it take to make Canada truly nuclear-weapon-free? Ploughshares researcher Bill Robinson explains.

Fifty years after the advent of the nuclear age, Canada still maintains a fundamentally ambiguous policy toward nuclear weapons. While we rule out acquiring our own nuclear weapons, oppose nuclear proliferation, and support, at least in principle, abolishing all nuclear weapons, we also oppose any steps toward eliminating the nuclear arsenals of our allies.

Despite the end of the Cold War, we continue to assert that Canada's own defence relies on the "nuclear umbrella" that the United States and other NATO allies have unfurled above us, and we continue to provide support for those weapons in a variety of ways. We supply political and diplomatic backing for NATO's nuclear policies, which still allow for the possible first-use of nuclear weapons, and we refuse to participate in the World Court's case now underway to examine the legality of the use or threatened use of nuclear weapons. In short, we oppose any reliance on nuclear weapons by non-allied countries, but we continue to treat those weapons as a useful even necessary element of our own defences and those of our allies.

This contradictory position undermines our efforts to prevent nuclear proliferation and promote nuclear disarmament. As long as we remain integrated into the nuclear weapons policies and capabilities of our allies, our policies will always be effectively pro-nuclear, no matter what we may claim our longterm policy objectives to be.

Project Ploughshares believes that Canada should become a nuclear-weapon-free zone (NWFZ). NWFZ status would not protect us from the consequences of a nuclear war, but it would make us more effective advocates for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament.

In one sense, Canada is already close to being nuclear-weapon-free. It is probable that nuclear weapons have entered Canada only once in the past two-and-a-half years, during the visit of a Trident missile submarine to Nanoose, British Columbia, in February 1995. But the dramatic drop in naval nuclear visits that has taken place in the past few years, like most of the other nuclear changes of recent years, occurred because the nuclear-weapon states changed their deployment policies, not because Ottawa decided to end the visits.

The new defence white paper, released in December 1994, was utterly silent on the role of nuclear weapons in Canadian defence policy.[1] Was this a sign that the government is embarrassed by its policy on nuclear weapons and wishes to avoid debate on the subject, or that it expects changes in this area and doesn't want to commit itself too publicly to the current policy? That probably would be too optimistic an interpretation. But the government's failure to spell out an explicit post-Cold War nuclear policy does mean that the window for future policy changes is open wider than it otherwise might have been.

Making Canada a NWFZ

Table 1 is a checklist of the steps required to make Canada a full NWFZ. A checkmark in the first column means that Canada already is committed by formal government policy to meet the indicated requirement. A checkmark in the second column means that Canada meets the requirement under normal, peacetime circumstances, whether or not a formal policy exists.

As a non-nuclear-weapon state member of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), Canada already has committed itself not to possess nuclear weapons, and not to export nuclear weapons or nuclear materials and technology for use in producing nuclear weapons. These commitments appear in Table 1 as steps one, three, and four. (As far as the NPT is concerned, step four forbids only those exports that might contribute to the development or production of nuclear weapons by non-nuclear-weapon states; exports to the acknowledged nuclear-weapon states the United States, Britain, France, China, and Russia are not forbidden. Current Canadian policy, however, applies to all states.)

What the NPT does not require, however, is step two, a commitment to forgo the deployment of nuclear weapons in Canada. It does not even ban the use of nuclear weapons by Canadian personnel, as long as those weapons remain owned and controlled by a nuclear-weapon state. For this reason, Canada was considered to be a non-nuclear-weapon state in good standing even when the nuclear-armed Genie anti-aircraft missiles were deployed at Canadian airfields for the use of Canadian NORAD forces. (The Genies were only retired and returned to the United States in 1984.)

A minimal NWFZ policy would require not only the existing NPT commitments but also several of the other steps listed in Table 1, including: step two, which prohibits the deployment of nuclear weapons in Canada; step five, which prohibits nuclear weapon tests in Canada; and possibly steps six and seven, which prohibit transporting nuclear weapons through Canadian territory.[2]

As the table demonstrates, Canada already has met most of these requirements, at least on an unofficial, normal peacetime basis. Few have been enshrined in formal policy, however, so even this minimal nuclear-weapon-free status can disappear at any time, as it does whenever a nuclear-armed submarine sails into Nanoose.

The NWFZ Project Ploughshares advocates would be more comprehensive, and would add all of the remaining steps in the table.[3] Canada already meets some of these requirements on a normal, peacetime basis, and recent changes, notably the cancellation of cruise missile testing in May 1994, have brought Canada closer to full compliance. Nonetheless, as the following point-by-point review demonstrates, there is still a long way to go before Canada can call itself a truly nuclear-weapon-free country.

No nuclear weapons

Under normal peacetime conditions, Canada already complies with this requirement: currently no nuclear weapons are deployed in Canada. But arrangements to permit nuclear-armed American bombers to disperse to Canadian airfields in the event of an alert do exist, according to at least one report.[4] The government has not confirmed that these arrangements exist, but neither will it state that it would not permit the dispersal of bombers to Canadian airfields. Such deployments would not be permitted in a NWFZ.

No production/export of nuclear weapons

Canadian policy already forbids the export of uranium, nuclear reactors, or other nuclear-related material or technology to any country except when they are under international safeguards designed to prevent their use in developing or producing nuclear weapons.[5] There is considerable reason to doubt the effectiveness of this policy in practice, however. As the accompanying article by Owen Wilkes points out, Canadian-designed reactors have contributed directly or indirectly to the nuclear programs of every nuclear-weapon state except China. Canada's nuclear export policy became more stringent in the mid-1970s, partly in response to India's development of nuclear weapons using plutonium from a Canadian-supplied reactor, but even under the current policy the risk of contributing to proliferation remains.[6] In 1992, the parliamentary Sub-Committee on Arms Export recommended that "the nature, results and controls over nuclear-related materials, systems, technology and components be the subject of a parliamentary study."[7] To date, however, no such study has been undertaken.

No testing of nuclear weapons

Government policy already rules out nuclear testing in Canada; this prohibition will likely be enshrined in law in 1996 with the expected completion of a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.

No transit of nuclear weapons

As noted previously, nuclear-armed submarines continue to visit Nanoose, BC on rare occasions. The policy permitting visits to Canadian ports was reaffirmed in 1991 when the government exempted such visits from public environmental review.[8] At the time, then-opposition leader Jean Chretien came out in support of a public review of the visits; Prime Minister Chretien, however, has shown no interest in such a review. Submarines also regularly pass through Canadian territorial waters in the Strait of Juan de Fuca and elsewhere; in most such cases, however, international law is on the side of the submarines there is little that the government could do to stop them even if it were inclined to try.

Nuclear-armed bombers do not enter Canadian airspace under normal circumstances. Arrangements do exist, however, to permit bombers and their supporting tanker aircraft to operate in Canadian airspace in the event of an alert.[9] Many of the famous "fail-safe" points, the locations where bombers on airborne alert would circle awaiting attack orders, are in Canadian airspace.[10] These arrangements would have to be terminated for Canada to become a true NWFZ.

No support of nuclear weapons

The final category, nuclear support, covers a wide variety of activities. So far, the export of nuclear weapon delivery vehicles (ballistic missiles, bombers, etc.) and their components is limited only slightly. Under the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), a voluntary system of export controls subscribed to by most of the industrial states, Canada restricts the export of an extensive list of components and technologies for ballistic and cruise missile systems with ranges greater than 300 kilometres.

The MTCR does not apply, however, to exports to other high-technology countries, including the existing nuclear-weapon states. Canada continues to permit the export of nuclear and dual-capable nuclear/conventional delivery system components to friendly nuclear-weapon states. In recent years such exports have become rare, but some still occur. Known recent contracts, such as electroluminescent display panels for Trident ballistic missile submarines and a range of parts for F-15E, F-16, and Tornado dual-capable fighter aircraft, have tended to be fairly minor. The MTCR list does not cover bombers and dual-capable aircraft, but it might provide a useful starting point for defining the kind of components and technologies that should not be exported to any nuclear-weapon state or aspirant.

Now that cruise missile testing has been cancelled, Canada is no longer involved in nuclear delivery vehicle testing. The government does not have a policy against participating in similar weapons tests in the future, however, and American nuclear bomber training flights continue to take place. Some of the British, Dutch, and German low-level training flights in Nitassinan (Labrador-Quebec) also might involve simulated nuclear delivery missions.

Canada also hosts or participates in the operations of a wide variety of nuclear-weapon support systems. Arrangements exist, for example, to allow tanker aircraft to operate from Canadian airfields in the event of an alert.[11] It is likely that we continue to host several of the Greenpine radio sites, which are designed to relay attack orders to airborne nuclear bombers.[12] Canada's continued participation in the North American Aerospace Defence Command (NORAD) integrates Canadian air defence forces into the strategic defence elements of the American nuclear warfighting capability. The government's decision announced in the recent white paper to begin participating in ballistic missile defence research with the US was a significant step toward deeper Canadian involvement in strategic defence activities.

Finally, Canada continues to provide political and diplomatic support for nuclear weapons, voting against calls at the United Nations, for example, for the nuclear-weapon states to adopt no-first-use policies.

Rethinking the bomb

The 50th year of the nuclear age is an appropriate time to start rethinking Canada's position on the bomb. As long as we remain, in effect, a part of the nuclear-armed world, our actions will continue to lend legitimacy to the possession of nuclear weapons. By reinforcing the idea that it is appropriate for non-nuclear-weapon states to seek the protection of a "nuclear umbrella," we increase the danger that nuclear weapons will continue to proliferate, that efforts to eliminate them will fail, and that these weapons will be used again some day.

Canada doesn't need a "nuclear umbrella"; abolishing nuclear weapons is the best way to protect Canada from nuclear war. Becoming a true nuclear-weapon-free zone would be a step in the right direction.

[1] Defence White Paper 1994, Department of National Defence, 1994. By contrast, the previous defence white paper acknowledged explicitly the role of nuclear weapons (Challenge and Commitment: A Defence Policy for Canada, 1987, pp. 17-19).

[2] Both of the main existing international NWFZs the Latin American nuclear-weapon-free zone and the South Pacific nuclear-weapon-free zone leave the question of nuclear transits to the discretion of individual member states.

[3] Ernie Regehr, Bill Robinson, and Simon Rosenblum, Making Canada a Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone, Ploughshares Working Paper 87-1, 1987.

[4] William Arkin and Richard Fieldhouse, Nuclear Battlefields: Global Links in the Arms Race, 1985, p. 78.

[5] See, for example, Canada's nuclear non-proliferation policy, Department of External Affairs, 1985.

[6] Bill Robinson, "Does Canada Export the Bomb?" Ploughshares Monitor, December 1992, pp. 18-20.

[7] The Future of Canadian Military Goods Production and Export, Standing Committee on External Affairs and International Trade, Sub-Committee on Arms Export, October 1992, pp. 23-24.

[8] "Ministers announce measures regarding allied nuclear vessels in Canadian waters," News Release 44/91, 30 October 1991.

[9] The existence of these arrangements was confirmed in the 1987 white paper, Challenge and Commitment, p. 18.

[10] Bill Robinson, "Radio Activity in the North," Ploughshares Monitor, March 1988, pp. 22-23.

[11] Challenge and Commitment, p. 18.

[12] "Radio Activity in the North," pp. 22-23.

Table 1

A 12-step program for making Canada
a nuclear-weapon-free zone

Step                            Formal policy     Normal practice

No nuclear weapons

1  possessed by Canada                *                 *
2  deployed in Canada                                   *

No production/export of nuclear weapons

3  nuclear explosive devices          *                 *
4  nuclear materials/technology       *                 *?

No testing of nuclear weapons

5  nuclear tests in Canada            *                 *

No transit of nuclear weapons

6  nuclear-armed naval vessels
7  nuclear-armed aircraft                               *

No support of nuclear weapons

8  delivery vehicle export
9  delivery vehicle testing                             *
10 nuclear weapon training
11 nuclear support systems
12 nuclear policy support